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Introduction 
This doctoral thesis is a collection of three empirical essays which explore the underlying 
factors affecting households’ financial decisions. We perform our analyses using three different 
datasets under the light of three different perspectives. We first look at several wealth decisions that 
can be critical to households’ financial wellbeing. We then explore the relationship between 
financial knowledge, financial satisfaction and attitudes towards cheating. We further investigate 
new potential determinants of saving behavior. Overall, the studies illustrated in the following 
chapters underline one common finding: financial education plays a key role in determining 
economic decisions.  
The first chapter, titled “The Role of Financial Literacy and Money Education on Wealth 
Decisions” is a joint work with Alessandro Bucciol and Marcella Veronesi. In this research we 
investigate the relationship between financial education and a wide range of wealth outcomes 
including retirement planning and portfolio allocation. We consider two specific channels of 
financial education: basic and advanced financial literacy acquired when adults, and money 
education received from the family during adolescence. We use panel data from the Dutch DNB 
Household Survey and from an additional module on financial literacy. Our findings indicate that 
advanced financial literacy is positively correlated with stock holding and with the ownership of 
financial assets. When money education received from the family during adolescence is included in 
the analysis, we find that it also plays an important, though different, role in explaining financial 
decisions. In particular, money education is more likely to be associated with safer investments. In 
addition, we observe some gender differences, with males more affected than females by both types 
of financial education as regards wealth decisions. Our results highlight the importance of 
improving financial knowledge, not only through proper educational programs when adults, but also 
in the family environment during adolescence, where teens can learn positive attitudes towards 
money that are maintained throughout their life. 
The second chapter, which is titled “Does financial satisfaction affect attitudes towards 
cheating?” is a joint work with Viola Angelini, on which I worked during my visiting at the Faculty 
of Economics and Business of the University of Groningen. In this research we study potential 
determinants of individuals’ attitudes towards dishonesty using Dutch data from the Longitudinal 
Internet Studies for the Social Sciences panel. We consider both dishonesty towards the 
government, such as benefits fraud or tax evasion, and other forms of unethical behavior, such as 
fare evasion, property stealing and bribery. We focus on financial satisfaction, defined 
as satisfaction with one's present financial situation, as a relevant factor affecting cheating attitudes. 
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We rely on the role of financial literacy in influencing individuals’ financial satisfaction to estimate 
the causal effect of financial wellbeing on consumers’ misbehaviors. Our findings indicate that the 
financial satisfaction is a significant determinant of cheating towards the government. By contrast, 
an improvement in financial satisfaction does not make individuals less likely to justify stealing 
property and fare evasion: these components of cheating are mainly affected by personal 
characteristics and attitudes towards money. Most importantly, we find a strong and significant role 
of risk aversion in reducing the acceptability of these unethical actions. Interestingly, we find that 
both financial satisfaction and risk aversion are significant drivers of tolerance towards bribery. 
Therefore, decisions to behave dishonestly do not result only from financial advantages: financial 
satisfaction and risk aversion have different and independent impacts on individuals’ tolerance 
towards dishonesty.  
The third chapter, “Saving behavior: Financial Socialization and Self-Control” focuses on a 
specific dimension of financial behavior: saving decisions. In doing our research we use novel 
household data from the National Financial Well-Being Survey for the United States. We look at 
financial socialization, measured as exposure during adolescence to financial concepts across 
different dimensions, including discussions with family about financial issues, teachings from 
parents on how to be smart shoppers and experiential learning through allowances or saving 
accounts. We hypothesize that financial socialization affects saving behavior as well as personal 
self-control. Thus, we conduct a mediation analysis to decompose the effect of financial 
socialization on saving habits into a direct and an indirect component through self-control. We 
further analyze the effect of financial socialization and self-control on the decisions to save through 
specific financial products, such as checking accounts, educational loans, insurances, retirement 
accounts and financial assets, in a multivariate framework. Finally, we explore how financial 
socialization and self-control are related with the decisions to transfer money automatically into 
retirement and non-retirement saving accounts. Our results show that financial socialization does 
not only have a direct positive effect on the probability of saving money as a regular habit, but also 
an indirect positive one by means of increasing self-control. However, the relevance of financial 
socialization depends on the type of financial product being examined. Specifically, people who 
received financial education at home, either through teachings about money or by direct exposure to 
financial instruments, are more likely to hold safe financial assets like insurances or retirement 
accounts. Interestingly, we find that both financial socialization and self-control are significantly 
and positively related with the decision to automatically transfer money to savings accounts. 
Overall, we provide evidence of a strong association between financial socialization, self-control 
and saving behavior. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL LITERACY 
AND MONEY EDUCATION 
ON WEALTH DECISIONS 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the relationship between financial education and a wide range of wealth decisions 
using DNB Household Survey data and a recent approach proposed by Lewbel (2012). We consider 
two channels of financial education: basic and advanced financial literacy acquired during 
adulthood, and money education received from the family during adolescence. We find that 
advanced financial literacy positively affects the ownership of financial and risky assets, whereas 
money education and the propensity to invest in risky assets and holding debt are negatively related. 
We also find evidence of a gender gap, with males’ wealth decisions more affected by higher levels 
of financial literacy. Overall, our results highlight the complementarity between the two channels, 
with financial literacy increasing the propensity to invest in risky assets and money education in 
safer assets. Our findings underline the importance of acquiring financial education not only 
through proper educational programs when adults, but also in the family environment during 
adolescence, where teens can learn positive attitudes towards money that are maintained throughout 
their life. 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: D14; I22; G41 
Keywords: Financial literacy; Money education from family; Wealth decisions; Gender difference. 
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1. Introduction 
A growing strand of literature indicates that “more informed consumers are better 
consumers” (Hathaway and Khatiwada, 2008), as individuals with higher levels of financial 
education are more likely to participate in financial markets, invest in stocks, and plan for 
retirement, which is important to stimulate the accumulation of wealth (Christelis et al., 2010; Van 
Rooij et al., 2011a, 2011b; Alessie et al., 2011). Overall, financial education is positively associated 
with many economic outcomes. However, the level of financial education is low in many countries, 
especially among women, the young, people living in rural areas, with low incomes and low 
educational attainments (Lusardi et al., 2010; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011). Improving the level of 
financial education is today a primary issue; this is why, in recent years, governments have 
introduced programs aimed to improve financial education. 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between two specific channels of financial 
education (financial literacy and money education) and a wide range of wealth decisions such as 
retirement planning and portfolio allocation.  
We use 2005-2017 panel data from the Dutch DNB Household Survey including an 
additional module on financial literacy. Following Van Rooij et al. (2011b) to measure financial 
literacy, we create two indexes (basic and advanced financial literacy) from sixteen questions on 
financial topics included in the additional module. We use these indexes in our analysis to capture 
individuals’ objective knowledge of financial concepts. Following Bucciol and Veronesi (2014) to 
measure money education, we consider teachings on saving received from the family during 
adolescence. The money education variable provides information about the role of parental 
education in stimulating a good economic behavior throughout life. 
We expect both financial literacy and money education to correlate with saving and the 
accumulation of wealth, but through two different channels: by means of investment in riskier 
assets (financial literacy) or safer assets (money education). As regards the first dimension, 
financial decisions require the capacity to operate with new products and services which are 
available on the present economic environment. Individuals who are more financially 
knowledgeable may find it easier to deal with complex financial instruments and handle risky 
assets, as through financial literacy they develop greater skills at managing money. On the other 
hand, money education at young age may affect time preferences, elevating individuals’ focus on 
financial planning and on the achievement of future savings goals (Lührmann et al., 2018). We 
consider parents as instrumental in influencing children’s awareness about the importance of 
money, as well as their propensity to protect themselves against future financial losses. For this 
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reason, individuals who received money education at young age may be more willing to choose 
safer investments assets later in life.  
In particular, we ask the following three main research questions: (i) What is the relationship 
between wealth decisions and financial literacy? (ii) Is money education received from the family 
during adolescence related to wealth decisions when adults, and how does this effect compare with 
the effect of financial literacy? (iii) Are there any gender differences in the response of males and 
females to financial literacy and money education on wealth decisions? 
This research contributes to the existing literature in three main directions. First, we identify 
the association between financial literacy, money education and a wide set of wealth outcomes 
using a recent approach developed by Lewbel (2012). We consider the fact that financial education 
may not be exogenous to wealth outcomes, and so that estimates can be biased due to omitted 
variables and reverse causality. Given the well-known difficulty of finding reliable instruments for 
financial education, the implementation of the Lewbel’s approach is particularly valuable in this 
type of analysis. By using this approach, we compare our findings with those from the existing 
literature, which mostly exploits standard instruments to address the endogeneity of financial 
literacy.1 We use Lewbel’s approach to investigate the relationship between financial literacy and a 
broad set of wealth outcomes. We look at individuals’ saving, retirement planning, the size of 
financial assets, the separate ownership of safe or risky assets, and debt holding. Studying all these 
dimensions at the same time is important to provide additional evidence on the effect of financial 
education across several wealth decisions, as well as assessing the dimensions on which this effect 
is more relevant. 
Second, we contribute to the literature by comparing for the first time the role of financial 
literacy in shaping financial decisions with the role of money education received during 
adolescence from the family. Money education is part of the process of financial socialization, by 
which individuals obtain “skills, information and attitudes to maximize their ability in the financial 
marketplace” (Ward, 1974). We consider teachings on money and saving received at age 12-16 
from the family, as part of money education. The positive effects of money education may partially 
derive from building better financial knowledge, which in turn stimulates better financial decisions 
during adulthood. However, children’s progress toward financial independence is also directly 
driven by parental teachings (Serido and Deenanath, 2016), with parents having strong influence on 
children’s socialization and moral development – especially at young ages (Houser et al., 2016). 
Whilst more knowledgeable individuals may have a clearer picture on how to handle their money, 
 
1 See Fernandes et al. (2014) and Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) for a review of the studies on the causal effect of 
financial education on financial behavior, along with the instruments used in the empirical analysis.  
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accumulating more wealth and avoiding taking up excessive debt, individuals who grew up learning 
the value of money may also develop positive attitudes toward saving, acquiring knowledge, values 
and attitudes on consumption that may be maintained throughout their life. Thus, it seems plausible 
that our measure of money education directly affects respondents’ financial attitudes, aspirations 
and behavior, rather than their willingness to learn financial concepts. 
Third, we investigate whether the effects of financial literacy and money education on 
wealth decisions differ by gender. The existing literature documents a gender gap, with males on 
average more financially literate than females (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008). This gap partly 
explains the observed difference in stock holding (Almenberg and Dreber, 2015). We study the 
gender gap on financial literacy as well as money education over several wealth decisions including 
risky asset holdings, saving, and retirement planning. 
Our findings show that advanced financial literacy positively affects the ownership of 
financial and risky assets, whereas money education received from the family during adolescence 
plays a different role in explaining financial decision. In particular, we find a negative correlation 
between money education and the propensity to invest in risky assets and holding debts when 
adults. 
Overall, our results highlight the complementarity between the two channels, with financial 
literacy increasing the propensity to invest in risky assets and money education in safer assets. Our 
results also underline the importance of acquiring financial education not only through proper 
educational programs when adults, but also in the family environment during adolescence, where 
teens can learn positive attitudes towards money that are maintained throughout their life. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the 
literature on financial literacy and family socialization, describing their effects on individuals’ 
financial decisions. Section 3 describes the data we use in our study and the summary statistics, 
together with the research hypotheses. Section 4 reports the econometric analysis and the results. 
Section 5 discusses our main findings and concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
This study nests two streams of literature, on financial literacy and on money education 
received from the family. We discuss them in Sub-sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. 
 
2.1. Financial literacy 
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A growing body of literature emphasizes the crucial role of financial literacy in influencing 
investors’ economic behavior, and especially stock holding (e.g., Christelis et al., 2010; Van Rooij 
et al., 2011b) and retirement planning (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Lusardi, 
2009; Stango and Zinman, 2009; Alessie et al., 2011). Financial literacy affects market 
participation, as individuals who are more financially literate display a greater propensity to invest 
in stocks (Christelis et al., 2010; Van Rooij et al., 2011b) and are more likely to choose mutual 
funds with lower fees (Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton, 2008). Financial literacy is also related to 
wealth accumulation and retirement decisions. Lusardi (2009) finds that a large share of Americans 
arrives close to retirement with little or no wealth. Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a) relate the lack in 
retirement planning to financial illiteracy. Similarly, Alessie et al. (2011) study the relationship 
between financial literacy and retirement planning among the Dutch population; according to their 
findings, individuals with low levels of financial literacy find it difficult to form expectations about 
future replacement rates and they do not know at what age to retire. Their study also shows the 
positive effect of financial knowledge on retirement planning, a finding that has also been 
emphasized by Stango and Zinman (2009). Moreover, respondents with more confidence in their 
financial knowledge exhibit higher propensity to plan for retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008). 
Planners display greater levels of patience and diligence in their economic behaviors; these factors 
are generally associated with having low discount rates, which contribute to increase saving and, in 
turn, retirement wealth (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007b). 
Van Rooij et al. (2011b) investigate the relationship between financial literacy and 
households net worth and find a positive relationship between these two dimensions; consistent 
with this result, Behrman et al. (2012) show that financial literacy is positively and significantly 
associated with total net wealth. In the United States, Brown et al. (2016) investigate the impact of 
educational reforms aimed at increasing financial literacy on debt behavior of young people. In the 
decade after completing high school, students exposed to the reforms appear to improve debt savvy, 
in that they increase the prevalence of credit reports without increasing reliance on nonstudent debt. 
The relationship between financial literacy and debt-related outcomes has also been investigated by 
Stango and Zinman (2009), who show that financially illiterate individuals are more likely to 
borrow and to accumulate lower amounts of wealth.  
Despite the rapid growth of interest in issues surrounding financial literacy, rigorous 
evidence of the impact of financial education remains scant in developing countries, where people 
are highly exposed to heavy shocks without having proper insurance or mitigation instruments 
(Kaiser and Menkhoff, 2017). Notable exceptions include Cole et al. (2011) and Sayinzoga et al. 
(2016). In particular, Sayinzoga et al. (2016) investigate the impact of an intensive one-week 
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training on financial behavior of a sample of Rwandan smallholders and find a positive effect of the 
intervention on savings. Moreover, the financial training induces non-borrowing farmers to take up 
loans and enhances the start-up of new income-generating activities. Their results strongly motivate 
providing financial literacy as an effective policy for targeting individual financial behavior. 
Improving financial education may also be beneficial at the macro level. Grohmann et al. 
(2018) examine the link between financial literacy and financial inclusion in a cross-country setting, 
which allows to control for several institutional and financial characteristics. Their results document 
a significant and positive effect of financial literacy on financial inclusion, measured as access to 
and use of financial services; in turn, better financial inclusion could be an important instrument of 
financial development. However, whether financial literacy has a causal effect on financial choices 
is still an open question (Brown et al., 2016; Brugiavini et al., 2019). 
To measure financial literacy, Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) added an experimental module to 
several national surveys. The module includes three questions on interest compounding, the effects 
of inflation and risk diversification, which are now commonly used in the literature to assess 
individuals’ financial knowledge. They find that many individuals lack the most basic economic 
concepts needed to make saving and investment decisions. The lack of financial literacy is widely 
documented in the United States (Bernheim, 1995) as well as in other countries including Australia, 
Japan, and many European countries (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011), and particularly pronounced 
among women (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008). Hsu (2016) tries to motivate this gender gap, 
suggesting that women may be less interested than men on these topics. In addition, Lusardi and 
Mitchell (2011, 2014) find that financial literacy is higher for middle-age people, while older people 
tend to overstate their level of financial knowledge, compared to young respondents. Workers and 
people with higher educational attainments, especially in science and math, are generally more 
financially literate. Finally, people know more about inflation and risk diversification, if these have 
been experienced in their countries.  
The generalized poor performance of citizens on financial literacy surveys conducted 
worldwide (Huston, 2010) has intensified the need for financial education; to address this issue, in 
recent years, several governments have established educational programs aimed to improve 
financial knowledge and most of them have shown to be effective (Otto and Webley, 2015; 
Sherraden et al., 2009). For instance, Bernheim et al. (2001) analyses a cross-sectional survey from 
the United States, and find that secondary schools students, who were exposed to a financial 
educational program, increase the accumulation of assets over time. Similarly, Lührmann et al. 
(2015) examine the impact of a short financial education program on teenagers in German high 
schools and show that the training significantly increases their interest in, and knowledge of, 
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financial matters, especially their ability to properly assess the riskiness of assets. However, a recent 
meta-analysis conducted by Fernandes et al. (2014) reveals that interventions to improve financial 
literacy explain only a small part of the variance in financial behaviors. The effects of financial 
literacy interventions are even weaker in low-income samples and decay over time. In a similar 
work, Kaiser and Menkhoff (2017) show that the effectiveness of financial education is influenced 
by the peculiarities of the specific intervention, notably the characteristics of the target group. 
Indeed, financial education interventions are less effective for low-income clients as well as in low 
and lower-middle income economies, possibly because of the disadvantageous institutional 
circumstances in these countries. Additionally, Miller et al. (2015) argue that financial education 
interventions have a positive impact in such outcomes where individuals have the ability to exert 
greater control, including savings and record keeping, but do less well in preventing negative 
outcomes such as loan defaults.  
 
2.2. Money education from family 
The role of financial literacy in supporting individuals’ economic behavior during their life 
has long been recognized. However, the family also plays an important role in influencing 
individuals’ financial behavior during childhood, through the mechanism of “parent-child 
socialization”. According to Serido and Deenanath (2016), children’s progress toward financial 
independence is driven by parental teachings, which are an informal source of financial education. 
Danes (1994) and Shim et al. (2010) find that the role of parents in predicting children’s financial 
behavior is substantially larger than the role of other socialization agents, including peers and 
school; consistent with these results, Sundarasen et al. (2016) find that money management of 
young adults is strongly influenced by parental norms. Similar findings are also reported by Mimura 
et al. (2015): among college students, those who describe their parents as an important source of 
financial information generally exhibit better financial practices. 
There are different ways to introduce children to the value of money; parents actively 
influence their children to make better decisions either through practical teachings or through 
parental communication. According to Feather (1991), giving children some pocket money is a 
useful tool to grant them their own independence in the transition toward adulthood. Similarly, 
Fornero et al. (2018) investigate whether providing children a habit in managing pocket money 
could “generate a familiarity with good financial behaviors, like planning, which are maintained 
later in life”; in their research, they show the positive effect of pocket money on the “self-assessed” 
financial knowledge measured in adulthood. In further support of such discussions, parental 
socialization has been shown to predict positive financial mental outcomes like controllability and 
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efficacy, which in turn are associated with healthy financial behaviors (Shim et al., 2015). Parental 
socialization may also vary by gender: for example, Gutter et al. (2010) investigate a national 
sample of emerging adults in college and find that females discuss with their parents about money 
more often than do young males, and therefore they are more strongly influenced by their parents. 
Bucciol and Veronesi (2014) study the effect of different parental teaching strategies 
received during childhood on the propensity to save and the amount of money saved in the adult 
age; they find that young adults are more likely to accumulate money if they received teachings on 
how to manage their wealth during childhood. In a different sample, Brown and Taylor (2016) 
examine the economic behavior of individuals over time and find that having saved as a child is 
positively associated with the probability of saving, as well as the amount saved on a regular basis, 
during early adulthood. The development of saving habits throughout life has also been investigated 
by Otto and Webley (2015); in a sample of British students, they find that those who have learned 
to budget during childhood become more autonomous in adult age and find it easier to save later on. 
Moreover, in a situation of income constraint, they are more likely to save by adjusting 
expenditures, rather than using other strategies to acquire money (i.e., working or asking parents 
additional money). Money education received in young age is also linked with some measures of 
future orientation; according to Bucciol and Zarri (2019), individuals who received teachings to 
save during childhood are more likely to evaluate the consequence of their behavior on longer time 
periods. 
Our paper contributes to this literature by comparing for the first time the role played on 
wealth decisions by financial literacy acquired during adulthood and money education received 
during childhood, and by analyzing how they are related not only with saving but also with 
retirement planning, investments in financial assets, the ownership of risky and safe assets, and debt 
holding.  
 
3. Data and research hypotheses 
We use longitudinal data from the DNB Household Survey (from now on, DHS), a 
household survey conducted annually since 1993 by CentERdata and sponsored by the Dutch 
National Bank. The DHS collects information about work, housing, economic situation, personal 
and psychological characteristics on a representative sample of the Dutch population. Occasionally, 
special modules on specific topics are added to the main survey. 
In this analysis, we pay particular attention to the 2005 module on financial literacy (for 
details see Van Rooij et al., 2011b). The module contains sixteen questions meant to assess general 
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understanding of financial topics. Following Van Rooij et al. (2011b, 2012), we split the questions 
into basic and advanced literacy and perform two separate factor analyses on the two sets of 
questions (five and eleven, respectively) to build two well established indexes of basic and 
advanced literacy (their correlation is 0.435);2 see Appendix A.1 for details. Another important 
dimension in our study comes from two questions on the general questionnaire related to teachings 
received at age 12-16 from the family. The questions regard having received advice on how to 
budget and encouragement to save. Given the high correlation (0.653) between the answers to the 
two questions, we combine them into one variable representing the advice on money management 
received in early life from parents or grandparents, which we label as a measure of “money 
education from family”. See Appendix A.2 for details. The three questions on financial literacy and 
money education describe what we call “financial education”. 
We focus on the DHS waves since year 2005, as information about financial literacy was not 
available before, and we restrict our sample to adults older than 18. Our final sample consists of 
1,017 respondents in charge of household finances for a total of 6,404 observations with complete 
information from the 2005-2017 waves of DHS. 
 
3.1. Research hypotheses 
The measures of financial literacy capture basic and advanced knowledge of financial 
matters acquired during adulthood, while the measure of money education informs on whether the 
respondent received teachings on saving from the family during adolescence. We expect both 
financial literacy and money education to correlate with economic decisions. However, given the 
existing evidence from the literature (e.g., Christelis et al., 2010; Van Rooij et al., 2011b; Bucciol 
and Veronesi, 2014; Otto and Webley, 2015; Brown and Taylor, 2016), we also expect financial 
literacy and money education to be more likely associated with riskier and safer investments, 
respectively. Specifically, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
 
Hyp.1. Basic and advanced financial literacy make an individual more familiar with the 
financial environment, and are therefore positively correlated with the accumulation of 
saving and financial assets. 
 
2 The module incorporates the so-called “Big Three” questions on financial literacy selected by Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2011) following the principles of simplicity, relevance, brevity and capacity to differentiate. We obtain two factors in 
line with the indexes of financial literacy if we consider one single factor analysis. 
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Hyp.2. Advanced financial literacy makes an individual better able to understand the 
characteristics of some complex assets, and is therefore positively correlated with the 
investment in risky (and plausibly more complex) assets. 
Hyp.3. Money education from the family increases the propensity to save for a rainy day and 
protects an individual’s capital from abrupt changes in value. 
 
3.2 Outcome variables 
We consider six outcome variables related to wealth decisions, which are explained 
hereafter. Our first outcome of interest is saving defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
individual is able to save some money, and zero otherwise.3 According to Lopez et al. (2000), more 
educated investors are able to take better decisions about saving since they display greater 
knowledge of financial markets. 
The second variable is retirement planning, which comes from the additional module on 
financial literacy; it is equal to one if the respondent states to have thought about retirement, and 
zero otherwise.4 Exploiting US survey data, Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a) find that thinking about 
retirement is strongly correlated with financial literacy. Their findings support the importance of 
improving financial education, a result that is particularly relevant also for the Netherlands. Indeed 
Alessie et al. (2011) find a positive effect of financial literacy on retirement planning in the 
Netherlands.  
The third dependent variable used in our analysis is (the inverse hyperbolic sine of) financial 
assets. This variable considers the amount invested in safe and risky assets owned by the 
individuals. Financial assets are a measure of “money at hand”, whose values come from their 
contractual claims. 
The remaining outcome variables used in our analysis are dummy variables representing 
assets holding. The variable safe assets is equal to one if the household holds checking accounts, 
deposits and other safe ways to invest money, and zero otherwise; the variable risky assets is equal 
to one if the household holds stocks, mutual funds, put or call options, and zero otherwise (as in 
Van Rooij et al., 2011b). The last variable in our analysis is called debt, and it is equal to one if the 
household has private loans (apart from home mortgages), extended lines of credit and outstanding 
debts, zero otherwise. As suggested by Lusardi and Tufano (2015), debt literacy is very low 
especially among women, the elderly and those with low income: this result is consistent with the 
 
3 The exact wording of the question is “How is the financial situation of your household at the moment?”. Our dummy 
variable is set to one if the answer is “some money is saved” or “a lot of money can be saved”. 
4 The exact wording of the question is “How much have you thought about your retirement?”. Our dummy variable is 
set to one if the answer is “a lot” or “some”. 
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evidence on financial knowledge. Interestingly, the authors find a strong relationship between debt 
literacy and debt loads; individuals without debt knowledge are more likely to borrow at a larger 
cost and to be involved in more expensive transactions. Their analysis suggests that a large share of 
the costs paid by investors is caused by their lack of financial knowledge. 
 
3.3. Summary statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the variables we use in our study. The average age 
in our sample is 58, about 38% are female, and the majority of the sample lives with a partner 
(67%). About 49% of respondents are workers, 58% have a high school diploma, and about 15% 
have college education. The average household net income is about 35,000 euros per year.5 As 
regards financial education, the average level of basic financial literacy (0.89 out of 1) is 
statistically higher than that of advanced financial literacy (0.65).6 About 70% received advice on 
how to manage their money during adolescence. The two indexes on financial literacy are highly, 
though not extremely, correlated with each other (the correlation is 0.435) and virtually 
uncorrelated with money education (the polychoric correlation is -0.035 for basic literacy, and -
0.047 for advanced literacy). In our sample, about 58% are able to save some money, 72% have 
thought about retirement, most individuals invest in safe assets (about 89%) rather than in risky 
assets (26%), and about 14% have some debts. The average value of financial assets owned by an 
individual is about 50,000 euros. Interestingly, financial literacy is higher in portfolios made of safe 
and risky assets (with or without the inclusion of debt), while money education is more frequent in 
portfolios made of safe assets only, or safe and risky assets – but without debt.7 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
 Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
     
Financial outcomes     
Saving (d) 0.585 0.493 0 1 
Retirement planning (d) 0.721 0.449 0 1 
Financial assets 50,183.5 111,155.2 -97,660.84 3,642,061 
Safe (d) 0.890 0.313 0 1 
Risky (d) 0.258 0.438 0 1 
Debt (d) 0.144 0.351 0 1 
     
Financial education     
Basic financial literacy 0.891 0.191 0 1 
 
5 Monetary values are corrected for inflation and reported to 2015 prices using Dutch CPI index. Source: 
http://stats.oecd.org/. See Appendix A.5. for further information on the income variable. 
6 Statistical t-test on the mean comparison: 72.205; p-value <0.01. 
7 Appendix A.6 reports average financial education separately for each combination of assets. 
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Advanced financial literacy 0.651 0.286 0 1 
Money education from family (d) 0.704 0.456 0 1 
     
Control variables     
Risk averse 0.675 0.192 0 1 
Future orientation 0.525 0.137 0 1 
Female (d) 0.382 0.486 0 1 
Age 58.302 13.668 24 90 
With partner (d) 0.672 0.470 0 1 
Household size -1 1.239 1.212 0 7 
If children (d) 0.271 0.444 0 1 
Worker (d) 0.491 0.500 0 1 
Retired (d) 0.325 0.468 0 1 
High school (d) 0.582 0.493 0 1 
College (d) 0.148 0.356 0 1 
Income 35,376.54 40,703.08 161.858 2,560,580 
Poor health (d) 0.248 0.432 0 1 
     
Notes: The final sample includes 6,404 observations on 1,017 respondents interviewed between 2005 and 
2017. (d) indicates that the variable is a dummy. 
 
4. Econometric analysis  
We split the analysis in three parts. First, we investigate the relationship between basic and 
advanced financial literacy and our financial outcomes (Sub-section 4.1). Second, we study whether 
money education received during adolescence from the family is related to wealth decisions when 
adults, and how this effect compares with the effect of financial literacy (Sub-section 4.2). We 
conclude the section with a discussion of gender differences on the role played by financial literacy 
and money education on wealth decisions (Sub-section 4.3). 
We estimate the following equation: 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑊𝑖𝛽1 + 𝑍𝑖,𝑡𝛽2 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛽3 + 𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝛽4+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is one of the dependent variables representing the financial outcomes of respondent i at 
time t (t = 2005, …, 2017) described in Section 3 such as saving, retirement planning, financial 
assets, safe assets, risky assets or debt; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term. We include in our 
analysis four sets of explanatory variables, which can be grouped as follows: 
 
- 𝑊𝑖 is a vector of variables related to financial literacy received when adults and money 
education received from the family during adolescence. Its composition varies according to the 
specification we consider: it includes the two indexes of financial literacy (basic and advanced) 
in Sub-section 4.1; and both indexes of financial literacy and the dummy variable on whether 
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individuals received money education at age 12-16 from their family in Sub-section 4.2. The 
variables are listed in Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2. 
- 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 includes variables on risk and time preferences; specifically, we consider individuals’ risk 
aversion and their level of future orientation in taking financial decisions. We create these 
variables from six questions concerning taking risk and 12 statements about the future, 
respectively; interviewed people are asked to indicate whether they agree or not with these 
statements, on a scale from one to seven. The variables are listed in Appendix A.3 and 
Appendix A.4. 
- 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of socio-demographic characteristics such as individuals’ gender, age, education, 
marital status, employment, health status, household income and family composition. 
- 𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of year and geographic area fixed effects. It captures heterogeneity over space 
and over time, with the inclusion of region (North, South, East, West) and year dummy 
variables, respectively. 
 
Our variables related to financial literacy do not change over time and are fixed to year 
2005. This has two implications. First, we may expect financial literacy to increase with age and 
experience; therefore, our measures could be seen as a lower bound of the true level of financial 
literacy.8 Second, having time-invariant variables (on financial literacy as well as money education) 
prevents us from using a panel fixed-effects estimator. We therefore estimate random-effects 
regression models, incorporating a proxy for unit-specific effects by applying the Mundlak’s 
correction (1978). This approach includes in the specification group-means of all the explanatory 
variables changing over time. This allows us to relax the assumption of zero correlation between the 
observed and the unobserved variables, which is required by the random-effect model. 
However, our estimates could still suffer from reverse causality and from omitted variable 
bias. For example, financial literacy and our financial outcomes could be influenced by individuals’ 
skills and financial experience: individuals learn more on financial topics when they are involved in 
financial decisions or when they start to plan for retirement (Alessie et al., 2011). In addition, 
financial literacy is rather difficult to measure, also for potential measurement errors in financial 
variables (Van Rooij et al., 2011b), and our indexes are only proxy measures of the true financial 
literacy. Although money education from family took place in the past, some unobservable 
confounders may also influence the relationship between this variable and respondents’ wealth 
 
8 Some of the financial literacy questions (the “big three” questions) were also asked to the same respondents in year 
2010, as part of a new survey on retirement preparedness. The mean value of correct answers for each of the 2010 
questions is very similar to that of the corresponding ones in 2005, meaning that the level of financial literacy is quite 
constant over time. 
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decisions. For instance, children who received money education may come from richer families and 
they may also be more concerned about money later in life.  
Given that we do not have information on these potential confounders, our measures related 
to financial education (financial literacy and money education) may be endogenous.  
We address these concerns by using the instrumental variable (IV) method proposed by 
Lewbel (2012). This method allows to identify structural parameters in specifications with 
endogenous variables by creating instruments from the product between the exogenous variables 
included in the main model (in mean-centered form) and the residuals from a first-stage regression 
of the endogenous variables on the exogenous ones. Specifically, let us assume that in the model of 
Equation (1) there is potential endogeneity on variables W, thus causing inconsistent estimates. 
Lewbel (2012) suggests estimating a first-stage regression of the endogenous variables on the 
exogenous ones as in Equation (2), 
 
𝑊𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝑍𝑖,𝑡𝛾1 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛾2 + 𝐹𝑖,𝑡𝛾3+ 𝜔𝑖,𝑡    (2) 
 
and then generate instruments as the product between the residuals in Equation (2) and each 
exogenous (mean-centered) regressor. In order to achieve identification of the parameters, Lewbel’s 
approach relies on two assumptions: i) errors from the first-stage regression are heteroskedastic; ii) 
the exogenous variables are uncorrelated with the product between errors from the main regression 
and errors from the first-stage regression. Assumption i) is strongly supported in our data according 
to a White test for heteroscedasticity (results available upon request); Assumption ii) is a relatively 
milder version of the exclusion restriction under standard IV, and is consistent with the finding of 
validity of the over-identifying restrictions. The Hansen over-identification test supports this result 
in all our regressions. The analyses reported in this section show IV estimates for panel data, where 
instruments are created by using Lewbel’s approach; Appendix B presents random-effect estimates 
without instrumented variables. 
 
4.1. Financial literacy and wealth decisions 
Table 2 presents Lewbel IV estimates on the relationship between financial literacy, 
measured by the two indexes of basic and advanced financial literacy, and our outcomes of interest: 
saving, retirement planning, financial assets, safe assets, risky assets and debt. We find that basic 
financial literacy is positively correlated only with the likelihood of having money saved (one 
standard deviation increase of basic financial literacy raises the probability to save by 0.191*0.196 
=3.74 percentage points), while it is not a significant determinant of the other wealth decisions. 
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Thus, having basic financial knowledge may be equivalent to having “common sense” in financial 
decision-making. The index of basic financial literacy based on five simple financial questions 
might proxy for basic cognitive skills and is not enough to affect most of our financial outcomes.9 
The weak effect of basic financial literacy is in line with evidence from Van Rooij et al. (2011b). 
On the other hand, having advanced financial literacy significantly and positively affects 
financial assets and, in particular, owning risky assets. The estimated coefficient suggests that one 
standard deviation increase in advanced financial literacy raises by 0.286*0.192 =5.49 percentage 
points the probability of investing in stock, options or mutual funds. Thus, using a different 
estimation technique we confirm previous evidence by Van Rooij et al. (2011b) on stock market 
participation. Risky assets usually provide greater returns, but they also present higher costs and 
volatilities; investors who deal with these financial instruments need deep understanding of the 
financial markets to properly manage the risk and to make efficient investment decisions. We thus 
find support to Hypotheses 1 and 2, according to which financial literacy increases savings and 
financial assets, but only advanced financial literacy is associated to an investment in risky assets. 
Interestingly, we do not find a significant effect of advanced financial literacy on saving, retirement 
planning and debt. Individuals with more financial literacy may be able to manage their investments 
in a better way avoiding excessive borrowing and debt accumulation (Lusardi and Tufano, 2015). 
However, we find that socioeconomic variables, such as gender, civil status and education are 
significant predictors of debt holding in our sample (Column 6, Table 2). 
Other important determinants of our financial outcomes are the variables on risk aversion 
and future discounting. As expected, higher levels of risk aversion are associated positively and 
significantly with safe asset ownership and negatively with risky asset ownership. In addition, a 
higher degree of future orientation is associated with a better ability to accumulate financial assets 
and risky assets. Therefore, also time preferences play a role in describing people’s decision 
making; planning may reflect individual features such as patience and diligence, which are usually 
associated with greater propensity to save (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007b). Our results highlight the 
importance of taking these variables into account in analyzing the relationship between financial 
literacy and wealth decisions; indeed, risk averse individuals, or those who care about their future, 
might be more likely to invest in financial education to manage their investments in a better way.  
Overall, results from Table 2 suggest the presence of a significant relationship between 
financial assets and the index of advanced rather than basic financial literacy. We notice, however, 
that the relationship found using the Lewbel approach is not as strong as we would obtain without 
 
9 The same evidence is confirmed from regression models where advanced financial literacy is excluded from the 
specification. This suggests that basic financial literacy cannot be seen as a proxy for overall financial literacy. 
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correcting for endogeneity (see Appendix Table B.1). In such analysis, we find advanced financial 
literacy to positively correlate with all our dependent variables apart from debt holding, which in 
contrast is positively correlated with basic financial literacy. The size of the coefficients on 
financial literacy is also higher in Appendix Table B.1 than in Table 2. This evidence is in line with 
the existing literature, which finds a positive effect of financial literacy on retirement planning (e.g., 
Van Rooij et al., 2011b) and more frequent debt holding among individuals who find it difficult to 
understand concepts related to debt (e.g., Gathergood, 2012; Lusardi and Tufano, 2015). We 
interpret the difference of our benchmark results as an indication that endogeneity is indeed present, 
and we should rely more on the Lewbel IV estimates presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Financial literacy (Lewbel IV estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Saving Retirement 
planning 
Financial 
assets 
Safe 
assets 
Risky 
assets 
Debt 
       
Basic financial literacy 0.196** 0.046 0.627 0.003 -0.068 0.008 
 (0.094) (0.110) (0.853) (0.076) (0.066) (0.064) 
Advanced financial literacy 0.065 0.142 1.833** 0.109 0.192*** 0.032 
 (0.099) (0.112) (0.900) (0.072) (0.072) (0.079) 
Risk averse 0.017 -0.002 0.105 0.061** -0.309*** -0.014 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.338) (0.028) (0.034) (0.028) 
Future orientation 0.096 0.061 1.189** 0.038 0.088* 0.057 
 (0.061) (0.044) (0.503) (0.040) (0.048) (0.044) 
Female 0.022 0.026 0.239 0.021 -0.052** -0.042* 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.257) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) 
Age/10 0.323* -0.347 4.151** 0.336** 0.086 -0.177 
 (0.181) (0.218) (2.048) (0.160) (0.169) (0.152) 
(Age/10)2 -0.005 0.023** -0.102 -0.006 -0.007 0.012* 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.075) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
With partner 0.087** 0.009 0.051 -0.027 -0.019 -0.057** 
 (0.036) (0.027) (0.450) (0.033) (0.025) (0.028) 
Household size -1 -0.055** 0.012 -0.187 -0.004 -0.003 0.015 
 (0.023) (0.013) (0.222) (0.017) (0.021) (0.012) 
If children -0.003 0.050 0.119 -0.023 0.006 -0.021 
 (0.047) (0.036) (0.343) (0.029) (0.038) (0.032) 
Worker 0.157*** -0.027 0.414 0.021 0.024 -0.012 
 (0.039) (0.024) (0.280) (0.020) (0.028) (0.024) 
Retired 0.045 -0.012 0.727** 0.051** 0.026 0.024 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.303) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) 
High school -0.036 0.012 -0.017 -0.018 0.094 0.145** 
 (0.061) (0.022) (0.765) (0.063) (0.070) (0.060) 
College -0.170 -0.048 -0.450 0.053 0.135 0.270*** 
 (0.135) (0.068) (1.092) (0.076) (0.092) (0.105) 
Income 0.044*** -0.009 0.126 -0.005 -0.007 0.000 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.117) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) 
Poor health 0.010 0.014 -0.069 -0.015 0.001 0.020 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.173) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Constant -3.074*** -1.642*** -12.105*** 0.510* -1.241*** 0.840** 
 (0.454) (0.498) (3.940) (0.283) (0.406) (0.375) 
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Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mundlak fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.620 0.236 0.330 0.201 0.175 0.416 
Avg. dependent variable 0.585 0.721 9.273 0.890 0.258 0.144 
Number of respondents 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 
Observations 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 
       
Notes: The instrumented variables are in italics. Income and financial assets are transformed into inverse hyperbolic sine. Standard 
errors clustered at the respondent level are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
4.2. Money education from family and wealth decisions 
In this sub-section, we investigate the association between having received money education 
during adolescence in the family environment and the outcomes on wealth decisions, and how this 
compares with the role of financial literacy. Table 3 presents coefficient estimates of a model where 
we include both indexes of financial literacy (basic and advanced) and the variable labeled “money 
education,” that is a dummy variable on having received teachings about saving from the family at 
age 12-16. All the variables on financial education have been instrumented by using Lewbel’s 
approach. We find that having received money education during adolescence significantly increases 
the propensity to save when adults by 10.6% (Column 1). In addition, money education is 
negatively correlated with the likelihood of owning risky assets (-13%, Column 5) and holding debt 
(-10.8%, Column 6), in line with the idea that money education is more likely associated to safer 
assets and saving (Hypothesis 3).  
We now compare the effect of having received money education during adolescence with 
the effect of financial literacy measured when adults. A previous work by Grohmann et al. (2015) 
suggests that the positive effects of parental socialization may partially derive from building better 
financial knowledge, which in turn stimulates better financial decisions during adulthood. Thus, 
financial literacy may partially mediate the relation between childhood experiences and financial 
behaviors. However, we found negligible correlation between our measures of financial literacy and 
money education (see Sub-section 3.3). Moreover, we notice that the coefficients on the financial 
literacy variables change little with respect to those in Table 2, which means that teaching 
adolescents to save and providing financial literacy during adulthood are different ways to boost 
financial knowledge. Indeed, our measure of money education informs on whether the respondent 
received teachings specifically related to saving and it does not capture a broader set of financial 
socialization practices. Thus, it seems plausible that our measure of money education directly 
affects respondents’ financial attitudes, aspirations and behavior, rather than their willingness to 
learn financial concepts. 
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Our results reported in Table 3 indicate that advanced financial literacy is still a significant 
determinant of wealth decisions, positively associated with financial and risky assets, even after 
controlling for money education. Moreover, in line with results by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a), 
we find that advanced financial literacy during adulthood positively affects the likelihood of 
thinking about retirement. However, we show that having received money education in young age is 
also an important factor affecting wealth decisions when adults. 
In addition, we find that investors who are more financially literate are more likely to invest 
their money in a speculative way with the purpose of increasing their gains (see Hypothesis 2). 
Column 5 of Table 3 confirms these results and shows that the propensity of holding risky assets is 
positively influenced by having advanced financial knowledge; however, money education affects 
the same wealth outcome in the opposite direction, with an effect that in magnitude partly 
counterbalances the effect of advanced financial literacy. Moreover, the last specification (Column 
6) of Table 3 shows that while financial literacy does not affect the likelihood of holding debt, 
people who grew up learning the value of money are less likely to hold debt. These results indicate 
that advices about the importance of money shape attitudes toward saving and debt. Individuals 
may choose to save, or may refrain from borrowing, because they have been told that this is the 
right thing to do (Almenberg et al., 2018). However, over the lifespan, financial choices become 
more complicated as consumers age: individuals in different age groups display different 
perspectives, influences, and pressures (Zick et al., 2012). To shed more light on this aspect, in 
Appendix C we examine heterogeneity in financial behaviors across different age groups. Results 
are reported in Appendix Table C.1. 
Overall, our findings show the importance of also considering money education received 
from the family at young age in analyzing wealth decisions; the benefits of parental education in 
stimulating a good economic behavior of children, which is easily maintained later in life, 
complement the positive effect of financial literacy in fostering wealth decision-making. 
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Table 3. Financial literacy and money education (Lewbel IV estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Saving Retirement 
planning 
Financial 
assets 
Safe 
assets 
Risky 
assets 
Debt 
       
Basic financial literacy 0.211** 0.062 0.798 0.027 -0.098 0.036 
 (0.091) (0.108) (0.854) (0.075) (0.070) (0.065) 
Advanced financial literacy 0.043 0.192* 1.815** 0.089 0.251*** 0.029 
 (0.095) (0.110) (0.862) (0.068) (0.073) (0.077) 
Money education from family 0.106* 0.065 0.598 0.068 -0.131** -0.108** 
 (0.061) (0.071) (0.601) (0.046) (0.051) (0.047) 
Risk averse 0.014 -0.002 0.088 0.058** -0.302*** -0.012 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.338) (0.028) (0.034) (0.028) 
Future orientation 0.084 0.057 1.091** 0.027 0.096** 0.069 
 (0.061) (0.044) (0.514) (0.041) (0.048) (0.043) 
Female 0.015 0.031 0.218 0.016 -0.039 -0.037 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.253) (0.019) (0.025) (0.023) 
Age/10 0.323* -0.327 4.218** 0.340** 0.097 -0.175 
 (0.181) (0.218) (2.025) (0.158) (0.170) (0.149) 
(Age/10)2 -0.006 0.023** -0.104 -0.006 -0.006 0.012* 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.075) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
With partner 0.087** 0.009 0.052 -0.027 -0.019 -0.057** 
 (0.036) (0.027) (0.451) (0.033) (0.025) (0.028) 
Household size -1 -0.055** 0.012 -0.183 -0.004 -0.003 0.014 
 (0.023) (0.013) (0.222) (0.018) (0.021) (0.012) 
If children -0.003 0.050 0.120 -0.023 0.006 -0.021 
 (0.047) (0.036) (0.344) (0.030) (0.038) (0.031) 
Worker 0.155*** -0.027 0.403 0.020 0.026 -0.010 
 (0.039) (0.024) (0.279) (0.020) (0.028) (0.024) 
Retired 0.044 -0.012 0.720** 0.050** 0.027 0.025 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.302) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) 
High school -0.039 0.012 -0.036 -0.021 0.099 0.146** 
 (0.060) (0.022) (0.763) (0.063) (0.071) (0.059) 
College -0.174 -0.047 -0.476 0.048 0.143 0.273*** 
 (0.135) (0.068) (1.078) (0.074) (0.093) (0.105) 
Income 0.044*** -0.009 0.126 -0.005 -0.007 0.000 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.117) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) 
Poor health 0.011 0.014 -0.063 -0.014 -0.000 0.020 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.172) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Constant -3.189*** -1.637*** -12.655*** 0.423 -1.072*** 0.922** 
 (0.462) (0.504) (3.930) (0.281) (0.413) (0.373) 
       
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mundlak fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.515 0.323 0.470 0.262 0.103 0.471 
Avg. dependent variable 0.585 0.721 9.273 0.890 0.258 0.144 
Number of respondents 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 
Observations 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 
       
Notes: The instrumented variables are in italics. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are in parentheses. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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4.3. Gender differences 
We now enrich the models in Table 3 by making a distinction between males and females in 
the effects of financial literacy and money education on wealth decisions. In our data, males show 
significantly higher levels of basic and advanced financial literacy than females (in line with 
Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008), but lower levels of money education received from the family.10 
According to Almenberg and Dreber (2015), a significant part of the gender gap in stock market 
participation can be explained by gender differences in financial literacy. However, gender 
differences may also matter in the socialization process. In particular, children may be socialized 
differently regarding saving and budgeting depending on their gender. This motivates our analysis 
on which, however, we do not have a priori hypotheses.  
We report the results in Table 4, where the variables on financial literacy and money 
education are interacted with gender, so that they measure the effects on males and females, 
separately. 
First of all, it seems that most of the effects we found in previous analyses are driven by 
males rather than females. Indeed, financial literacy and money education are important 
determinants of wealth decisions for males, with additional effects compared to those shown in 
Table 3. For males, having advanced financial literacy affects significantly and positively all the 
financial outcomes in Columns 1-5, while it is negatively associated with the likelihood of holding 
debt. In general, the magnitude of the coefficients is also relatively higher than in Table 3, which 
suggests that our previous results, averaging the effects of males and females, compensate larger 
effects for males with smaller effects for females. Indeed, the female coefficients of Table 4 report a 
narrower set of effects: at the 1% level, we see that for females advanced financial literacy is 
positively correlated only with risky assets, whereas it has a weaker effect on the general propensity 
to hold financial assets. As for males, we find that money education is positively correlated with 
financial and safe assets; conversely, the negative effect of money education on debt holding is 
statistically significant only among females. This result is consistent with previous findings by 
Almenberg et al. (2018), who investigate intergenerational transmission of financial behavior to 
shed light on the determinants of household debt. The authors find that attitudes towards debt are 
more easily transmitted from parents to daughters, as they are much more likely than sons to discuss 
about personal financial matters with family members. 
Tests on the equality of the coefficients by gender reveal that the difference is significant in 
the case of money education with respect to saving and debt holding, with larger effects among 
 
10 We run t-tests on mean comparison. Basic financial literacy: 12.994, p-value <0.01; advanced financial literacy: 
30.926, p-value <0.01; money education: -2.689, p-value <0.01. 
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males than females for saving and vice versa for debt holding. As regards advanced financial 
literacy, the coefficients by gender are statistically different only with respect to financial assets; the 
correlation between advanced financial literacy and this wealth outcome is larger among males than 
females. 
 
Table 4. Financial literacy and money education by gender (Lewbel IV estimates) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Saving Retirement 
planning 
Financial 
assets 
Safe 
assets 
Risky 
assets 
Debt 
       
Basic financial literacy 0.088 0.095 0.752 0.016 0.005 0.222*** 
  (Males) (0.096) (0.112) (0.975) (0.063) (0.074) (0.068) 
Advanced financial literacy 0.238*** 0.282*** 2.544*** 0.107** 0.322*** -0.146** 
  (Males) (0.073) (0.089) (0.696) (0.047) (0.061) (0.063) 
Money education from family 0.107*** 0.120*** 0.687** 0.044** -0.009 -0.036 
  (Males) (0.034) (0.041) (0.286) (0.019) (0.033) (0.028) 
Basic financial literacy 0.076 0.106 1.013 0.074 -0.032 0.043 
  (Females) (0.086) (0.102) (0.820) (0.071) (0.060) (0.052) 
Advanced financial literacy 0.117 0.133 0.987* 0.038 0.216*** 0.015 
  (Females) (0.072) (0.085) (0.552) (0.043) (0.048) (0.049) 
Money education from family 0.017 0.081 1.071*** 0.079*** 0.005 -0.111*** 
  (Females) (0.042) (0.052) (0.368) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) 
Risk averse 0.024 -0.001 0.116 0.058** -0.305*** -0.019 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.334) (0.028) (0.034) (0.028) 
Future orientation 0.076 0.052 1.030** 0.030 0.079 0.071 
 (0.060) (0.044) (0.497) (0.039) (0.049) (0.044) 
Female 0.180 0.141 0.654 -0.020 0.048 0.064 
 (0.117) (0.143) (1.206) (0.089) (0.086) (0.075) 
Age/10 0.346* -0.313 4.139** 0.332** 0.121 -0.173 
 (0.178) (0.216) (2.021) (0.157) (0.168) (0.148) 
(Age/10)2 -0.005 0.023** -0.105 -0.006 -0.007 0.012* 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.075) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
With partner 0.087** 0.010 0.059 -0.027 -0.019 -0.057** 
 (0.036) (0.027) (0.450) (0.033) (0.025) (0.028) 
Household size -1 -0.055** 0.012 -0.180 -0.004 -0.003 0.014 
 (0.023) (0.013) (0.222) (0.017) (0.021) (0.012) 
If children -0.002 0.050 0.114 -0.023 0.006 -0.020 
 (0.047) (0.036) (0.344) (0.030) (0.038) (0.031) 
Worker 0.156*** -0.027 0.417 0.021 0.025 -0.012 
 (0.039) (0.024) (0.280) (0.020) (0.028) (0.024) 
Retired 0.045 -0.012 0.734** 0.051** 0.027 0.023 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.303) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) 
High school -0.030 0.011 -0.076 -0.024 0.094 0.138** 
 (0.060) (0.022) (0.760) (0.063) (0.070) (0.060) 
College -0.161 -0.047 -0.494 0.047 0.138 0.265** 
 (0.135) (0.068) (1.074) (0.075) (0.092) (0.104) 
Income 0.044*** -0.009 0.126 -0.005 -0.007 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.117) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Poor health 0.010 0.014 -0.056 -0.013 0.001 0.020 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.172) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Constant -3.032*** -1.672*** -13.016*** 0.425 -1.181*** 0.732** 
 (0.448) (0.493) (3.920) (0.278) (0.401) (0.361) 
       
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mundlak fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Test by gender: Basic fin. lit. [0.927] [0.943] [0.839] [0.538] [0.696] [0.038] 
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Test by gender: Adv. fin. lit. [0.234] [0.218] [0.074] [0.270] [0.168] [0.043] 
Test by gender: Money educ. [0.098] [0.555] [0.411] [0.313] [0.744] [0.078] 
       
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.511 0.593 0.418 0.429 0.440 0.896 
Avg. dependent variable 0.585 0.721 9.273 0.890 0.258 0.144 
Number of respondents 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 
Observations 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 
       
Notes: The instrumented variables are in italics. Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are in parentheses; p-values 
are in squared parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Similar to other studies (e.g., Alessie et al., 2011; Van Rooij et al., 2011b), our findings 
underline positive relationships between financial literacy and the propensity to invest in financial 
assets, notably risky assets; moreover, this study adds evidence about the role of financial literacy in 
determining new financial outcomes yet to be explored, and for the first time, the role of money 
education received from the family during adolescence on wealth decisions compared to financial 
literacy.  
By using the recent identification approach developed by Lewbel (2012), we show that basic 
financial literacy is not enough to affect most of the wealth decisions under examination, as it may 
be equivalent to having basic cognitive skills in decision-making. Advanced financial literacy 
significantly and positively affects financial assets and, in particular, owning risky assets; indeed, 
investors who deal with these financial instruments need deep understanding of the financial 
markets to properly manage their financial resources. 
In addition, we find that when both financial literacy and money education received from the 
family during adolescence are included in the analysis, they are both significant drivers of wealth 
decisions. However, while advanced financial literacy has a positive effect on the likelihood of 
holding risky assets, money education acquired during adolescence is negatively associated with the 
same outcome. Interestingly, we find that money education from the family significantly decreases 
the likelihood of holding debt while financial literacy does not. When we explore gender 
differences, we find that the effect of advanced financial literacy on financial assets is larger among 
males than females while the effect of money education on debt holding is larger among females 
consistently with the intergenerational transmission of attitudes towards debt from parents to 
daughters (Almenberg et al., 2018). 
Overall, our results highlight the complementarity between the two channels of financial 
education, with financial literacy increasing the propensity to invest in risky assets and money 
education in safer assets. Money education received during adolescence is then as important as 
financial literacy to describe individuals’ wealth decisions, although our definition works mainly 
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through investment in safer assets. Consequently, it is important to develop policies promoting 
money education at young age in addition to financial literacy. In our work, money education is 
defined as a set of teachings on money received within the family. However, there are different 
approaches on how family may influence individuals’ financial skills; for example, children might 
learn the value of money via observation and intent participation, rather than through 
communication and advices (Rogoff et al., 2003). Matthies et al. (2012) find that parents contribute 
in fostering children’s pro-environmental behavior by acting as social models; this might also apply 
for the development of positive financial attitudes.  
Unfortunately, our dataset does not allow to investigate the effect of parents as role models 
on their children financial behavior later in life, and we leave this as future research to investigate. 
Moreover, in line with Shim et al. (2010), we highlight the key role of the family in influencing 
individuals’ financial decisions. However, school and peers are also important socialization factors 
which might affect children’ consumption behavior (Varcoe et al., 2001; Hayta, 2008); teachers are 
likely to affect financial attitudes of young people, as they are the main role models outside the 
family environment. Therefore, another direction for future research involves studying whether 
money education acquired from other socialization agents, most notably teachers at school, is as 
relevant as that from the family in predicting wealth decisions during adulthood. 
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Appendix A. Key variables construction and summary statistics 
 
A.1. Financial literacy indexes  
The survey questions are divided in two blocks, “basic” literacy (questions L1-L5) and 
“advanced” literacy (questions D1-D4 and P1-P7); correct answers are in bold. Each question 
also allows “Do not know” and “Refuse” as possible answers. We create two indexes from 
factor analysis, separately from the two blocks of variables as in Van Rooij et al. (2011). The 
two indexes are then scaled in the 0-1 range. 
 
“[L1] Suppose you had €100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 
5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow: 
more than €102, exactly €102, less than €102?  
a) More than €102 
b) Exactly €102 
c) Less than €102 
 
[L2] Suppose you had €100 in a savings account and the interest rate is 20% per year and you 
never withdraw money or interest payments. After 5 years, how much would you have on this 
account in total? 
a) More than €200 
b) Exactly €200 
c) Less than €200 
 
[L3] Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 
2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy more than, exactly the same as, or less 
than today with the money in this account?  
a) More than today 
b) Exactly the same as today 
c) Less than today 
 
[L4] Assume a friend inherits €10,000 today and his sibling inherits €10,000 3 years from 
now. Who is richer because of the inheritance? 
a) My friend 
b) His sibling 
c) They are equally rich 
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[L5] Suppose that in the year 2010, your income has doubled and prices of all goods have 
doubled too. In 2010, will you be able to buy more, the same or less than today with your 
income? 
a) Buy more than today 
b) Buy the same as today 
c) Buy less than today 
 
[D1] Which of the following statements describes the main function of the stock market? 
a) The stock market helps to predict stock earnings 
b) The stock market results in an increase in the price of stocks 
c) The stock market brings people who want to buy stocks together with those who want 
to sell stocks 
d) None of the above 
 
[D2] Which of the following statements is correct? If somebody buys the stock of firm B in 
the stock market 
a) He owns a part of firm B 
b) He has lent money to firm B  
c) He is liable for firm B’s debts 
d) None of the above 
 
[D3] Which of the following statements is correct?    
a) Once one invests in a mutual fund, one cannot withdraw the money in the first year 
b) Mutual funds can invest in several assets, for example invest in both stocks and bonds 
c) Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return which depends on their past performance 
d) None of the above 
 
[D4] Which of the following statements is correct? If somebody buys a bond of firm B: 
a) He owns a part of firm B 
b) He has lent money to firm B 
c) He is liable for firm B’s debts 
d) None of the above 
 
[P1] If the interest rates fall, what should happen to bond prices? 
a) They should rise 
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b) They should fall 
c) They should stay the same 
 
[P2] Do you think that the following statement is true or false? Buying a company stock 
usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund. 
a) True 
b) False 
 
[P3] Do you think that the following statement is true or false? Stocks are normally riskier 
than bonds. 
a) True 
b) False 
[P4] Considering a long time period (for example 10 or 20 years), which asset described 
below normally gives the highest return: Savings accounts, Bonds or Stocks? 
a) Savings accounts 
b) Bonds 
c) Stocks 
 
[P5] Normally, which asset described below display the highest fluctuations over time: 
Savings accounts, Bonds or Stocks? 
a) Savings accounts 
b) Bonds 
c) Stocks 
 
[P6] When an investor spreads his money among different assets, does the risk of losing 
money increase, decrease or stay the same? 
a) Increase 
b) Decrease 
c) Stay the same 
 
[P7] Is the following statement true or false? If you buy a 10-year bond, it means you cannot 
sell it after 5 years without incurring a major penalty 
a) True 
b) False” 
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A.2. Money education from family 
We consider the following two questions related to the experience with money during 
adolescence to measure money education from the family. We define the dummy variable 
money education from family equal to one if the answer to at least one question is either a) or 
b), zero otherwise. We combine the two questions as in Bucciol and Veronesi (2014) because 
statements may be easily confounded and overlapped by the respondents. 
 
“[Budget] Did your (grand)parents try to teach you how to budget when you were between 12 
and 16 years of age? 
a) Yes, they gave me advice and practical help 
b) Yes, they gave me some advice and practical help 
c) Yes, but to a certain extent 
d) No 
 
[Encouragement] Did your (grand)parents stimulate you to save money between the age of 12 
and 16? 
a) Yes, they emphasized the necessity of saving 
b) Yes, they told me how important saving is 
c) Yes, but to a certain extent 
d) No, not at all” 
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A.3. Risk preferences 
We create the index risk averse by using factor analysis, separately by wave, after reverse-
coding the variables SPAAR3, SPAAR5, and SPAAR6. This approach is taken from Kapteyn 
and Teppa (2011) and Bucciol and Miniaci (2018). The index is then scaled in the 0-1 range. 
 
“To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
Please indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 to what extent you agree with the statement. 
1 means ‘totally disagree’; 7 means ‘totally agree’. 
 
[SPAAR1] I think it is more important to have safe investments and guaranteed returns, than 
to take a risk to have a chance to get the highest possible returns 
[SPAAR2] I do not invest in shares, because I find this too risky 
[SPAAR3] If I think an investment will be profitable, I am prepared to borrow money to make 
this investment 
[SPAAR4] I want to be certain that my investments are safe 
[SPAAR5] If I want to improve my financial position, I should take financial risks 
[SPAAR6] I am prepared to take the risk to lose money, when there is also a chance to gain 
money” 
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A.4. Time preferences 
The statements in the following questions belong to the “Consideration of Future 
consequences” scale developed by Strathman et al. (1994). Accordingly, we create the index 
future orientation by adding the answer to the questions, after reverse-coding TOEK03, 
TOEK04, TOEK05, TOEK09, TOEK10, TOEK11 and TOEK12. The index is then rescaled 
in the 0-1 range. 
 
“To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
Please indicate on a scale from 1 to 7 to what extent you agree with the following statements. 
1 means ‘extremely uncharacteristic’; 7 means ‘extremely characteristic’. 
 
[TOEK01] I think about how things can change in the future, and try to influence those things 
in my everyday life 
[TOEK02] I often work on things that will only pay off in a couple of years 
[TOEK03] I am only concerned about the present, because I trust that things will work 
themselves out in the future 
[TOEK04] With everything I do, I am only concerned about the immediate consequences (say 
a period of a couple of days or weeks) 
[TOEK05] Whether something is convenient for me or not, to a large extent determines the 
decisions that I take or the actions that I undertake 
[TOEK06] I am willing to sacrifice my well-being in the present to achieve certain goals in 
the future 
[TOEK07] I think it is important to take warnings about negative consequences of my acts 
seriously, even if these negative consequences would only occur in the distant future 
[TOEK08] I think it is more important to work on things that have important consequences in 
the future, than to work on things that have immediate but less important consequences 
[TOEK09] In general, I ignore warnings about future problems because I think these 
problems will be solved before they get critical 
[TOEK10] I think there is no need to sacrifice things now for problems that lie in the future, 
because it will always be possible to solve these future problems later 
[TOEK11] I only respond to urgent problems, trusting that problems that come up later can be 
solved in a later stage 
[TOEK12] I find it more important to do work that gives short-term results, than work where 
the consequences are not apparent until later” 
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It should be noticed that the DHS includes some auxiliary variables for routing purposes; 
since year 2000, due to the presence of “routing variable 7” in the section “Economic and 
Psychological Concepts”, statements about saving, risk taking and the future are answered 
only by respondents with a total household net income greater than or equal to 10,000 euros 
per year. Since year 2009 questions about the future are only asked if respondents did not fill 
them out in the previous waves. As a result, the inclusion of variables on risk aversion and 
future discounting determines a reduction in the number of observations used in our analysis. 
 
A.5. Income 
The DHS provides information about several income components and a measure of net 
personal income, which is the aggregation of total gross income, alimonies for children or 
spouse, scholarships or study loans, inheritance and rent subsidies minus income tax. 
Consistently with Van Rooij et al. (2011), in our analysis we consider net disposable income 
at household level. When this information is missing, we replace it with the amount of net 
income or with the central value of net income category indicated by the respondent, both 
expressed at the household level. Values are then corrected for inflation and reported to 2015 
prices using Dutch CPI index. 
 
A.6. Summary statistics by portfolio composition 
 
Table A.6. Average financial education by portfolio composition 
 
 Observations Basic 
literacy 
Advanced 
literacy 
Money 
education 
     
None 543 0.859 0.573 0.637 
Safe 3,489 0.867 0.599 0.721 
Safe + Debt 649 0.911 0.597 0.638 
Safe + Risky 1,438 0.946 0.820 0.737 
Safe + Risky + Debt 202 0.949 0.783 0.604 
Risky 83 0.904 0.557 0.614 
     
Overall 6,404 0.891 0.651 0.704 
     
Notes: The portfolio is split in safe assets (safe), risky assets (Risky) and debt holdings 
(Debt). The table reports average financial education separately for each combination of 
assets. 
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Appendix B. Random-effect estimates (without instruments) 
 
Table B.1. Financial literacy (Random-effect estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Saving Retirement 
planning 
Financial 
assets 
Safe 
assets 
Risky 
assets 
Debt 
       
Basic financial literacy 0.079 0.092 0.922 0.049 0.021 0.122*** 
 (0.064) (0.072) (0.637) (0.048) (0.047) (0.041) 
Advanced financial literacy 0.137*** 0.185*** 1.931*** 0.068** 0.321*** -0.055 
 (0.050) (0.055) (0.436) (0.032) (0.036) (0.038) 
Risk averse 0.021 -0.001 0.114 0.052* -0.316*** -0.018 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.338) (0.028) (0.034) (0.028) 
Future orientation 0.093 0.055 1.067** 0.037 0.082* 0.061 
 (0.060) (0.044) (0.499) (0.039) (0.048) (0.043) 
Female 0.029 0.034 0.267 0.017 -0.030 -0.051** 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.236) (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) 
Age/10 0.321* -0.324 4.331** 0.347** 0.154 -0.181 
 (0.178) (0.216) (2.075) (0.162) (0.167) (0.150) 
(Age/10)2 -0.005 0.023** -0.098 -0.006 -0.007 0.012* 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.075) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
With partner 0.087** 0.009 0.045 -0.028 -0.019 -0.057** 
 (0.036) (0.027) (0.456) (0.033) (0.025) (0.028) 
Household size -1 -0.055** 0.012 -0.181 -0.004 -0.003 0.015 
 (0.023) (0.013) (0.223) (0.018) (0.021) (0.012) 
If children -0.003 0.050 0.128 -0.024 0.007 -0.020 
 (0.047) (0.036) (0.344) (0.030) (0.038) (0.031) 
Worker 0.157*** -0.027 0.404 0.021 0.025 -0.012 
 (0.039) (0.024) (0.280) (0.020) (0.028) (0.024) 
Retired 0.045 -0.012 0.737** 0.052** 0.026 0.024 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.305) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) 
High school -0.029 0.012 0.043 -0.015 0.096 0.138** 
 (0.061) (0.022) (0.797) (0.067) (0.069) (0.060) 
College -0.164 -0.048 -0.384 0.044 0.137 0.264** 
 (0.135) (0.068) (1.067) (0.076) (0.092) (0.104) 
Income 0.044*** -0.009 0.122 -0.005 -0.007 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.117) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) 
Poor health 0.009 0.014 -0.061 -0.013 0.000 0.021 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.173) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Constant -2.988*** -1.598*** -12.164*** 0.424 -1.095*** 0.736** 
 (0.443) (0.486) (4.005) (0.286) (0.399) (0.367) 
       
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mundlak fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R-squared 0.143 0.092 0.135 0.048 0.223 0.046 
Avg. dependent variable 0.585 0.721 9.273 0.890 0.258 0.144 
Number of respondents 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 
Observations 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 
       
Notes: Income and financial assets are transformed into inverse hyperbolic sine. Standard errors clustered at the respondent 
level are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
36 
 
Table B.2. Financial literacy and money education (Random-effect estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Saving Retirement 
planning 
Financial 
assets 
Safe 
assets 
Risky 
assets 
Debt 
       
Basic financial literacy 0.084 0.099 0.979 0.053 0.022 0.117*** 
 (0.064) (0.073) (0.634) (0.048) (0.047) (0.041) 
Advanced financial literacy 0.134*** 0.178*** 1.892*** 0.065** 0.321*** -0.052 
 (0.049) (0.055) (0.435) (0.032) (0.036) (0.038) 
Money education from family 0.069*** 0.101*** 0.868*** 0.061*** 0.009 -0.061*** 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.218) (0.016) (0.022) (0.020) 
Risk averse 0.020 -0.002 0.095 0.050* -0.316*** -0.017 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.338) (0.028) (0.034) (0.028) 
Future orientation 0.085 0.051 0.957* 0.028 0.081* 0.068 
 (0.060) (0.044) (0.501) (0.039) (0.048) (0.043) 
Female 0.026 0.028 0.226 0.014 -0.030 -0.048** 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.233) (0.017) (0.023) (0.022) 
Age/10 0.324* -0.325 4.361** 0.350** 0.154 -0.183 
 (0.177) (0.217) (2.051) (0.161) (0.168) (0.149) 
(Age/10)2 -0.006 0.023** -0.101 -0.006 -0.007 0.012* 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.075) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
With partner 0.087** 0.009 0.047 -0.028 -0.019 -0.057** 
 (0.036) (0.027) (0.456) (0.033) (0.025) (0.028) 
Household size -1 -0.055** 0.012 -0.177 -0.004 -0.003 0.014 
 (0.023) (0.013) (0.224) (0.018) (0.021) (0.012) 
If children -0.003 0.050 0.129 -0.024 0.007 -0.020 
 (0.047) (0.036) (0.345) (0.030) (0.038) (0.031) 
Worker 0.156*** -0.027 0.392 0.020 0.025 -0.011 
 (0.039) (0.024) (0.279) (0.020) (0.028) (0.023) 
Retired 0.044 -0.013 0.729** 0.051** 0.026 0.024 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.304) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) 
High school -0.030 0.011 0.023 -0.017 0.096 0.139** 
 (0.060) (0.021) (0.791) (0.067) (0.069) (0.059) 
College -0.166 -0.049 -0.417 0.042 0.137 0.265** 
 (0.135) (0.068) (1.051) (0.075) (0.092) (0.104) 
Income 0.044*** -0.009 0.123 -0.005 -0.007 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.117) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) 
Poor health 0.010 0.014 -0.055 -0.013 0.000 0.021 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.173) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Constant -3.050*** -1.680*** -12.926*** 0.370 -1.102*** 0.789** 
 (0.447) (0.489) (3.953) (0.282) (0.400) (0.364) 
       
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mundlak fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R-squared 0.148 0.103 0.139 0.051 0.223 0.051 
Avg. dependent variable 0.585 0.721 9.273 0.890 0.258 0.144 
Number of respondents 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 
Observations 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 
       
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively.  
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Table B.3. Financial literacy and money education by gender (Random-effect estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Saving Retirement 
planning 
Financial 
assets 
Safe 
assets 
Risky 
assets 
Debt 
       
Basic financial literacy 0.106 0.099 0.812 0.024 0.040 0.163** 
  (Males) (0.092) (0.103) (0.978) (0.063) (0.071) (0.066) 
Advanced financial literacy 0.165** 0.221*** 2.545*** 0.088** 0.397*** -0.111* 
  (Males) (0.066) (0.070) (0.633) (0.044) (0.053) (0.057) 
Money education from family 0.113*** 0.116*** 0.862*** 0.056*** 0.019 -0.051* 
  (Males) (0.033) (0.036) (0.272) (0.019) (0.031) (0.027) 
Basic financial literacy 0.050 0.091 1.054 0.080 -0.008 0.079 
  (Females) (0.085) (0.099) (0.802) (0.071) (0.060) (0.051) 
Advanced financial literacy 0.102 0.128 1.091** 0.040 0.223*** 0.018 
  (Females) (0.070) (0.081) (0.541) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047) 
Money education from family -0.003 0.079* 0.923*** 0.071** -0.003 -0.083*** 
  (Females) (0.040) (0.047) (0.356) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) 
Risk averse 0.022 -0.001 0.124 0.051* -0.312*** -0.018 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.338) (0.029) (0.034) (0.028) 
Future orientation 0.082 0.050 0.937* 0.027 0.078 0.069 
 (0.060) (0.044) (0.502) (0.040) (0.048) (0.043) 
Female 0.196* 0.117 0.846 -0.016 0.132* -0.029 
 (0.107) (0.126) (1.125) (0.085) (0.080) (0.072) 
Age/10 0.333* -0.325 4.272** 0.346** 0.145 -0.173 
 (0.178) (0.217) (2.048) (0.161) (0.167) (0.149) 
(Age/10)2 -0.005 0.023** -0.101 -0.006 -0.007 0.012* 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.076) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
With partner 0.087** 0.009 0.053 -0.027 -0.018 -0.057** 
 (0.036) (0.027) (0.456) (0.033) (0.025) (0.028) 
Household size -1 -0.055** 0.012 -0.178 -0.004 -0.003 0.014 
 (0.023) (0.013) (0.224) (0.018) (0.021) (0.012) 
If children -0.002 0.050 0.128 -0.024 0.007 -0.020 
 (0.047) (0.036) (0.345) (0.030) (0.038) (0.031) 
Worker 0.156*** -0.027 0.404 0.020 0.026 -0.012 
 (0.039) (0.024) (0.279) (0.020) (0.028) (0.024) 
Retired 0.045 -0.012 0.742** 0.052** 0.027 0.023 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.304) (0.024) (0.030) (0.024) 
High school -0.032 0.010 -0.001 -0.017 0.092 0.140** 
 (0.060) (0.022) (0.792) (0.067) (0.069) (0.059) 
College -0.164 -0.049 -0.420 0.042 0.137 0.266** 
 (0.135) (0.068) (1.055) (0.075) (0.092) (0.104) 
Income 0.044*** -0.009 0.123 -0.005 -0.007 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.117) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) 
Poor health 0.010 0.014 -0.052 -0.012 0.000 0.020 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.173) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Constant -3.086*** -1.702*** -13.131*** 0.380 -1.156*** 0.783** 
 (0.448) (0.491) (3.991) (0.285) (0.399) (0.361) 
       
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mundlak fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Test by gender: Basic fin. lit. [0.653] [0.958] [0.847] [0.552] [0.598] [0.321] 
Test by gender: Adv. fin. lit. [0.498] [0.367] [0.071] [0.412] [0.012] [0.075] 
Test by gender: Money educ. [0.025] [0.531] [0.892] [0.666] [0.601] [0.436] 
       
R-squared 0.152 0.104 0.141 0.052 0.225 0.056 
Avg. dependent variable 0.585 0.721 9.273 0.890 0.258 0.144 
Number of respondents 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 1,017 
Observations 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 6,404 
       
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are in round parentheses; p-values are in squared parentheses. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
38 
 
Appendix C. Heterogeneity across age groups 
 
Table C.1. Financial literacy and money education across age groups (Lewbel IV estimates) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Saving Retirement 
planning 
Financial 
assets 
Safe 
assets 
Risky 
assets 
Debt 
Panel (a): age 18-40 
 
      
Basic financial literacy 0.126 0.305 -0.762 -0.171 -0.021 -0.031 
 (0.123) (0.189) (1.379) (0.133) (0.138) (0.128) 
Advanced financial literacy 0.037 0.063 1.405 0.172** 0.178** 0.092 
 (0.103) (0.150) (0.975) (0.084) (0.077) (0.093) 
Money education from family -0.007 0.063 1.517** 0.108 0.016 -0.092 
 (0.077) (0.105) (0.709) (0.067) (0.069) (0.064) 
Risk averse -0.033** -0.004 -0.192 0.001 -0.046*** -0.002 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.164) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) 
Future orientation 0.003 -0.001 0.019 0.002 -0.001 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
       
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.287 0.756 0.706 0.609 0.709 0.590 
Avg. dependent variable 0.591 0.546 18977.23 0.809 0.192 0.209 
Number of respondents 225 225 225 225 225 225 
Observations 733 733 733 733 733 733 
Panel (b): age 41-65 
 
      
Basic financial literacy 0.168* 0.214* 0.728 0.073 -0.060 0.152** 
 (0.091) (0.117) (1.076) (0.083) (0.067) (0.063) 
Advanced financial literacy 0.034 -0.032 2.325** 0.073 0.304*** -0.087 
 (0.095) (0.110) (0.978) (0.067) (0.071) (0.068) 
Money education from family 0.185*** 0.104 0.532 0.056 -0.126** -0.124** 
 (0.065) (0.074) (0.646) (0.045) (0.055) (0.053) 
Risk averse 0.011 0.002 0.077 0.012** -0.037*** -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.067) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Future orientation 0.001 0.001 0.016* 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.594 0.637 0.154 0.322 0.320 0.865 
Avg. dependent variable 0.566 0.733 4,923.05 0.883 0.253 0.160 
Number of respondents 661 661 661 661 661 661 
Observations 3,567 3,567 3,567 3,567 3,567 3,567 
Panel (c): age 66-90 
 
      
Basic financial literacy 0.184 -0.062 -0.049 -0.075 -0.043 0.004 
 (0.123) (0.140) (0.903) (0.059) (0.086) (0.054) 
Advanced financial literacy 0.029 0.121 2.253*** 0.086* 0.261*** 0.006 
 (0.095) (0.110) (0.660) (0.052) (0.079) (0.058) 
Money education from family 0.188** 0.164* 1.823*** 0.131** -0.002 -0.035 
 (0.078) (0.088) (0.657) (0.054) (0.069) (0.051) 
Risk averse 0.000 -0.005 -0.034 0.004 -0.038*** -0.009* 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.058) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
Future orientation 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Hansen J test (p-value) 0.463 0.935 0.785 0.427 0.435 0.988 
Avg. dependent variable 0.614 0.761 66,582.85 0.931 0.289 0.094 
Number of respondents 402 402 402 402 402 402 
Observations 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the respondent level are in round parentheses; p-values are in squared parentheses. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The instrumented variables are in italics. Other 
explanatory variables not reported in this table are the same as included in vectors Xi,t and Fi,t of equation (1).   
 
Table C.1 shows regression results of a model where we use the same specification reported 
in equation (1) to repeat our analysis in three different subsamples. Specifically, we define 
three age-groups in our sample (18-40, 41-65, 66-90) and we explore the relationship between 
financial education and behavior across them. This provides helpful information for policy 
makers to develop effective financial education programs that meet the needs of a varied 
consumer population in ways that a “one-size-fits-all approach” cannot.  
We find that both our financial education measures exhibit significant associations with the 
outcome variables, but with different patterns.  
Our results reported in panel (a) indicate that financial education variables are significantly 
related with young adults’ propensity to invest in financial assets (Column 3), holding both 
safe and risky assets. A possible interpretation is that by this age individuals may choose to 
invest their money in financial assets with the purpose of building their savings faster. Other 
important determinants of our financial outcomes are the variables on risk and time 
preferences. Interestingly, we find that an increase in future orientation among young adults is 
positively associated with the likelihood of holding debt. It is possible that young people, who 
care more about their future, are also more likely to think forward, incurring planning costs in 
the short-term for potential benefits in the long-term (Bucciol and Zarri, 2019). Results 
among middle-aged individuals are in line with those reported for the full sample (Table 3). In 
addition, we find a positive and significant association between basic financial literacy and 
holding debt. Individuals in this age group should be the most financially active and may 
optimally dissave; for example, an increase in basic financial knowledge among working-age 
individuals may foster their propensity to borrow to invest in human capital for them or for 
their children. Finally, among older-age individuals, money education affects significantly 
and positively all the financial outcomes in Columns 1-4. Here we interpret our outcome on 
retirement planning as individuals’ general propensity to think about their desired retirement 
lifestyles. In particular, individuals in their 70s who received money education may find 
beneficial to hold a conservative investment portfolio, which ensures a proper amount of 
finances that can be used for possible healthcare expenses.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
DOES FINANCIAL SATISFACTION AFFECT  
ATTITUDES TOWARDS CHEATING?  
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Using Dutch data from the LISS Panel, we study the effect of financial satisfaction on 
multiple dimensions of individuals’ attitudes towards dishonesty, namely benefits fraud, tax 
evasion, fare evasion, stealing property and bribery. We use two indices of financial literacy 
as instruments to deal with the potential endogeneity of financial satisfaction. Financial 
satisfaction significantly affects the propensity to engage in cheating towards the government. 
However, other forms of dishonesty are mainly influenced by personal characteristics such as 
differences in risk aversion. We show that love of money and being trusting might also affect 
individuals’ ethical behavior, as they are significantly related with the acceptability of 
immoral conduct. Our results are useful to deepen our knowledge about the factors affecting 
attitudes towards cheating and, consequently, think of ways to limit it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: A13; C26; D91; H26. 
Keywords: Cheating behavior; Financial satisfaction; Financial literacy. 
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1. Introduction  
The increasing perception of dishonesty in everyday social interactions has led to 
define the concept of “cheating culture”, in which individuals justify cheating behavior, 
consider it as a means to achieve their goals and believe that everyone cheats in order to 
succeed (Crittenden et al., 2009). Several theories have been developed on why individuals 
undertake unethical actions. According to the standard economic models, wealth-maximizing 
individuals maintain ethical behaviors as long as resulting rewards outweigh potential gains 
from unethical actions (Becker, 1968). Subsequently, Chang (1998) argues that it is perceived 
behavioral control, defined as people’s perception of their ability to perform the behavior of 
interest, which guides people’s choices. Most recent approaches in explaining dishonesty 
show that individuals do not cheat as much as they can, because they are interested in 
maintaining a positive self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008). Therefore, both economic incentives 
and psychological factors are significant predictors of unethical behavior, which could be 
related to individual attitudes, cultural traditions and socioeconomic conditions.  
Previous literature relates cheating behavior with a range of socio-demographic 
variables. Dreber and Johannesson (2008) report that males lie more than females to secure 
monetary benefits; along this line, Friesen and Gangadharan (2012) find that men cheat more 
to achieve personal gains. In contrast, other authors have found no gender differences in 
ethical behaviors (Kidwell et al., 1987; Singhapakdi and Vitell, 1990). Most studies consider 
age as a driving determinant of honest behavior (Torgler, 2006; Friesen and Gangadharan, 
2012). Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010) find a positive relation between age and the 
development of ethical standards; similarly, in the context of fiscal compliance, Torgler 
(2006) shows that tax morale rises with age. Occupational status and education may also 
influence dishonesty by changing the opportunities to offenders in several unethical activities 
(Anwar et al., 2017). 
In the present study we focus on the effect of financial satisfaction as a new potential 
determinant of cheating attitudes. Financial satisfaction, defined as satisfaction with one's 
present financial situation, is an important determinant of overall individual well-being (Joo 
and Grable, 2004; Plagnol, 2011). Most importantly, financial satisfaction may also change 
individuals’ perception about dishonesty. As shown by Sharma et al. (2014), financial 
deprivation influences the acceptability of immoral conduct and this eventually compromises 
moral decisions. We expect that people more satisfied with their financial status might be less 
willing to justify dishonest actions; conversely, those who are less financially satisfied might 
cheat more as an attempt to improve their financial positions. Therefore, in estimating the 
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impact of the financial satisfaction on cheating behavior we face an issue of reverse causality; 
we deal with the potential endogeneity of financial satisfaction through the instrumental 
variable approach.  
We enrich the analysis by considering the association between “love of money” and 
cheating attitudes. People who value money highly are more likely to exhibit personality traits 
such as sensation seeking, competitiveness and materialism, which may be positively related 
with cheating behavior (Kirkcaldy and Furnham, 1993). Money beliefs and values vary across 
individuals. Besides its objective functions, money owns affective, symbolic and behavioral 
meaning, as it is associated to individuals’ identity and self-concepts (Mitchell and Mickel, 
1999). Therefore, the more an individual agrees that money is important, the more she might 
find acceptable some questionable consumer activities (Vitell et al., 2007).  
We further investigate the association between being trusting and attitudes towards 
cheating. According to Uslaner (1999) decisions to behave morally depend on how people 
expect others to act and on personal values, as they foster individuals’ ethical standards of 
behavior.  
We combine the analysis of the determinants of cheating with the line of research on 
the relationship between financial literacy and financial behavior. According to previous 
findings, those who are more knowledgeable in financial matters have a better understanding 
of financial products, they are more likely to invest in risky assets and they save more for 
precautionary reasons (Van Rooij et al., 2011; de Bassa Scheresberg, 2013). Individuals who 
are financially knowledgeable are also less likely to incur in high-transaction costs or 
expensive borrowing methods (Lusardi and Tufano, 2015); furthermore, using Dutch data, 
Alessie et al. (2011) demonstrate the positive causal effect of financial literacy on retirement 
preparation. Overall, financial knowledge has positive implications on several aspects of 
financial behavior. In this research, we focus on the role of financial literacy in influencing 
individuals’ satisfaction with their financial position to estimate the causal effect of financial 
wellbeing on consumers’ misbehaviors.  
We use Dutch data from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences 
(LISS) panel, a longitudinal household survey based on a true probability sample of 
households living in the Netherlands. Our final sample consists of 1,228 observations for 
individuals who completed the questionnaire in year 2012. 
Our research contributes to the existing literature in three main directions. First, we 
look at a new potential determinant of individuals’ attitudes towards dishonesty, namely 
financial satisfaction. Second, we consider multiple dimensions of cheating behavior: besides 
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the analysis of tax evasion, which has been widely explored in earlier studies (Grundmann 
and Lambsdorff, 2017; Torgler, 2006; Robben et al., 1990), we investigate the probability of 
claiming government benefits without any rights, stealing property, accepting a bribe and 
engaging in ordinary dishonest actions, such as travelling on buses without a valid ticket. Tax 
evasion has been mainly analyzed as a problem of choice under uncertainty (Allingham and 
Sandmo, 1972); people compare the benefit of lower fiscal burdens with the cost of 
punishment in the event they were caught (Gneezy, 2005). The costs associated with tax 
evasion are not only monetary; behaving illegally has high moral costs that arise from the 
feeling of shame about evading (Torgler and Schneider, 2007; Bosco and Mittone, 1997). 
Several factors might also determine individuals’ decisions about cheating on government 
benefits. The Dutch government provides a number of welfare benefits, such as healthcare 
allowances, rent benefits or childcare assistance for citizens and residents in the Netherlands. 
People who deliberately apply for government benefits to which they are not entitled are 
committing fraud. The other unethical behaviors considered in our work do not provide large 
financial benefits to individuals but still have large social and economic consequences 
(Bucciol et al., 2013). Finally, as a third contribution, we estimate the causal impact of the 
financial satisfaction on cheating behavior by using two indices of financial literacy as 
instruments to deal with the potential endogeneity of financial satisfaction. 
Our findings show that the financial satisfaction is a significant determinant of 
cheating towards the government, like benefits fraud or tax evasion. While those who are 
more satisfied with their standards of living are less likely to justify claiming government 
benefits without any right, we find a positive effect of financial satisfaction on the propensity 
to accept tax evasion. By contrast, an improvement in financial satisfaction does not make 
individuals less likely to justify stealing property and fare evasion. We show that these 
components of cheating are mainly affected by personal characteristics and individual 
attitudes towards money. Most importantly, we find a strong and significant role of risk 
aversion in reducing the acceptability of these unethical actions. Interestingly, we find that 
both financial satisfaction and risk aversion are significant drivers of tolerance towards 
bribery. Therefore, decisions to behave dishonestly do not result only from financial 
advantages: financial satisfaction and risk aversion have different and independent impacts 
on individuals’ tolerance towards dishonesty. 
In addition, we show that those who value money highly are more willing to justify all 
our cheating outcomes, except for benefits fraud; conversely, being trusting is significantly 
and negatively associated with all forms of misbehavior considered in our analysis.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the data, 
together with the econometric model and the relevant variables used in the analysis. We 
present our main findings in Section 3. Section 4 provides several robustness checks. The last 
Section concludes, discussing implications of this research as well as some ideas for further 
extensions. 
 
2. Data 
 
2.1. LISS Core Study and Assembled Studies 
In our research we use Dutch data from the LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the 
Social sciences) panel. The LISS panel is based on a sample of the population registered by 
Statistics Netherlands. One member in the household provides the household data; households 
without the necessary technological infrastructure are provided with a computer and Internet 
connection. Survey data are collected by CentERdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands). 
The survey is organized in eight modules, which cover questions on family and income, 
economic situation, work and schooling, social integration, health, personality, religion and 
ethnicity, politics and values. CentERdata provided all study data to the authors in an 
anonymized format. 
In addition to the LISS Core Study, we consider data from two additional modules 
connected to the LISS core study: World Values Survey and Financial Literacy. The former is 
the Dutch version of the original survey administered to the panel members in December 
2012; from here we obtain our measures of cheating, which we use as dependent variables in 
the analysis, and several additional variables that we relate to cheating behavior. The second 
one is a single wave study administered to the LISS panel in August 2011. It consists of 5 
questions:1 the first one is on self-assessed financial knowledge, while the other four test the 
respondent’s knowledge of financial concepts (i.e. interest rate, inflation, diversification, 
relationship between interest rate and bond prices) and can be used to build an index of 
financial literacy. 
We use information from the LISS Core Study for respondents who completed the 
questionnaire in year 2012, when data about cheating behavior have been collected; the 
background variables are selected on the same month as the dependent variables used in our 
analysis. After combining these data with those from the assembled studies, we select 
participants in the economically relevant age range 18-80; this leaves a sample consisting of 
 
1 The precise wording of these questions is reported in Appendix A.1. 
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8,008 observations. In doing our analysis, we consider information that are no missing for 
respondents who participated in all the surveys mentioned above. Our final sample consists of 
1,228 observations.2  
 
2.2. Econometric model  
In performing our analysis we consider several determinants of unethical behavior and 
we focus on the relation between cheating attitudes and individuals’ financial satisfaction. 
The equation we estimate is specified as follows: 
 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽4 + 𝐹𝑖
′𝛽5 + 𝜀𝑖       (1) 
where 𝑐𝑖 represents the outcome variables on cheating attitudes for individual i (benefits 
fraud, tax evasion, fare evasion, stealing property and bribery) and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term.  
The focus of our analysis is on financial satisfaction, as we believe that it might have a 
strong influence on individuals’ perception about dishonesty: people who experience financial 
hardship might be more likely to justify cheating behaviors. Financial dissatisfaction increases 
individuals’ willingness to cheat for financial gains, as shown in the literature on subjective 
wellbeing or moral hypocrisy (Barden et al., 2005; Stone and Fernandez, 2008; Sharma et al., 
2014). At the same time, those who are more satisfied with their standards of living could be 
less willing to justify dishonest behavior. As individuals’ perceptions about cheating 
eventually compromise their practical conducts, we want to explore this issue in our data. 
In addition, we look at the role of love of money and general trust on attitudes towards 
cheating. 
Recent literature has examined how love of money relates to unethical behavior. 
People with high love of money are those who want to be rich and consider money as an 
important symbol of success (Tang and Liu, 2012). We argue that materialistic people, who 
value money highly, may be more likely to tolerate dishonest actions that provide financial 
gains. 
We also investigate the association between being trusting and tolerance towards 
cheating. Opinions about morality largely depend on how people expect others to act. We 
expect that people who trust others attach greater importance to social connections and they 
 
2 The number of complete observations for the variable representing bribery is 1,212. Descriptive statistics about 
the complete sample are similar to those reported in our analysis, supporting the representativeness of our data. 
Some differences arise in the percentage of married and religious people, who are slightly overrepresented in 
the final sample.  
46 
 
are more likely to put personal interest aside; therefore, they may be more willing to behave 
correctly. 
The other variables included in our analysis can be grouped in two vectors: 𝑋𝑖
′ and 𝐹𝑖
′. 
𝑋𝑖
′ refers to a vector of explanatory variables that comprises socio-demographic controls and a 
measure of risk aversion. 𝐹𝑖
′ is a vector of further control variables that we choose from the 
broader literature on consumer misbehavior; we include these variables in our specifications 
as a robustness check.  
For each binary dependent variable,3 we present estimations from a linear probability 
model with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. However, we cannot simply rely on 
these estimates to assess the causal effect of financial satisfaction on cheating, as we may face 
a problem of reverse causality: whilst individuals’ financial satisfaction determines their 
attitudes towards unethical behavior, it is also true that cheating might be performed with the 
purpose of improving financial satisfaction. Specifically, government subsidies are mainly 
granted to citizens in difficult financial conditions, which might improve after receiving 
financial support. The same is true when considering the propensity to cheat on taxes. 
Benefits fraud and tax evasion have a significant impact on the size of the shadow economy; 
people may engage in fraudulent activities towards the government with the purpose of 
improving their financial conditions. This implies that the coefficients estimated by these 
models might be biased; we deal with the problem of endogeneity by using our indices of 
financial literacy as instruments.  
We compare our estimates with those from a linear 2SLS model. Despite ignoring the 
binary nature of the outcome variables, it is widely used in the literature and supported by 
much real-world experience (Wooldridge, 2008; Angrist and Pischke, 2009); moreover, it is 
easily interpretable, and it allows us to test for the validity of our instruments.4  
The choice of using financial literacy as an instrument is justified by the following 
reasons: first, there is considerable evidence suggesting that financial knowledge has a 
positive impact on individuals’ financial satisfaction (Joo and Grable, 2004). Gerrans et al. 
(2014) show that financial knowledge provides financial satisfaction, which in turn is a 
predictor of personal wellbeing. In addition, financial literacy fosters the capacity to deal with 
financial emergencies and it increases the possibility of accumulating wealth (Lusardi et al., 
2011). For instance, Bernheim et al. (2001) report an increase in the accumulation of assets 
 
3 Please refer to Sub-section 2.3.1 for more details about the construction of our key variables. 
4 We re-estimate our equations using probit and IV probit models to specifically account for the binary nature of 
the dependent variables; results are provided in Appendix B. 
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over time in countries where students were exposed to financial curricula during high school. 
Hence, we expect that saving allows individuals to improve their financial satisfaction.  Based 
on this evidence, we claim that financial knowledge has a positive impact on individuals’ 
financial satisfaction. Second, it might be argued that those who display deeper legal and 
financial knowledge are also aware of how to act strategically in order to cheat. Indeed, we 
may expect that those who are capable to exploit their knowledge to be financially successful 
might be particularly prone in disregarding others’ interests by acting immorally. However, if 
this argument might hold for dishonest actions performed against institutions, such as tax 
evasion or benefits fraud, it does not apply to the other measures of cheating, which do not 
require specific financial knowledge. Moreover, those who, in our sample, display greater 
financial knowledge cannot be defined as “experts” in financial fields; knowledge of simple 
economics concepts, like those considered to create our indices, are not so sophisticated as to 
allow individuals to exploit them in order to cheat. Finally, our measures of cheating are not 
gauging actual behavior of individuals, but their tolerance towards some questionable actions; 
in our opinion, the justifiability of unethical behaviors considered in this study is mainly 
influenced by personal values and socio-economic conditions, rather than by individuals’ 
knowledge of financial concepts. Therefore, we assume that our indices of financial literacy 
are not directly related to individuals’ tolerance towards cheating. 
 
2.3. Definition of the key variables 
 
2.3.1. Cheating measures 
We obtain our indirect measures of cheating from the World Values Survey (LISS 
Panel version). Respondents are asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (Never) to 10 (Always) 
whether they justify or not some actions, among these: “Claiming government benefits to 
which you are not entitled”, “Avoiding a fare on public transport”, “Stealing property”, 
“Cheating on taxes if you have a chance” and “Someone accepting a bribe in the course of 
their duties”.5 
However, it should be noted that our dependent variables display very low variability, 
as most of respondents report they do not justify at all the dishonest behaviors described in the 
survey. It could be that interviewed people might under-report their real tendencies towards 
cheating, given the sensitive nature of the information asked. Thus, observations are not 
equally distributed across the entire scale: for each dependent variable used in the analysis, 
 
5 The precise wording of these questions is reported in Appendix A.2. 
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the largest concentration of responses is on point 1 on the corresponding Likert-scale.6 To get 
enough variation from individuals’ responses, we aggregate the other scaling items into one, 
which represents the overall acceptability of the specific unethical behavior. Therefore, we 
model our dependent variables as dichotomous ones, taking value one if respondents justify, 
even to a small extent, an incorrect behavior on the specific action (points 2 to 10 on the 
scale), and zero otherwise. 
 
2.3.2. Determinants of cheating behavior 
Financial satisfaction  
We measure financial satisfaction from the income questionnaire of the LISS Core 
Study; respondents are asked to report their satisfaction with their financial situations on a 
Likert-scale ranging from 0 (Not at all satisfied) to 10 (Entirely satisfied). 
It should be recalled that compliance with social norms is also influenced by economic 
factors such as changes in prices or available income (Halla and Schneider, 2014). The level 
of income provides objective information about respondents’ financial position; conversely, 
our measure of financial satisfaction is described by the satisfaction with one’s current 
financial status, which might be related to consumer choices, job productivity and marital 
stress (Joo and Grable, 2004). Both financial satisfaction and income might affect our 
dependent variables, but they are also correlated to each other. In particular, we expect the 
financial satisfaction over life resembles the life course pattern of income (Plagnol, 2011). In 
line with this, Dolan et al. (2008) find that financial satisfaction mediates the effects of 
objective circumstances (i.e. income or financial status) on individuals’ measure of personal 
wellbeing; again, Hira and Mugenda (2000) find that those who have higher household 
income and save more are more likely to report higher financial satisfaction.  
Our benchmark analysis is eventually based on the effect of financial satisfaction.7 
According to previous literature, subjective values and ethical principles have a deeper impact 
on moral behavior compared to other socio-demographic determinants (Uslaner, 1999). 
Dishonesty is not only driven by economic incentives; that it is why people usually engage in 
some levels of cheating, without updating completely their own morality (Shalvi et al., 2011). 
The huge importance attached to subjective components in influencing cheating behavior 
 
6 See figure A.1 in Appendix A.2. 
7 Appendix Table D.4 reports OLS estimates with household income as an additional explanatory variable; 
results are consistent.  
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justifies our choice of focusing on financial satisfaction; it reflects the interviewee’s feelings 
and satisfaction about her personal financial position, so we expect a greater effect of this 
subjective variable on individuals’ attitudes towards dishonesty.  
 
Love of money  
We measure money love of the respondent by considering her agreement on the 
following item of the World Values Survey (LISS Panel version): “It is important to this 
person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things”. This is a short description of 
another person. Respondents are asked to indicate whether they are similar to that person on a 
likert scale ranging from 1 (“not at all like me”) to 6 (“very much like me”). Our measure of 
“love of money” is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent provides an answer 
greater than or equal to the third tier (from “a little” to “very much” like her), and zero 
otherwise.  
 
General trust 
We measure the level of trust of individuals through the agreement on the following 
statement of the World Values Survey (LISS Panel version): “I see myself as someone who is 
generally trusting”. We model “general trust” as a dummy variable equal to one if the 
respondent indicates that she strongly agrees with this sentence, and zero otherwise.8 
 
2.3.3. Instruments: financial literacy 
Financial literacy is generally measured through three questions about key financial 
concepts (interest compounding, inflation, risk diversification). These questions were first 
administered in a special module for the 2004 US Health and Retirement Study and they were 
added to other international surveys thereafter (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014). The assembled 
study administered to the LISS panel presents these three standard questions and an additional 
one on the relationship between interest rate and bond prices. Although the questions vary in 
difficulty, none of them requires expert financial knowledge as they are not excessively 
complex. This notwithstanding, previous researches suggest that consumers’ knowledge of 
basic financial principles is very low; individuals who lack financial knowledge might take 
suboptimal financial decisions, as they do not plan for retirement, they rely more on informal 
 
8 Results qualitatively do not change when we reproduce our analysis by keeping the whole scale for both the 
dependent variables and all the main regressors (financial satisfaction, love of money and general trust).  
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sources of financial information and they also borrow at higher costs (Lusardi and Mitchell, 
2014).  
Following Van Rooij et al. (2011), we perform a factor analysis on the financial 
literacy questions. We first define a dummy variable for the correct answer to each question. 
Consistently with previous literature, we create another dummy if the respondent states that 
she did not know the answer to the question; exploiting information from such a response is 
necessary in measuring financial literacy, as it characterizes individuals who know the least 
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011). We combine financial literacy information on an index by 
performing the factor analysis with the principal component method. From this procedure we 
obtain two factors: one has heavy loadings on the simplest literacy questions, while the other 
is more heavily loaded on those about diversification and the relationship between interest 
rates and bond prices. Therefore, we retain two factors underlying the level of basic and 
advanced financial literacy, respectively. Barlett's test of sphericity (p<0.001) indicates that it 
is appropriate to use factor analysis. We assume that financial knowledge does not change 
between 2011, when the additional module on financial literacy has been administered, and 
2012; while financial education provided at school might increase financial knowledge and 
skills of young individuals, we expect that financial literacy is rather stable among adults, 
who constitutes the great majority of our sample.9 
 
2.3.4. Control variables 
Recent literature provides mixed evidence on the factors that mainly affect cheating 
behavior. The role of gender in influencing dishonest behavior has been investigated by 
Friesen and Gangadharan (2012), who find that men exhibit greater propensity to behave 
dishonestly, compared to women; in line with this, Crown and Spiller (1998) find that 
cheating behavior among males is significantly higher. Conversely, Ezquerra et al. (2018) 
report no gender difference in cheating once these are tested using the dice-paradigm. It could 
also be that males are more likely to report that they engaged in past cheating behaviors 
compared to females (Smith et al., 2002). Other studies suggest that gender differences arise 
only when interpersonal relationships are involved, while men and women display in the same 
way when dishonest actions are non-relational. We expect that gender is a significant 
predictor of ethical behavior; therefore, we decide to control for this variable in our 
specifications. The effect of age is also relevant. Diekhoff et al. (1996) find that younger 
 
9 We repeat our analysis by considering only respondents older than 25, as individuals in this age range should 
have completed their educational path, achieving a stable level of knowledge; results are consistent. 
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students cheat more than their older peers; Kelley et al. (1990) show that age positively 
influences ethical behavior, as individuals develop a greater understanding of honesty as they 
grow up. Similarly, Peterson et al. (2001) find that older people possess higher ethical 
principles and that gender differences decrease as people grow older. In the context of tax 
evasion, Torgler (2006) finds that being married correlates negatively to cheating behavior; 
married people or those with children are more constrained by their social networks, so they 
might be more oriented to comply with social norms to maintain respectable social positions. 
Occupational status and education may also influence tolerance towards cheating. As an 
example, workers who are self-employed have greater opportunities to underreport their 
incomes to pay less taxes, compared to individuals who are employed on a contractual basis.  
Based on this short discussion, we include several socio-demographic indicators as 
control variables in our specifications. We add an indicator for the level of urbanization of 
respondents’ place of residence, which is also useful to capture area fixed effects. Finally, we 
consider a dummy variable to account for risk aversion; as people’s unethical behaviors 
involve some risks, we argue that individuals who are more risk averse are also less likely to 
cheat (Eishenauer et al., 2011). 
 
2.3.5. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the relevant variables used in our analysis. The 
averages of the dependent variables are rather low. In particular, about 13% of individuals 
consider acceptable to claim not entitled government benefits and 9% of them justify 
dishonest behavior regarding property stealing. The percentage of individuals who accept fare 
evasion is higher (35%); it can be considered as less serious compared to other dishonest 
behaviors. Cheating on taxes is what could provide the greatest monetary benefits; it is 
justified by about 37% of the sample. 17% of individuals claim to tolerate bribery. The 
average age of the respondents is 54, about 52% are women and 9.7% of the individuals have 
college education. More than half of the individuals are married and 41% of them live in a 
highly urbanized area. Overall, 43.6% of respondents are employees, while self-employed 
individuals constitute only 3.3% of our sample. In our sample, 23.4% of the individuals 
consider money and wealth to be important and most of them state to be financially satisfied, 
with an average of 6.7 out of 10; 41% of respondents declare to be generally trusting. As 
expected, knowledge of basic financial concepts is higher (88.2%) than the average level of 
advanced financial knowledge (37.3%).  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
 
Dependent variables 
    
Benefits fraud 0.129 0.336 0 1 
Tax evasion 0.367 0.482 0 1 
Fare evasion 0.353 0.478 0 1 
Stealing property 0.093 0.290 0 1 
Bribery 0.172 0.377 0 1 
 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
    
Age 54.168 15.33 18 80 
Female 0.519 0.500 0 1 
Number of children 0.563 0.987 0 6 
Married 0.542 0.498 0 1 
Place of residence: high urban (population 
density per square kilometer≥1500) 
0.410 0.492 0 1 
Employee 0.436 0.496 0 1 
Self-employed 0.033 0.180 0 1 
College 0.097 0.296 0 1 
Household monthly income 2,515.103 1,524.057 0 13,500 
 
Main regressors 
    
Love of money 0.234 0.423 0 1 
Financial satisfaction 6.700 1.786 0 10 
General trust 0.410 0.492 0 1 
 
Instrumental variables 
    
Basic financial literacy 0.882 0.182 0.015 1 
Advanced financial literacy 0.373 0.270 0 0.874 
 
Further control variables 
    
Risk aversion 0.598 0.490 0 1 
     
Notes: data are from 2012 LISS Core Study and from the additional modules World Values Survey and 
Financial Literacy. The final sample consists of 1,228 observations. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Cheating towards the government 
We first discuss the impact of financial satisfaction on benefits frauds and tax evasion; 
these outcomes represent tolerance of cheating towards the government.  
Regression results from different specifications of Equation (1) are reported in Table 
2. For each dependent variable considered in this section, we present the results from the 
linear probability model (Columns 1 and 3) and from instrumental variables estimations, 
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where financial satisfaction has been instrumented using our two indices of financial literacy 
(Columns 2 and 4).  
Table 2. Cheating towards the government 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Benefits fraud Tax evasion 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
     
Financial satisfaction -0.016*** -0.088*** 0.009 0.093** 
 (0.006) (0.032) (0.008) (0.039) 
Love of money 0.037 0.040 0.096*** 0.093*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.035) (0.036) 
General trust -0.049*** -0.057*** -0.086*** -0.077*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.029) 
Age ≤ 30 0.076 0.028 -0.057 -0.002 
 (0.048) (0.056) (0.061) (0.068) 
Age 31-65 0.034 -0.031 -0.013 0.062 
 (0.025) (0.038) (0.040) (0.055) 
Female -0.023 -0.029 -0.121*** -0.114*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) 
Number of children 0.016 0.002 -0.002 0.013 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) 
Married -0.012 0.028 -0.027 -0.073* 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) (0.038) 
High urban -0.001 -0.007 -0.057** -0.051* 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) 
Employee 0.011 0.061* -0.017 -0.076* 
 (0.025) (0.035) (0.034) (0.045) 
Self-employed 0.042 0.077 0.054 0.014 
 (0.067) (0.073) (0.078) (0.087) 
College 0.018 0.050 -0.017 -0.055 
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.048) (0.052) 
Risk averse -0.031 -0.020 -0.035 -0.047 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.029) (0.031) 
Constant 0.242*** 0.727*** 0.461*** -0.108 
 (0.049) (0.220) (0.068) (0.271) 
     
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 
R-squared 0.036  0.047  
F-statistic   18.310  18.310 
Sargan test p-value  0.635  0.615 
Exogeneity test p-value  0.013  0.021 
     
Notes: this table presents coefficient estimates on cheating towards the government using OLS 
(Columns 1 and 3) and IV (Columns 2 and 4) regression models. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. Reference categories are: age>65 (age), not employed (occupation), less 
than high school (education).  
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According to Column 1 of Table 2, an improved financial satisfaction is associated 
with a lower propensity (1.6 percentage points) of accepting incorrect behaviors related to 
government benefits. As expected, financial satisfaction influences people’s perceptions about 
morality; individuals who are more satisfied with their standards of living are more critical in 
judging dishonest behaviors. Conversely, the results reported in the third column of Table 2 
show that the correlation between financial satisfaction and the probability to accept tax 
evasion is not statistically significant. 
However, as argued earlier, these estimates cannot be interpreted causally. Benefits 
fraud and tax evasion might provide individuals with large monetary payoffs, improving their 
financial conditions. This suggests that the effect of financial satisfaction on these outcomes is 
endogenous as we face an issue of reverse causality. 
We account for the potential endogeneity of financial satisfaction by using our indices 
of financial literacy as instrumental variables. We employ our two indices of financial literacy 
to account for the endogeneity of financial satisfaction.10 The Sargan test indicates no 
rejection of instruments’ exogeneity and from the Hausman test we find evidence in favor of 
the endogeneity of financial satisfaction. The F-statistic is above the recommended value to 
avoid the weak instruments problem (Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
The IV estimates in Column 2 of Table 2 show that the relationship between financial 
satisfaction and the propensity to cheat on government benefits remains negative and 
statistically significant at 1% significance level. We find that those who are more satisfied 
with their standards of living are less likely to justify claiming on government benefits 
without any right; however, the effect of financial satisfaction is even bigger in size compared 
to those provided by the model in Column 1. Therefore, after accounting for the endogeneity 
of financial satisfaction, we find that the effect of financial satisfaction in reducing incorrect 
behavior is above and beyond the one estimated by the linear probability model. The most 
interesting result arises when we consider the propensity to evade taxes as dependent variable; 
after accounting for the endogeneity of financial satisfaction, we find that people who are 
more satisfied with their financial positions are 9.3 percentage points more likely to accept tax 
evasion (Column 4). This effect is strongly significant from both a statistical and an economic 
perspective. Although we generally expect an inverse relationship between financial 
satisfaction and individuals’ misconduct, we should notice that higher financial satisfaction is 
generally associated with greater income levels; the rich might display lower tax morale 
 
10 Appendix C reports results for the tests of our instruments.  
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because their compliance implies a greater loss of income. Public good games also confirm 
this result, as income has been found to be negatively correlated with fiscal contributions 
(Cherry et al., 2005; Duch and Solaz, 2015).  
Many researchers have discussed the effects of money on human behavior and 
considerable evidence shows that love of money may eventually cloud individuals’ ethical 
attitudes (Tang and Chiu, 2003; Vitell et al., 2007). While love of money is not a significant 
determinant of the first measure of cheating considered in Table 2, our results on tax evasion 
provide evidence of a positive association between love of money and tolerance towards tax 
evasion. This correlation is quantitatively large, as love of money increases the propensity to 
cheat on taxes by 9.3 percentage points (Column 4). In line with Torgler (2003), results from 
Table 2 suggest that decisions on tax compliance are also influenced by moral attitudes. 
Interestingly, the correlation between being trusting and tolerance towards cheating is 
strongly significant and negative for all the specifications reported in Table 2; in particular, 
being trusting decreases the propensity of justifying benefits fraud and tax evasion by 5.7 and 
7.7 percentage points, respectively (Columns 2 and 4). A possible explanation is that people 
who trust others believe that peers would not act contrary to their own interests; they might be 
more likely to behave honestly, putting self-interest aside (Uslaner, 1999).    
The impact of socio-demographic characteristics on the propensity to claim 
government benefits without any right is not overall significant when we consider the 
instrumental variables estimates (Column 2).  This might be related to the lower precision of 
the IV estimates, as indicated by larger standard errors reported in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 
2.  
However, when we consider the last specification reported in Table 2, we find that 
being female, married or living in a high urban city have a significant negative effect on the 
propensity of justifying tax evasion. Our findings are in line with previous literature showing 
that women exhibit greater propensity to comply with tax payments, consider the fiscal 
system as fairer and overestimate the penalties for tax evasion (Kinsey, 1992; Rosenbaum et 
al., 2014). Moreover, married people might be more likely to comply with social norms 
because they face greater social constraints (Torgler, 2006). Interestingly, those living in 
highly urbanized areas are less likely to accept tax evasion. It may be that good institutions 
increase citizens' well-being, making them more likely to comply with fiscal rules; the costs 
of illegal activities might be perceived as higher for people living in highly urbanized areas 
also for the presence of greater institutional accountability (Torgler and Schneider, 2007). 
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3.2. Other forms of cheating  
Besides the components of cheating analyzed in the previous Sub-section, there are 
other forms of dishonesty that are extremely costly for the society. Some examples are 
stealing from one’s employer, illegally downloading music from the web, cheating on an 
exam or using public transportation without paying the ticket. In our analysis, we consider 
fare evasion, property stealing and bribery as expressions of other forms of dishonesty; Table 
3 reports regression results from Equation (1) for these cheating outcomes. 
According to the Hausman test, the OLS estimates do not differ significantly from the 
IV estimates; the exogeneity of financial satisfaction is not rejected. The assumption of 
instruments exogeneity finds statistical support in Sargan test of the overidentifying 
restrictions.11 For this reason, we rely on the linear probability model to discuss the effects of 
our regressors on the dependent variables under considerations. Indeed, the financial gains 
arising from these forms of cheating are probably not substantial enough to impact the 
financial satisfaction of the cheater. Estimation results from the OLS regressions are 
presented in Table 3.12  
Table 3. Other forms of cheating 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fare evasion Stealing property Bribery 
 OLS OLS OLS 
    
Financial satisfaction 0.001 -0.004 -0.012* 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) 
Love of money 0.057* 0.043* 0.053* 
 (0.034) (0.023) (0.030) 
General trust -0.093*** -0.047*** -0.038* 
 (0.026) (0.016) (0.021) 
Age: below 30 0.218*** 0.074* 0.172*** 
 (0.059) (0.041) (0.057) 
Age: below 65 0.049 0.047** 0.029 
 (0.037) (0.022) (0.029) 
Female 0.010 -0.013 -0.103*** 
 (0.027) (0.016) (0.022) 
Number of children 0.030* 0.010 -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) 
Married -0.059** 0.019 -0.022 
 (0.029) (0.017) (0.023) 
 
11 Sargan test statistic of overidentifying restrictions for the variable “fare evasion” is equal to 0.480 with a p-
value of 0.488. It is equal to 1.222 with a p-value of 0.270 for the variable “property stealing”. As regards 
“bribery”, the test statistic is equal to 0.381 with a p-value of 0.537. 
12 Regression results for the corresponding IV estimates are available upon request. 
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High urban 0.034 0.008 -0.027 
 (0.027) (0.017) (0.021) 
Employee 0.088*** -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.034) (0.022) (0.028) 
Self-employed 0.059 -0.057 -0.006 
 (0.079) (0.048) (0.067) 
College 0.079 0.041 -0.011 
 (0.048) (0.036) (0.039) 
Risk averse -0.106*** -0.061*** -0.052** 
 (0.029) (0.019) (0.024) 
Constant 0.329*** 0.117*** 0.333*** 
 (0.067) (0.038) (0.057) 
    
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,212 
R-squared 0.091 0.043 0.062 
    
Notes: this table presents coefficient estimates on other forms of cheating using OLS regression 
model. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance 
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Reference categories are: age>65 (age), 
not employed (occupation), less than high school (education). 
 
Those who state to be financially satisfied usually report higher savings and household 
income (Hira and Mugenda, 2000); therefore, we might expect that individuals who do not 
face financial constraints are less incentivized to cheat, especially for a low stake. However, 
we do not find evidence of a significant association between our measure of financial 
satisfaction and the propensity to accept fare evasion and property stealing, meaning that 
economic gains are not the most significant predictors of these forms of cheating.  
In line with De Angelo et al., (2016) we show that personal characteristics and 
preferences for decision making under uncertainty are more important in explaining variation 
in the acceptability of fare evasion and property stealing. Indeed, we find sizable and 
significant effects on money love and risk aversion. Even if fare evasion provides only a small 
benefit, as the cost of a bus ticket is generally small, we find that those who value money 
highly are 5.7 percentage points more likely to justify fare evasion on public transport 
(Column 1); this is in line with Delbosc and Currie (2016), who find that deliberate evaders 
believe it is acceptable to bend the rules to save money. The effect of love of money on the 
propensity to steal property is also positive and statistically significant; Column 2 of Table 3 
shows that people who consider important to be rich are 4.3 percentage points more willing to 
accept this form of cheating.  
Differences in risk aversion and in perceptions with respect to the probability of 
getting caught also affect the propensity to cheat. In line with Jing and Cheo (2013), we find 
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that risk aversion is negatively correlated with the propensity to accept fare evasion and 
property stealing. In particular, those who are more risk averse are 10.6 percentage points less 
likely to accept fare evasion on public transport and 6.1 percentage points less willing to steal 
property. 
Results on general trust highlight that social interactions matters: being trusting 
decreases the propensity of justifying all the forms of unethical behavior considered in Table 
3. It is possible that those who believe most people can be trusted identify themselves as part 
of a social group and develop strong mutual connections. In turn, shared group identity might 
enhance virtuous behaviors (Della Valle and Ploner, 2017). 
Therefore, as stated by Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) analyzing free riding in public 
goods experiments, only a minority of individuals are motivated by pure income-
maximization reasons; cooperation is determined by personal beliefs and, mainly, by 
expectations about peers’ contribution. 
Among the other forms of dishonesty considered in this subsection, bribery is the most 
closely related to cheating towards the government. Indeed, it is a form of corruption that 
might prevent the development of an efficient government system, as it often involves a 
misuse of public office for private gains (Dong et al., 2012; Lee and Guven, 2013).  
In line with our findings on benefits fraud, we show that an improved satisfaction with 
one's finances reduces the willingness to accept bribery by 1.2 percentage points. This result 
reinforces previous evidence by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), who find that corruption 
may be reduced by increasing citizens’ income. Moreover, as shown by Martin et al. (2007), 
financial constraints can increase firms’ propensity to engage in bribery as a strategy for the 
achievement of goals. Therefore, financial satisfaction seems to be an important determinant 
of individual attitudes towards bribery.  
However, the results reported in the last Column of Table 3 suggest that the 
acceptability of this unethical behavior partly depends on individuals’ attitudes towards risk. 
Indeed, the propensity to accept bribery is reduced by 5.2 percentage points when individuals 
are risk averse, possibly because of the intense feeling of shame that would arise in the event 
of getting caught. Therefore, both financial satisfaction and risk aversion are significant 
drivers of tolerance towards bribery. Specifically, a respondent who is risk averse is as 
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likely to disregard bribery as an individual who is satisfied with her personal financial 
situation (Column 3).13  
The standard analysis of free-rider problem assumes that people are rational and they 
weigh more personal interests than collective benefits (He, 2012). We show here that 
decisions to behave dishonestly do not result only from financial advantages: financial 
satisfaction and risk aversion have different and independent impacts on individuals’ 
tolerance towards bribery.  
In addition, we show that personal characteristics and individual attitudes towards 
money and risk aversion are the most significant predictors of the other forms of cheating, 
namely fare evasion and property stealing. 
We find statistically significant effects of socio-demographic indicators on the 
propensity to engage in fare evasion, property stealing and bribery. We show that married 
respondents are less likely to accept fare evasion, as they might possess higher ethical 
principles and be more oriented to comply with social norms (Peterson et al., 2001). Young 
respondents are more willing to accept all the forms of dishonesty considered in Table 3. 
Students or young workers represent the most significant market group in transit ridership; 
results on fare evasion are in line with Bucciol et al. (2013), who show through a field 
experiment that young individuals are more likely to travel without a valid ticket. These 
findings support previous literature indicating that younger people are more ethically 
permissive than older individuals, who possess higher moral values (Peterson et al., 2001; 
Longenecker et al. 1989). We find that being an employee increases the acceptability of 
evading fares on public transport. Organ and Ryan (1995) argue that job attitudes are 
significant predictors of personal behavior in the field. Those who are employed on a 
contractual basis are usually affected by organizational choices made by other individuals 
belonging to the same organization; when supervisor’s decisions are perceived as unfair, 
workers may try to restore fairness by indulging in dishonest behavior also outside 
organizational borders (Della Valle and Ploner, 2017). We show that females are 10.3 
percentage points less likely than males to tolerate bribery, confirming previous results by 
Swamy et al., (2001). Instead, we do not find a significant impact of education on the forms 
of cheating considered in Table 3. The overall impact of education on cheating attitudes is 
difficult to determine a priori (Ehrlich, 1975). Anwar et al., (2017) find that the effect of 
education on unethical behavior depends on the way it changes the available opportunities to 
 
13 The difference between the coefficient on financial satisfaction and the coefficient on risk aversion is not 
statistically significant as the p-value associated to the Chi-squared test is equal to 0.115. 
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offenders in several illegitimate activities. Further research is needed to clarify the 
relationship between education and cheating behavior; similar considerations hold for 
occupational status. Other control variables show insignificant impact on the same outcomes. 
 
4. Robustness checks 
 
4.1. The estimation model 
The dependent variables used in our analysis are constructed by assigning a positive 
value when cheating is considered justifiable by the respondent, even to a small extent; 
conversely, the value 0 represents the extreme opinion “Never justifiable”. We re-estimate our 
equations using probit and IV probit regression models to specifically account for the binary 
nature of the dependent variable; the estimates are provided in Appendix B. Results are very 
similar in sign and significance to those presented above, confirming the robustness of our 
findings.  
 
4.2. The definition of the instruments 
In the previous analysis, we have presented IV estimates by using two continuous 
instruments for one endogenous variable. As a robustness check, we estimate again our IV 
models with alternative binary instruments for financial literacy. The values of the financial 
literacy indices are mainly clustered towards the extremes of the distributions; therefore, we 
define a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent scores above the average level of 
basic and advanced financial literacy in the sample, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
Appendix Table D.1 shows that the effects of financial satisfaction, love of money and 
general trust are very similar, in terms of size and significance, to those previously estimated 
even when we consider two dummy variables as instruments. Our findings are consistent even 
when we consider only basic financial literacy as an instrument for the endogenous financial 
satisfaction. We state that knowledge of simple economics concepts is not so sophisticated as 
to be exploited by individuals to act immorally; this is even more valid when we focus on 
knowledge of basic financial concepts. Regression results in the case of exact identification 
are presented in Appendix Table D.2. 
We also repeat our estimates by using the alternative identification strategy proposed 
by Lewbel (2012). Regression results are provided in Appendix Table D.3. Lewbel’s method 
estimates structural parameters in regression models with endogenous variables by 
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constructing instruments as functions of the model’s data.14 Hence, the specification does not 
require external instruments to identify casual relationships. Results from Lewbel IV indicate 
that a greater satisfaction with personal financial position is negatively associated with the 
tolerance towards benefits fraud, whereas it is not relevant for the other forms of cheating, as 
mostly reported in Table 3. The effects of love of money and general trust are also consistent 
with the baseline results. 
 
4.3. Endogeneity issues: reverse causality and general trust 
Finding proper instruments is not easy, and we do not state that our choice entirely 
solves the endogeneity problems discussed above; for instance, it might still be argued that 
unobservable confounders may influence the relationship between financial literacy and 
individuals’ financial satisfaction.15 Notice, however, that our measure of financial literacy is 
lagged, so it should not be sensitive to the presence of omitted variables which can affect our 
specifications. By contrast, its effect on financial behavior might take time to realize, 
affecting individuals’ financial satisfaction in the following year (when data for the main 
estimates have been collected). We perform an additional robustness check by implementing 
the “Generalized Sensitivity Analysis” as developed by Harada (2012), to test whether the 
relation between financial satisfaction and financial literacy is robust to potential unobserved 
confounders. The contour plot depicted in Figure 1 shows that the correlation between 
unobservable variables, financial literacy and situation would have to be much stronger than 
that of the included covariates to change the magnitude and the significance of our results. As 
it is difficult that we are omitting variables more highly correlated with financial satisfaction 
than age, gender, educational level and civil status, we conclude that our findings are robust to 
potential omitted factors. 
We repeat the sensitivity analysis using alternatively “general trust” as assignment 
variable for the specification reported in Column 1 of Table 2.16 Indeed, the presence of 
unobserved factors that affect both attitudes towards cheating and the willingness of being 
trusting might also cause endogeneity problems, including reverse causality. Nevertheless, 
Figure 2 shows that potential confounders should be much strongly correlated with general 
 
14 Lewbel’s approach exploits heteroskedasticity in the first-stage regression residuals to achieve identification. 
As it does not rely on standard exclusion restrictions, this estimation strategy may be useful in applications 
where traditional instruments are not available. For a more detailed description of this method see Lewbel 
(2012). 
15 However, the robustness of the causal relation between financial literacy and financial behavior has been 
already established in previous research (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008). 
16 The algorithm can be applied to the other specifications as well. 
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trust and cheating than the included covariates to modify the causal interpretation of the 
results, confirming the robustness of our findings.  
In addition, to deal with the potential endogeneity of general trust, which might affect 
the quality of our results, we repeat our estimates by omitting general trust from the original 
model. As Appendix Table D.5 shows, in all instances results on the effects of financial 
satisfaction and love of money are qualitatively the same, meaning that they are not too 
sensitive to the presence of general trust in the specification. This notwithstanding, in doing 
our analysis we are not claiming that general trust causes ethical behavior, since those who 
are trusting might be less tolerant towards dishonesty to begin with. Our results on the link 
between general trust and cheating might not reflect causation, but they are still interesting to 
shed more light on the factors that are correlated with individuals’ tolerance towards unethical 
behavior. 
 
Figure 1. Generalized sensitivity analysis 
 
 
Notes: Generalized sensitivity analysis on the effect of advanced financial literacy 
(assignment variable) on individuals’ financial satisfaction (outcome variable). Partial 
correlations are used as the axes of the contour plot. The target size of the t-value of the 
treatment variable is 1.96. 
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Figure 2. Generalized sensitivity analysis 
 
 
Notes: Generalized sensitivity analysis is performed on the model equation reported in 
Column 1 of Table 2. Being trusting constitutes the assignment variable. Partial correlations 
are used as the axes of the contour plot. The target size of the t-value of the treatment variable 
is 1.96. 
 
4.4.  Additional determinants of attitudes towards cheating  
We control for additional determinants of cheating to limit the possibility that our 
results were driven by omitted variables. We do not include the whole set of control variables 
in the baseline specifications as we prefer a more parsimonious model, which increases 
precision of estimation.17   
We control for the national origin of the respondent, as it might produce a sense of 
identification with her own country that encourages cooperative behavior; according to De 
Cremer et al. (2001) sense of belonging might increase citizens’ level of social cooperation. 
We add another variable to represent religiosity, since it might encourage individuals to 
behave correctly by imposing moral constraints on their behaviors (Torgler, 2006). We 
consider a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent states to have high locus of control 
over her life, and zero otherwise. According to Verme (2009), freedom of choice and control 
are the best predictors of individuals’ life satisfaction; previous literature provides evidence 
about the role of life satisfaction in influencing subjective well-being and happiness, which 
 
17 The standard errors of the estimated coefficients slightly increase when we include additional control 
variables. 
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are positively related with ethics (James and Chymis, 2004; Bruni and Stanca, 2003). The 
other way around, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gërxhani (2016) identify a negative correlation 
between tax evasion and life satisfaction. Therefore, people with higher locus of control might 
be more satisfied with their own lives and, in turn, less likely to engage in unethical 
behaviors. We also include a variable equal to one if respondents consider important to learn 
values like tolerance and respect for other people, as proxy for moral principles. Finally, we 
control for trust in government, since individuals might be more likely to comply with rules of 
a State that acts trustworthily. 
We report the new estimates in Table 4. We find that the effects of our main variables 
of interests (financial satisfaction, love of money and general trust) remain stable in sign and 
significance when we add the new variables and we include additional controls for 
educational attainments, confirming the robustness of our findings. The marginal effect of 
financial satisfaction is about the same as in the baseline estimations discussed above.  The 
exogeneity test is not rejected when we consider the effect of financial satisfaction on fare 
evasion, stealing property and bribery. The effect of financial satisfaction on cheating on 
government benefits and on tax evasion is still consistent when we consider the instrumental 
variables approach. 
 
Table 4. Robustness check: additional control variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Benefits 
fraud 
Tax 
evasion 
Fare  
evasion 
Stealing 
property 
Bribery  
 
 IV IV OLS OLS OLS 
      
Financial satisfaction -0.094** 0.091* 0.000 -0.000 -0.012* 
 (0.040) (0.049) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
Love of money 0.036 0.096** 0.067* 0.044* 0.041 
 (0.029) (0.038) (0.036) (0.024) (0.030) 
General trust -0.058*** -0.078** -0.087*** -0.040** -0.044** 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.028) (0.016) (0.022) 
Dutch origin 0.029 -0.030 -0.023 -0.026 -0.033 
 (0.039) (0.052) (0.037) (0.024) (0.030) 
Believer -0.003 -0.038 -0.046 -0.018 0.010 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.029) (0.017) (0.023) 
Locus of control 0.006 -0.088** -0.031 -0.057*** 0.001 
 (0.032) (0.043) (0.030) (0.017) (0.024) 
Education: 
intermediate 
-0.004 0.001 0.010 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.026) (0.038) (0.033) (0.020) (0.027) 
Education: -0.004 -0.012 0.007 0.005 -0.076** 
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high school 
 (0.040) (0.055) (0.053) (0.032) (0.037) 
Trust in government 0.058 0.009 0.017 -0.003 0.076** 
 (0.040) (0.055) (0.043) (0.026) (0.038) 
Moral values -0.067 -0.085* -0.034 -0.067** -0.150*** 
 (0.042) (0.051) (0.046) (0.034) (0.043) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,131 1,117 
R-squared   0.089 0.059 0.087 
F-statistic  10.952 10.952    
Sargan test p-value 0.252 0.629    
Exog. Test p-value 0.017 0.061    
      
Notes: All estimations include the same control variables as in Tables 2 and 3. The inclusion of further 
controls determines a reduction in the sample size due to missing values. Exogeneity test is rejected 
for “Benefits fraud” and “Tax evasion”; for these variables we report the corresponding IV estimates. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Reference categories are: age>65 (age), not 
employed (occupation), less than high school (education). 
 
Our findings remain consistent even when we add household income as an explanatory 
variable in the OLS specifications. 18 Appendix Table D.4 shows that financial satisfaction is 
still negatively associated with the propensity to accept benefits fraud; conversely, it is not 
significantly related to the other measures of cheating. These findings are similar to those 
obtained in the baseline OLS regression models. The estimated coefficients on love of money 
and general trust also exhibit the same patterns.  
 
5. Conclusions 
We explore the effect of financial satisfaction on individuals’ attitudes towards 
cheating by using Dutch data from the LISS panel. We analyze the impact of this variable 
both on dishonesty towards the government, such as benefits fraud or tax evasion, and on 
other forms of unethical behavior, such as fare evasion, property stealing and bribery. We rely 
on the role of financial literacy in influencing individuals’ financial satisfaction as an 
instrument to assess the causal impact of financial satisfaction on the acceptability of 
unethical actions. 
 
18 We consider a variable measuring net household income in Euros. We refer the reader to Appendix E.1 to shed 
more light on the correlation between financial satisfaction and some other factors that can affect individuals’ 
financial condition, such as homeownership, assets or wages.  
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We find that those who are more satisfied with their standards of living are less likely 
to justify claiming on government benefits without any right. Interestingly, after accounting 
for the endogeneity of financial satisfaction, we show that people who are more satisfied with 
their financial positions are more likely to accept tax evasion, probably because fiscal 
compliance for wealthy individuals implies a considerable loss of income. This result also 
suggests that respondents are more willing to justify behaviors which give relatively more 
benefits and less damage to themselves. 
By contrast, an improved financial satisfaction does not make individuals less likely to 
tolerate fare evasion and property stealing. The main assumptions underlying the analysis of 
free-rider problems are that people are rational and weigh more personal interests than 
collective benefits (He, 2012). In our analysis, we show that decisions to behave dishonestly 
do not result only from financial advantages: personal characteristics and individual attitudes 
towards money and risk aversion are the most significant predictors of these forms of 
dishonesty. 
Interestingly, when we consider the acceptability of bribery as our dependent variable, 
we find that both financial satisfaction and risk aversion are important determinants of this 
unethical behavior.  
The present research confirms previous evidence stating that love of money may 
eventually cloud individuals’ ethical attitudes (Tang and Chiu, 2003; Vitell et al., 2007). 
Conversely, being trusting decreases the propensity to justify all the cheating outcomes 
considered in our analysis.  
One limitation of our study is that we can only measure attitudes towards cheating and 
not cheating behavior. As the data are self-reported data, they are obviously not free from bias 
(Swamy et al., 2001). For example, the level of honesty measured in our sample is likely to 
overestimate the real one, because respondents might give socially acceptable answers. 
Moreover, we cannot completely exclude that different attitudes towards cheating may be 
caused by some time-invariant unobserved factors affecting also financial satisfaction. Some 
examples of these influences are respondents’ intrinsic ability or family connections.  
In an effort to mitigate omitted variable bias, further research may investigate the 
effect of ethical education received in early life on attitudes towards cheating. Knowing that 
parents have a strong influence on children’s socialization and moral development (Houser et 
al., 2016), it could be interesting to see whether those who internalized ethical concepts in the 
family environment are more likely to behave honestly throughout their life. A possible 
extension also concerns the relationship between financial satisfaction and love of money. 
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Specifically, one may think that the financial satisfaction may have a larger effect if 
respondents value richness relatively more. In Appendix E.2 we study how financial 
satisfaction and love of money interact to affect individuals’ attitudes towards cheating.  
We plan to expand this work also in another direction. We obtain our measure of 
cheating from the original World Values Survey, which explores values and beliefs of people 
in almost 100 countries. It could be interesting to repeat our analysis by comparing Western 
and Eastern countries, to see whether differences in culture and economic ideologies impact 
on cheating behavior. According to Gächter and Schulz (2016), the willingness to follow rules 
is widespread in countries which are more collectivist and present strong institutions. 
Conversely, people living in corrupted social environments, where cheating goes often 
unpunished, may increase their tolerance of dishonesty. Appendix Table E.3 reports cross-
country data on the willingness to accept fare and tax evasion, respectively, from the original 
worldwide survey; answers are those from the same questions used in our analysis. As in 
Magnus et al., (2002)19 we consider cheating attitudes in US, Russia and Netherlands. In our 
analysis, we add two countries which are characterized by different standards of ethics: Italy 
and Sweden (Andrighetto et al., 2016). Whilst honesty is a typical national trait in Sweden, 
Italy is ranked very low in terms of honesty amongst European countries (Daun, 1989; 
Mackie, 2001). We also report results for an emerging country like Indonesia; corruption is a 
significant problem in the developing world and individuals’ opinions about cheating might 
vary according to the extent of dishonesty they see in their societies (Olken, 2007; Gächter 
and Schulz, 2016). From panel “a” of Appendix Table E.3, it emerges that 65.1% of Dutch 
people consider fare evasion as “never justifiable”; therefore, answers provided by the overall 
population in the Netherlands are in line with those obtained from the LISS Panel version of 
the original survey, where we have found that most respondents do not justify at all cheating 
behavior. By contrast, Russians are the most likely to accept small-scale dishonesty. Swedes 
seem to be less extreme in their judgements, as they spread their answers across the first three 
points of the likert-scales associated to both types of cheating behavior (panels “a” and “b”). 
Interestingly, Table E.1 indicates that countries like Indonesia and Italy, where we might 
expect to find higher tolerance of cheating behavior, are instead those that report the highest 
percentage of declared tax morality (panel “b”). These results partly contrast empirical 
evidence on the underground economy in Italy, which has been estimated to be considerably 
larger than in many other Western countries (Ardizzi et al., 2012). Thus, further research 
 
19 Magnus et al. (2002) compare cheating attitudes of students from different cultures, finding the highest level 
of honesty among students from the United States.  
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might address cross-country differences in attitudes towards cheating, as well as the impact of 
cultural factors and economic conditions on it.  
Our analysis is useful to deepen our knowledge about the factors affecting individuals’ 
tolerance towards cheating and, consequently, think of ways to limit it. We are aware that it is 
difficult to act directly on individuals’ financial satisfaction; however, financial satisfaction 
may be considered a determinant factor of individuals’ satisfaction with life in general. For 
this reason, knowing the existence of a strong association between financial literacy and 
financial satisfaction, it may be useful to promote effective education programs aimed at 
improving consumers’ financial knowledge, as they may have positive consequences on their 
overall wellbeing too. We show that money love and trust in others also have significant 
impacts on personal opinions about cheating. Thus, it might be important to strengthen moral 
values and money beliefs among citizens, since they may affect individuals’ ethical actions; 
improving social cooperation may also be an effective way to reduce tolerance towards 
dishonesty. 
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Appendix A. Wording of Survey Questions 
 
A.1. Financial literacy  
Each question also allows “Do not know” and “Would rather not say” as possible answers. 
 
“Suppose you have 100 euros on a savings account and the interest is 2% per year. How 
much do you think you will have on the savings account after five years, assuming that you 
leave all your money on this savings account?  
1) more than 102 euros  
2) exactly 102 euros  
3) less than 102 euros  
 
Suppose that the interest on your savings account is 1% per year and that inflation amounts 
to 2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy more, exactly the same, or less than 
you could today with the money on that account?  
1) more than today  
2) the same as today  
3) less than today  
 
A share in a company usually offers a more certain return than an investment fund that only 
invests in shares.  
1) true  
2) not true  
 
If the interest rate goes up, what should happen to bond prices?  
1) they increase  
2) they decrease  
3) they stay the same  
4) none of the above” 
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A.2. Outcome variables 
Respondents are required to indicate on a scale from 1 to 10 to what extent they agree with 
the following statements. 1 means “Never”; 10 means “Always”. 
 
“For each of the following actions indicate whether you think it can always be justified, never 
be justified, or something in between?  
hz12a217 Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled  
hz12a218 Avoiding a fare on public transport  
hz12a219 Stealing property  
hz12a220 Cheating on taxes if you have a chance 
hz12a221 Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties” 
 
Figure A.1. Frequency distribution of responses (n=1,228) 
  
Notes: the figure reports the frequency distribution graphs of the variables representing benefits fraud 
(variable hz12a217) and fare evasion (variable hz12a218). Both variables present the largest 
concentration of responses on point 1 (“Never”) on the scale. The frequency distribution graphs of the 
other dependent variables are similar and available upon request. 
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Appendix B. Probit and IV probit  
 
Table B.1. Cheating towards the government 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Benefits fraud Tax cheating 
 PROBIT IV PROBIT PROBIT IV PROBIT 
     
Financial satisfaction -0.016*** -0.373*** 0.010 0.266** 
 (0.005) (0.133) (0.008) (0.117) 
Love of money 0.033 0.168 0.096*** 0.250*** 
 (0.024) (0.117) (0.035) (0.096) 
General trust -0.049*** -0.284*** -0.086*** -0.212*** 
 (0.019) (0.104) (0.027) (0.081) 
Age: below 30 0.083 0.164 -0.055 0.004 
 (0.053) (0.226) (0.057) (0.190) 
Age: below 65 0.038 -0.073 -0.012 0.182 
 (0.027) (0.192) (0.039) (0.154) 
Female -0.023 -0.138 -0.120*** -0.305*** 
 (0.020) (0.103) (0.028) (0.082) 
Number of children 0.013 0.013 -0.002 0.041 
 (0.010) (0.057) (0.015) (0.049) 
Married -0.013 0.103 -0.027 -0.206* 
 (0.020) (0.129) (0.029) (0.106) 
High urban 0.001 -0.019 -0.057** -0.138* 
 (0.019) (0.101) (0.028) (0.081) 
Employee 0.014 0.275* -0.018 -0.219* 
 (0.023) (0.152) (0.034) (0.128) 
Self-employed 0.044 0.341 0.049 0.016 
 (0.060) (0.270) (0.081) (0.234) 
College 0.016 0.213 -0.017 -0.155 
 (0.033) (0.174) (0.046) (0.145) 
Risk averse -0.029 -0.098 -0.034 -0.131 
 (0.020) (0.106) (0.029) (0.085) 
     
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 
Log-likelihood -450.943  -778.436  
Pseudo R-squared 0.047  0.036  
F-statistic   18.310  18.310 
Sargan test p-value  0.495  0.529 
Exogeneity test p-
value 
 0.016  0.028 
     
Notes: this table reports the marginal effects of the regressors estimated through probit 
(Columns 1 and 3) and IV probit (Columns 2 and 4) models on cheating towards the 
government. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels. 
Reference categories are: age>65 (age), not employed (occupation), less than high school 
(education). 
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Table B.2. Other forms of cheating 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fare evasion Stealing property Bribery 
 PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT 
    
Financial satisfaction 0.001 -0.004 -0.012** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Love of money 0.055* 0.038* 0.049* 
 (0.033) (0.021) (0.027) 
General trust -0.093*** -0.047*** -0.036* 
 (0.026) (0.016) (0.021) 
Age: below 30 0.216*** 0.092* 0.172*** 
 (0.063) (0.052) (0.062) 
Age: below 65 0.054 0.052** 0.030 
 (0.038) (0.022) (0.030) 
Female 0.010 -0.011 -0.103*** 
 (0.027) (0.017) (0.022) 
Number of children 0.029** 0.009 -0.001 
 (0.014) (0.008) (0.012) 
Married -0.061** 0.018 -0.020 
 (0.028) (0.018) (0.023) 
High urban 0.035 0.009 -0.026 
 (0.027) (0.017) (0.021) 
Employee 0.087*** -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.033) (0.019) (0.026) 
Self-employed 0.061 -0.042 -0.011 
 (0.078) (0.032) (0.056) 
College 0.073 0.035 -0.007 
 (0.047) (0.030) (0.035) 
Risk averse -0.102*** -0.058*** -0.050** 
 (0.027) (0.017) (0.022) 
    
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,212 
Log-likelihood -739.717 -353.079 -519.043 
Pseudo R-squared 0.072 0.069 0.066 
    
Notes: this table reports the marginal effects of the regressors estimated through probit models 
on other forms of cheating. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels. Reference categories are: age>65 (age), not employed (occupation), less than 
high school (education). 
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Appendix C. Postestimation tests  
 
Table C.1. Tests of the instruments  
 
First stage- dependent variable: financial satisfaction  
Basic financial literacy 1.596***    
(0.342) 
 
Advanced financial literacy 0.856***    
(0.192) 
 
Other regressors not reported  
 
Benefits 
fraud 
Tax 
evasion 
Fare  
evasion 
Stealing 
property 
Bribery 
 
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,212 
Exogeneity test p-value 0.013 0.021 0.661 0.322 0.489 
Sargan test p-value 0.636 0.615 0.488 0.270 0.537 
F-statistic first stage  18.310 18.625 
Both basic and advanced financial literacy positively and significantly affect financial 
satisfaction; the F-statistics are above the value recommended to avoid the weak instruments 
problem (Staiger and Stock, 1997). For all our dependent variables, Sargan test indicates no 
rejection of instruments’ validity. When we consider cheating towards the government 
(benefits fraud and tax evasion), we find evidence of the endogeneity of financial satisfaction. 
Conversely, the exogeneity test is not rejected when we move to the other forms of cheating 
(fare evasion, stealing property and bribery). 
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Appendix D. Robustness checks 
 
Table D.1. IV estimates using binary instruments 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Benefits  
fraud 
Tax  
evasion 
Fare  
evasion 
Stealing 
property 
Bribery  
 
 IV IV IV IV IV 
      
Financial satisfaction -0.111*** 0.101** -0.021 -0.018 -0.007 
 (0.038) (0.047) (0.043) (0.027) (0.034) 
Love of money 0.041 0.093** 0.058* 0.044* 0.053* 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.034) (0.023) (0.029) 
General trust -0.059*** -0.076*** -0.096*** -0.048*** -0.038* 
 (0.021) (0.029) (0.027) (0.016) (0.021) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,212 
F-statistic  15.759 15.759 15.759 15.759 16.437 
Sargan test p-value 0.942 0.710 0.441 0.533 0.897 
Exogeneity test p-value 0.005 0.035 0.587 0.591 0.892 
      
Notes: Control variables are the same as reported in Tables 2 and 3. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels. 
 
Table D.2. IV estimates using only basic financial knowledge as instrument for financial 
satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Benefits  
fraud 
Tax  
evasion 
Fare  
evasion 
Stealing 
property 
Bribery  
 
 IV IV IV IV IV 
      
Financial satisfaction -0.077* 0.109** 0.006 -0.049 -0.048 
 (0.041) (0.051) (0.049) (0.035) (0.043) 
Love of money 0.039 0.092** 0.057* 0.045* 0.055* 
 (0.027) (0.036) (0.034) (0.024) (0.030) 
General trust -0.056*** -0.075** -0.093*** -0.052*** -0.042* 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.027) (0.017) (0.022) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,212 
F-statistic  19.828 19.828 19.828 19.828 20.084 
Exogeneity test p-value 0.109 0.030 0.920 0.175 0.375 
      
Notes: Control variables are the same as reported in Tables 2 and 3. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels. 
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Table D.3. Regression results using Lewbel IV estimator 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Benefits  
fraud 
Tax  
evasion 
Fare  
evasion 
Stealing 
property 
Bribery  
 
 IV IV IV IV IV 
      
Financial satisfaction -0.031** -0.005 0.007 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.017) (0.011) (0.014) 
Love of money 0.037 0.097*** 0.057* 0.043** 0.053** 
 (0.024) (0.034) (0.033) (0.020) (0.026) 
General trust -0.051*** -0.087*** -0.093*** -0.046*** -0.037* 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.027) (0.017) (0.022) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,212 
Sargan test p-value 0.147 0.873 0.110 0.918 0.707 
R-squared 0.030 0.044 0.091 0.043 0.058 
      
Notes: Control variables are the same as reported in Tables 2 and 3. Instruments are generated 
using Lewbel’s method. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels. 
 
 
Table D.4. OLS estimates including household income as an additional explanatory variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Benefits 
 fraud 
Tax  
evasion 
Fare  
evasion 
Stealing property Bribery  
 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
      
Financial satisfaction -0.014** 0.010 0.003 -0.004 -0.011 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) 
Love of money 0.040 0.099*** 0.062* 0.044* 0.056* 
 (0.026) (0.035) (0.034) (0.024) (0.030) 
General trust -0.051*** -0.088*** -0.096*** -0.047*** -0.040* 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.016) (0.021) 
(log)income -0.026* -0.005 -0.018 -0.001 -0.013 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.008) (0.017) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,212 
R-squared 0.040 0.049 0.094 0.044 0.063 
      
Notes: When income is included in the specification we consider OLS rather than IV 
regression model as we cannot reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments.  Control 
variables are the same as reported in Tables 2 and 3. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels. 
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Table D.5. Regression estimates by omitting general trust 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Benefits  
fraud 
Tax  
evasion 
Fare  
evasion 
Stealing 
property 
Bribery  
 
 IV IV OLS OLS OLS 
      
Financial satisfaction -0.088*** 0.093** 0.002 -0.003 -0.012* 
 (0.032) (0.039) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) 
Love of money 0.042 0.096*** 0.061* 0.046* 0.055* 
 (0.027) (0.036) (0.034) (0.024) (0.030) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,212 
R-squared   0.082 0.037 0.059 
F-statistic  18.194 18.194    
Sargan test p-value 0.559 0.543    
Exogeneity test p-value 0.012 0.024    
      
Notes: Control variables are the same as reported in Tables 2 and 3. Exogeneity test is 
rejected for “Benefits fraud” and “Tax evasion”; for these variables we report the 
corresponding IV estimates. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels. 
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Appendix E. Further extensions 
 
E.1. Potential drivers of financial satisfaction 
This appendix provides additional information on the potential drivers of financial 
satisfaction. We first look at the correlation between financial satisfaction and some other 
factors that can affect individuals’ financial condition. Specifically, we consider a binary 
variable representing “homeownership” and four dummies representing assets held by 
respondents, such as checking accounts or savings certificates (“safe”), insurance policies 
(“insurance”), stocks, options or warrants (“risky”) and “real estate”. We also consider a 
variable representing respondents’ satisfaction with their wages on a scale ranging from 0 to 
10 (“earnings”). Table E.1.1 reports the correlation matrix of variables. 
 
Table E.1.1. Correlation matrix 
  
Financial 
satisfaction 
Home 
ownership 
Safe Insurance Risky 
Real 
estate 
Earnings 
Financial satisfaction 1.000      
Home ownership 0.162 1.000     
Safe 0.125 0.095 1.000     
Insurance 0.149 0.129 0.121 1.000    
Risky 0.149 0.182 0.116 0.303 1.000   
Real estate 0.041 0.106 0.035 0.068 0.140 1.000  
Earnings 0.379 0.018 -0.037 0.037 0.017 -0.065 1.000 
 
It is observed from Table E.1.1 that none of the variables is highly correlated with financial 
satisfaction. The maximum correlation is between “financial satisfaction” and “earnings” and 
is equal to 0.379. However, the number of complete observations for the variable representing 
respondents’ satisfaction with their wages is rather low (n=607). Thus, any conclusion based 
on the results reported in Table E.1.1 may be misleading. 
Therefore, to shed more light on the drivers of financial satisfaction we proceed as follows: 
we first define a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent states to be more satisfied 
than the average with her wage (the average wage satisfaction in  our sample is equal to 6.7). 
We interpret this variable as a measure of “wage satisfaction”. Similarly, we create another 
variable equal to one if the individual is not satisfied with her wage. To test whether the effect 
of financial satisfaction on cheating depends on wage satisfaction we estimate the following 
equation: 
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𝑐𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
+ 𝛽2𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛽5 + 𝐹𝑖
′𝛽6 + 𝜀𝑖 
(2) 
 
 
 
where 𝑋𝑖
′ and 𝐹𝑖
′ include the same explanatory variables as indicated in equation (1). 
Regression results from this alternative model are reported in Table E.1.2.  
 
Table E.1.2. Interaction between financial satisfaction and wage satisfaction  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Benefits  
fraud 
Tax  
evasion 
Fare  
evasion 
Stealing 
property 
Bribery  
 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
      
Financial sat*wage sat -0.006 0.004 0.002 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Financial sat*wage dissat -0.003 0.013 0.010 0.005 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) 
Love of money 0.035 0.095*** 0.056* 0.042* 0.052* 
 (0.026) (0.035) (0.034) (0.023) (0.030) 
General trust -0.049*** -0.087*** -0.094*** -0.047*** -0.038* 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.016) (0.021) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Test on the interaction 
coefficients 
[0.456] [0.191] [0.281] [0.240] [0.167] 
      
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,212 
R-squared 0.032 0.048 0.093 0.044 0.061 
      
Notes: Control variables are the same as reported in Tables 2 and 3. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels. 
 
In the model we are most interested in the interaction terms. It is reasonable to believe that 
financial satisfaction may be driven by wage adequacy. However, we do not find evidence of 
a significant difference between respondents who are satisfied with their current status and 
their wages (𝛽1) and those who are satisfied with their status, but not with their wages (𝛽2). 
Test on the equality of the interaction coefficients reveals that the p-value associated to the 
Chi-squared test is above 0.10 in each specification. As discussed in Sub-section 2.3.2, results 
reported in Table E.1.2 confirm that financial satisfaction is more than a matter of economic 
setting. Personality traits, subjective expectations and aspirations about standard of living may 
be more important drivers of financial satisfaction. 
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E.2. Financial satisfaction and love of money 
 
The effect of financial satisfaction on individuals’ attitudes towards dishonesty may depend 
on the love of money. To test for that, we consider an alternative specification that includes an 
interaction between financial satisfaction and love of money. Results are reported in Table 
E.2.  
Table E.2. Financial satisfaction, love of money and their interaction  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Benefits  
fraud 
Tax  
evasion 
Fare  
evasion 
Stealing 
property 
Bribery  
 
 IV IV OLS OLS OLS 
      
Financial satisfaction -0.096*** 0.102** -0.001 -0.004 -0.014* 
 (0.037) (0.045) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
Love of money -0.435* 0.566* -0.020 0.038 -0.015 
 (0.247) (0.298) (0.130) (0.074) (0.108) 
General trust -0.054*** -0.079*** -0.093*** -0.047*** -0.038* 
 (0.020) (0.029) (0.026) (0.016) (0.021) 
Financial sat*lovemoney 0.071* -0.071 0.012 0.001 0.010 
 (0.037) (0.045) (0.019) (0.010) (0.015) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,228 1,212 
R-squared   0.092 0.043 0.062 
F-statistic  16.077 16.077    
Sargan test p-value 0.616 0.631    
Exogeneity test p-value 0.013 0.018    
      
Notes: Control variables are the same as reported in Tables 2 and 3. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels. 
 
 
We notice from Table E.2 that the degree of love of money is not too crucial for the impact of 
financial satisfaction on cheating. The interaction term is statistically significant only in 
Column 1, where we analyze the propensity of accepting incorrect behaviors related to 
government benefits. The positive effect of the interaction term partly counterbalances the 
negative effect of financial satisfaction; thus, the overall effect of financial satisfaction seems 
to be lower in absolute terms for those who value money highly. This cautiously indicates that 
individuals who love money may be less sensitive to social problems and more likely to 
justify all forms of cheating towards the government. Further research would be required to 
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draw rigorous conclusions: this is only a first step towards investigating more deeply the 
relationship between financial satisfaction, love of money and cheating. 
 
 
E.3. Cross country comparison 
 
Table E.3. Mean values per Country/Region on the willingness to accept fare evasion (panel 
“a”) and tax evasion (panel “b”) 
 
 Total Indonesia Italy Netherlands Russia Sweden 
United 
States 
 
Panel (a): Justifiable-avoiding a fare on public transport 
Never justifiable 55.9 78.6 62.9 65.1 35.5 45.6 47.3 
2 9.9 9.5 9.2 10.1 7.0 15.0 11.4 
3 6.8 2.8 7.0 6.9 7.2 12.1 8.4 
4 4.1 1.3 6.2 5.3 6.6 6.9 4.8 
5 8.2 2.3 7.0 5.1 12.8 7.9 14.1 
6 3.6 1.3 3.2 3.2 5.5 3.8 4.5 
7 2.6 0.8 1.3 1.8 5.4 4.0 1.7 
8 1.6 0.3 1.0 0.7 3.8 2.7 0.8 
9 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.3 1.9 0.5 0.2 
Always justifiable 3.2 1.3 0.5 1.0 9.5 1.1 1.4 
Missing 2.5 0.9 1.3 0.5 4.8 0.5 5.5 
Mean 2.55 1.60 2.09 2.04 3.94 2.68 2.60 
Number of obs. 8,156 1,994 999 1,044 1,941 998 1,180 
 
Panel (b): Justifiable-cheating on taxes 
Never justifiable 60.7 77.8 60.9 60.2 47.9 53.1 60.4 
2 10.4 9.9 10.1 10.7 6.9 17.7 10.8 
3 6.8 2.9 10.1 7.0 6.7 11.3 7.3 
4 4.1 1.9 4.5 4.7 5.9 4.7 3.5 
5 6.0 1.3 5.3 6.6 10.5 5.1 7.2 
6 2.6 1.1 3.5 2.9 3.7 2.1 2.5 
7 1.8 1.1 1.6 2.5 3.0 1.6 0.7 
8 1.3 0.4 1.4 1.3 2.2 2.1 0.7 
9 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.5 1.8 0.8 0.1 
Always justifiable 2.1 0.9 1.3 2.2 4.9 0.8 1.4 
Missing 3.2 1.9 1.0 1.4 6.3 0.7 5.3 
Mean 2.24 1.57 2.18 2.30 3.03 2.25 2.06 
Number of obs. 8,092 1,972 1,002 1,035 1,901 996 1,182 
        
Notes: Data are from World Values Survey Wave 5, 2005-2009. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
SAVING BEHAVIOR: 
FINANCIAL SOCIALIZATION AND SELF-CONTROL 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the linkages between financial socialization and self-control in 
explaining saving behavior. Using novel household survey data from the United States, we 
decompose the effect of financial socialization in its direct and indirect components, mediated 
through self-control. In addition, we analyze the relationship between these two dimensions 
and the ownership of different financial products, as well as the decision to save through 
alternative saving strategies. Our results show that financial socialization received early in life 
is positively associated with general saving habits. Furthermore, we find that parents’ 
financial socialization influences the development of children’s self-control skills. However, 
their contribution differs depending on the type of financial product being analyzed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: D14; D81; D91. 
Keywords: Financial socialization; Self-control; Saving behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
Many individuals do not save or save sub-optimally, reaching the retirement age with 
virtually no personal financial assets and limited resources to meet unforeseen expenses (Poterba et 
al., 1996). This issue is of special relevance in the US, where Social Security benefits are low 
compared with other advanced countries. The change toward defined-contribution plans has shifted 
the responsibility of saving onto private individuals, who must be able to accumulate an adequate 
level of income for retirement (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). According to the Northwestern Mutual’s 
2018 Planning and Progress Study, 78 percent of American people state they are worried about not 
having enough money to cover expenses at retirement age. In fact, 10 percent of the people declare 
they own less than 5,000 USD on retirement savings while another 21 percent indicate they have 
nothing.  
Research on saving behavior attributes a key role to financial literacy in stimulating saving 
(Van Rooij et al., 2012). As an extension, all forms of education toward financial and economic 
issues, taught at any age, can be seen as potential drivers of a more widespread saving behavior. 
One form of financial education is the so-called financial socialization, i.e., any form of financial 
education received when children or adolescents from several socialization agents, including 
parents, educators, peers and schools. Previous research indicates the effect of parenting to be as far 
stronger than financial socialization through any other socialization agent (Shim et al., 2009; 
Grusec, 2011). Children acquire financial skills within the family through different socialization 
processes, such as observing parents’ financial behavior or speaking with them about financial 
topics since young age (Solheim et al., 2011). In this way, children develop financial skills and 
capabilities that foster their financial independence and facilitate their transition into adulthood.  
It is nowadays widely acknowledged that relevant lifetime financial outcomes can be 
partially explained by differences in non-cognitive traits during childhood (Lades et al., 2017). 
Economists are devoting increasing interest to the role of personal self-control as an effective 
predictor of saving behavior (Tangney et al., 2004; Achtziger et al., 2015). Self-control is typically 
defined as the ability to resist temptation and to overcome first impulses (Baumeister, 2002). Self-
control problems might hinder savings via over spending (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). As such, 
people undersave because they lack the willpower to do so. Consequently, self-control problems 
typically result in overconsumption and low wealth (Ameriks et al., 2007). 
Research generally indicates that parenting is important to the process of developing self-
control among young people (Feldman and Weinberger, 1994; Hay, 2001). Because of this, in this 
research we hypothesize that financial socialization affects saving behavior as well as personal self-
control. Specifically, we expect a positive link between financial socialization and saving behavior, 
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since parents may help the development of good saving habits by encouraging children to use 
financial products while growing up at home. Moreover, we expect a positive relation between 
financial socialization and self-control, which is also supposed to be a significant driver of saving 
behavior. Thus, financial socialization might exert both direct and indirect effects on saving 
behavior through self-control.  
The main contribution of this empirical work is twofold. First, since we hypothesize that 
self-control mediates the association between financial socialization and saving behavior, we 
decompose the effect of financial socialization on saving habits into direct and indirect components 
through self-control. We perform a mediation analysis by using the KHB method (Karlson et al., 
2012), which extends the decomposition properties of linear models to nonlinear ones and has been 
shown to perform better, or at least as well as, other existing methods. In our research we extend 
previous work by Bucciol and Veronesi (2014), who document a positive direct effect of parental 
teachings received during childhood on the propensity to save during adulthood, and consider the 
role of self-control as a potential mediator. A second contribution of this paper is that we examine 
the different links between financial socialization, self-control and several financial products and 
services like checking accounts, educational loans, insurances, retirement accounts and financial 
assets. In addition, we explore the role of financial socialization and self-control on automated 
savings for both retirement and non-retirement purposes.  
Therefore, this study explores how financial socialization and self-control are related with 
saving behavior while controlling for several sociodemographic characteristics. To this end, we use 
novel US household data collected in year 2016 from the National Financial Well-Being Survey. 
We measure financial socialization as exposure while growing up to financial concepts across 
different dimensions, including, among others, discussions about financial issues, teachings on how 
to be smart shoppers and experiential learning through allowances or saving accounts. Hence, our 
measure of financial socialization is broader than the ones used in previous literature, covering both 
the practical and theoretical knowledge about generic and specific economic concepts learned in 
young age.  
Our findings indicate that parental influence is a significant driver of respondents’ saving 
behavior. Financial socialization received at young age is found to be positively related with the 
subsequent probability to save regularly, both directly and indirectly via self-control. We show that 
individuals who received teachings about money in young age, then later in life are more likely to 
hold safe financial products such as insurances or retirement accounts. In addition, our results 
suggest that financial socialization increases individuals’ awareness in the financial domain, 
fostering their competence in holding financial assets during adulthood. When we explore the 
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specific effect of self-control in determining saving behavior, we find that an increase in self-
control rises the propensity to have money in retirement accounts and financial assets. Moreover, 
both financial socialization and self-control exert positive and significant effects on the decision of 
automatically transferring savings to both retirement and non-retirement accounts. 
The pattern of under-saving has raised concern by academics and policy makers, who have 
started to devote special attention to the determinants of saving behavior. The identification of 
which characteristics correlate with saving behavior can be of great relevance to develop adequate 
policy interventions to stimulate savings. Our results underline the importance of parents as relevant 
socialization agents in the formation of financial values, norms and habits that drive financial well-
being during adulthood (Drever et al., 2015). Since our measure of financial socialization does not 
only cover teachings but also ‘active’ education in the form of having to manage a regular 
allowance, we believe that the measure we use captures in a better way the spirit of financial 
socialization.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
literature. Section 3 presents the data and some summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical analysis for saving habits, presenting the benchmark results and some robustness checks. 
Section 5 reports results from the role of financial socialization and self-control on different 
financial products and services and on automated saving strategies. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
This study examines the role of financial socialization and self-control on saving behavior. 
This section provides an overview of existing research on these three topics: saving behavior, self-
control problems and financial socialization. 
 
2.1. Saving behavior 
Saving behavior patterns have been widely analyzed in the economic literature, especially in 
the US context, where household saving rates have declined dramatically over the last 20 years 
(Wisman, 2009). Previous research indicates that a large fraction of Americans, and in particular 
those belonging to the so-called baby boom generation, save too little (Bernheim et al., 2001). In 
line with this, Munnell et al. (2009) show that nearly half of workers in the US are expected to be 
unable to keep their standard of living in retirement. In December 2016, the average benefits for the 
principal groups of Social Security beneficiaries in the US, notably retired, disabled workers, and 
aged widows and widowers were lower compared with other major industrial countries (OECD, 
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2017). For this reason, we have observed a switch to defined-contribution plans, such as a 401(k), 
which shift financial risks and responsibilities to the employees. The transition towards defined 
contribution plans has potential implications for financial stability, as it provides households with 
much more choice and flexibility in terms of how to manage their savings and investments.  
Saving behavior has been associated with several socio-demographic factors. Women 
typically save less and score lower than men on risk tolerance measures (Fisher et al., 2015). Hence, 
it is possible that risk tolerance contributes to a gender difference in savings. Researchers have also 
found that saving increases with age (Chang, 1994). Moreover, saving behavior is also influenced 
by decisions taken from peers. For instance, Duflo and Saez (2003) show that social interactions are 
a powerful mechanism in the process of information acquisition, with strong effects on economic 
decisions.  
Among the different drivers of wealth heterogeneity, financial literacy has been shown to 
positively affect wealth accumulation (Van Rooij et al., 2012). Financial literacy can be defined as 
people’s ability to process economic information and make informed financial decisions (Lusardi 
and Mitchell, 2014). It has been significantly and positively associated with stock market 
participation, retirement planning and wealth accumulation (Van Rooij et al., 2011a; 2011b; 2012). 
Fairly robust evidence also shows that people with low levels of financial literacy are more likely to 
exhibit debt problems (Lusardi and Tufano, 2015).  
Economic theory assumes that individuals have full information and process it properly, so 
that their financial choices are the result of maximizing a utility function (DellaVigna, 2009). 
However, the empirical evidence suggests deviations from this standard theory, as people do not 
always make sound financial decisions. Sometimes individuals do not adequately plan for 
retirement and many households report that they would like to save more but lack willpower 
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008).  
Much of the recent literature seeks to incorporate behavioral factors into models of saving 
behavior. Madrian and Shea (2001) analyze the impact of automatic enrollment in the 401(k) plan 
on saving behavior of employees. Their findings do not only indicate an increase in 401(k) 
participation under automatic enrollment, but they also conform with several behavioral 
explanations for individual savings behavior, such as anchoring around the default and status quo 
bias. In line with this, Knoll (2010) shows that when deciding about how and when to save for 
retirement, individuals make suboptimal choices as they often rely on heuristics or rules of thumb. 
In the past few years, automatic saving has been proved to be one of the most powerful 
remedies against low participation and savings contribution rates (Tantia et al., 2014). All in all, 
these results highlight the importance of also considering behavioral factors in the determination of 
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saving behavior: bounded rationality, procrastination and nominal loss aversion may all play a role 
in explaining lack of saving (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004). In this sense, self-control is also 
indisputably an important factor for saving outcomes (Thaler, 1994). 
 
2.2. Self-control problems 
Economists are devoting increasing interest to the effects of dynamic inconsistencies, self-
control and temptation on intertemporal decisions. Self-control is typically defined as the ability to 
resist temptation and to overcome first impulses (Baumeister, 2002). Previous literature on self-
control strongly highlights its importance as a psychological resource that influences individuals’ 
financial behavior (Achtziger et al., 2015). High self-control has been positively related with goal 
achievement, the propensity to save regularly and, consequently, with the ability to manage 
unforeseen expenses (Tangney et al., 2004). On the other hand, Gathergood (2012) shows that 
consumers who lack self-control make greater use of quick-access financial products and are more 
likely to have problems in dealing with over-indebtedness. Interestingly, using a sample of highly 
educated adults, Ameriks et al. (2007) explore the relation between self-control and wealth and find 
that self-control problems are smaller in scale for older than for younger respondents.  
The effect of self-control on the decisions to save is difficult to predict a priori. Several 
studies agree to note that people fail to save for retirement even though they plan to do so (Choi et 
al., 2002). Self-control failures are argued to be among the reasons why people exhibit time 
inconsistent preferences (Beshears et al., 2015). Several scholars have been concerned about how 
self-control affects saving for retirement (Jabobs-Lawson and Hershey, 2005). However, the 
empirical findings are mixed. On the one hand, self-control problems might hinder savings via over 
spending (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). Individuals who lack self-control usually prefer investment 
opportunities that provide higher immediate utility, as their spending attitudes are driven by short-
term and impulsive motives (Gathergood and Weber, 2014).  On the other hand, knowing their lack 
of self-control, they might look for commitment devices, such as pensions, in order to limit their 
future temptation (Laibson, 2015). This is a central implication from the models of dynamically 
inconsistent time preferences (Strotz, 1956).  
 
2.3. Financial socialization 
Previous work has found a positive association between financial literacy among the young 
and parents’ financial sophistication (Lusardi et al., 2010). Economic habits might be easily 
transmitted from parents to children through the mechanism of financial socialization. Hence, in 
this research we look at the role played by financial socialization in affecting saving behavior.  
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Money education received during young age positively affects subsequent financial 
decisions, notably those involving saving and assets accumulation. For instance, Bucciol and 
Veronesi (2014) find a positive effect of parental teaching strategies received during childhood on 
the propensity to save during adulthood. Similarly, using a Dutch sample of young adults, Webley 
and Nyhus (2013) provide evidence of a positive link between parental encouragement and the 
ability to control spending, saving preferences, conscientiousness and future orientation. In line 
with this, Bucciol and Zarri (2019) show that saving education provided by parents induces people 
to be more future oriented later in life. Kim and Chatterjee (2013) study the association between 
financial socialization experiences and beneficial financial practices in young adulthood. Their 
results indicate that owning a saving account during childhood is positively associated with 
financial asset ownership during adulthood. According to Serido and Deenanath (2016), children’s 
progress toward financial independence is mainly driven by parental teachings. Therefore, parents 
play an important role in influencing good financial habits during childhood, which might also 
persist later in life.  
Research on financial socialization supports a common view of parental education as a 
transitional process from childhood into early adulthood in which children develop consumer roles 
and gain financial independence (Gudmunson et al., 2016). As stated by McGoldrick and Carter 
(1999), the successful transition throughout the life cycle stages is largely dependent on 
achievements and skills acquired in previous stages. Financial socialization goes further than simply 
focusing on an improvement in financial knowledge, as it represents the process by which attitudes 
and values of individuals are formed (Grohmann et al., 2015).  
However, the association between financial socialization and economic behavior might be 
mediated by third factors, being financial goals among the most widely studied (Topa and Herrador-
Alcaide, 2016). For instance, Lee and Yu (2017) study the relationship between parenting behavior 
during adolescence and children’s financial efficiency in early adulthood, finding adolescents’ 
future orientation as a significant mediator between these two dimensions. Adolescents who learn 
from parents through financial socialization develop general skills that will be maintained over the 
life course. One of these skills is self-control. High self-control allows individuals to diligently 
follow their financial plans and to convert their financial goals into responsible financial behaviors 
(Tang, 2017). Parental influence is particularly important during adolescence, when the differences 
in self-control are established (Hay, 2001). Indeed, according to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), 
one of the major causes of low self-control is ineffective parenting. For instance, children whose 
parents do not monitor their children’s behavior are expected to display low self-control and thus 
exhibit more deviant, delinquent, and criminal behaviors over the life-course.  
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Lades et al. (2017) investigate the impact of self-control problems in childhood on future 
pension participation. Their mediation analysis shows that a large part of this relationship (about 50 
percent) can be explained by the contribution of self-control to a wide range of factors, such as 
educational attainment, economic status and home ownership. Furthermore, financial socialization 
from parents may also affect the behavior of children by influencing their general self-control skills, 
which in turn are important drivers of financial well-being during adulthood (Tang, 2017). To date, 
only a few studies have investigated the role of financial socialization in the development of self-
control (Feldman and Weinberger, 1994; Hay, 2001), generally finding a positive effect.  
 
 
3. Data 
Our dataset comes from the US National Financial Well-Being Survey (from now on, 
NFWBS). This survey was conducted in year 2016 by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
and it was fielded on the GfK Knowledge Panel.1 Data have been collected between October 27 and 
December 5, 2016. Sample data were drawn from an online panel after being properly weighted to 
reflect the US adult population with respect to age, gender, ethnicity, poverty and educational 
levels.  
The NFWBS primarily investigates financial knowledge, financial behavior and financial 
wellbeing of a representative sample of individuals. Variables collected through NFWBS include 
information about respondents’ saving behavior, financial skills and attitudes, and other related 
factors. Socio-economic information such as age, ethnicity, labor status or household income of the 
respondents come from GfK Knowledge Panel data.2 For our study purposes, the main advantage of 
this dataset is that it includes a battery of questions related to individuals’ financial experience and 
behavior. This allows us to investigate several financial factors that might affect saving decisions, 
which have not been explored in the previous literature and, to the best of our knowledge, are not 
available in other datasets. 
A total of 6,394 subjects completed the survey. In the questionnaire, respondents are asked 
who takes cares of the money matters at the household. They have to choose from the following 
options: i) “I take care of all or most money matters”, ii) “Someone else and I take care of money 
matters about the same”, iii) “Someone else takes care of all or most money matters”. As in Van 
 
1 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is a Federal agency created in year 2010 to regulate the use of financial 
products and to help consumers in understanding financial services, supporting their participation in financial markets. 
The GfK Knowledge Panel is the largest probability-based Internet panel in the US, with a total of about 55,000 panel 
members. 
2 These data were collected prior to the survey as part of GfK’s standard business operations. 
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Rooij et al. (2012), we focus on respondents who state they are those who mostly make financial 
decisions at home, namely those who pay the bills and take the responsibility to make financial 
investments. Indeed, their financial capabilities are most relevant for household financial decision 
making (Smith et al., 2010). Since the survey does not gather information on all the members in the 
household, this is done to drop from the sample those who have no decision power with regard to 
financial issues. This leaves a subsample of 3,235 individuals. After leaving aside some respondents 
with missing values in the variables of interest, our final sample consists of 2,854 observations.  
 
3.1. Main variables 
3.1.1. Outcome variables 
Three different sets of outcome variables are considered to analyze the determinants of 
households’ saving. First, we aim to empirically examine how financial socialization and self-
control relate to general saving behavior. To this end, we define the dummy variable saving habits, 
which takes the value one if the respondent agrees with the following sentence: “Putting money into 
savings is a habit for me”. Looking at this variable is useful to learn more on regular saving habits, 
which are extremely important to achieve financial goals and to have adequate emergency reserves 
(Fisher and Anong, 2012). 
Second, as we have detailed data on financial products chosen by the individuals, we 
analyze the association between self-control, financial socialization and the decisions to save 
through specific financial products. Respondents are asked to select which financial products and 
services they currently have from an exhaustive list, ranging from checking or savings accounts to 
non-retirement investments, such as stocks, bonds or mutual funds. We group these items into five 
categories representing (1) checking accounts, (2) educational loans, (3) life or health insurance, (4) 
retirement accounts and (5) financial assets. We model each category as a dummy variable 
measuring whether individuals currently hold each of the different financial products or services.  
We refer the reader to Appendix A.1 for further details. 
We finally explore how financial socialization and self-control are related with alternative 
saving strategies. The last decade has seen many behavioral applications to savings programs. In 
particular, automatic saving has been proved to be one of the most powerful remedies for low 
participation and savings contribution rates (Tantia et al., 2014). Automatic saving may foster 
financial decisions, as it decreases the complexity of decision-making and it reduces attitudes of 
procrastination. However, the decision to save automatically has not been widely explored in 
previous research. NFWBS includes unique data to investigate this peculiar dimension of saving 
behavior. It contains two questions meant to assess whether respondents have money automatically 
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transferred into retirement and non-retirement saving accounts, respectively.  These questions allow 
us to compare the features of such financial decisions with those of saving money voluntarily 
through different saving products. We define the dummy variable automated retirement, which is 
equal to one if the respondent allocates a certain amount of money into an account for retirement 
purposes, and zero otherwise. We create another dummy variable (automated non retirement) 
taking a value of one if the respondent chooses to transfer money automatically into a non-
retirement account. The exact wording of the questions is reported in Appendix A.2. 
 
3.1.2. Financial socialization and self-control 
As discussed before, parents may transmit saving habits to children through the mechanism 
of financial socialization. There are different ways to introduce children to the value of money, such 
as setting regular allowances and saving goals or discussing with them questions about budgeting. 
We include a proxy for financial socialization in our analysis. Respondents were asked seven 
questions about teachings received from family while growing up at home, which are used by the 
NFWBS to measure financial socialization.  
These questions ask respondents whether they discussed family matters with parents and if 
they spoke with them about the importance of saving. In addition to these standard items on 
financial socialization, individuals are asked information about specific parental lessons received in 
young age. Specifically, they are asked whether they received teachings about how to establish a 
good credit rating, how to be a smart shopper or how to determine success in life. The last two 
financial socialization items are related to practical teachings received from parents. Indeed, the 
NFWBS asks respondents if the family provided them with a regular allowance or a saving account. 
The exact wording of the questions is reported in Appendix A.3. For each item related to financial 
socialization, we define a dichotomous variable for respondents who provided a positive answer to 
each question. We perform a factor analysis with polychoric correlation on those binary variables. 
In this way, we are able to retain a unique index representing financial socialization. Bartlett test of 
sphericity (p-value< 0.001) indicates that it is appropriate to perform factor analysis.3 
Next, we measure self-control based on the answers to three questions in the NFWBS. 
Individuals are asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (“Not at all”) to 4 (“Completely well”) the 
response that best describes them for each of the following items: “I often act without thinking 
through all the alternatives”, “I am good at resisting temptation”, “I am able to work diligently 
toward long-term goals”. We model each item related to self-control as a dichotomous variable, 
 
3 The summary index used in our analysis is mostly correlated with the second financial socialization item (“Spoke to 
me about the importance of saving”). The correlation is equal to 0.823. 
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with the value one representing answers 3 and 4 provided by respondents.4 We then combine the 
information from the three items in a unique index representing individuals’ self-control. Our 
summary index is drawn from a factor analysis with polychoric correlation; Bartlett test of 
sphericity (p-value< 0.001) indicates that it is appropriate to perform factor analysis. The index, that 
we label self-control, takes values in the 0-1 range and provides us with a comprehensive measure 
of individuals’ self-control. 
Given the relevance of behavioral biases in shaping economic behavior of individuals 
(Gathergood and Weber, 2014), we conduct a mediation analysis to investigate whether differences 
in self-control may act as a channel through which early financial socialization enhances 
individuals’ saving decisions later in life. For instance, teachings received during childhood affect 
individuals’ self-control (Tang, 2017), which in turn has been shown to influence financial behavior 
such as retirement planning, wise use of debt and credit, budgeting and saving (Baumeister, 2002; 
Howlett et al., 2008).5 After having identified the role of self-control as a mediator in the relation 
between financial socialization and saving behavior, we further investigate its role as an 
independent variable capable to affect saving behavior. 
 
3.2. Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis. More than half of the 
respondents (55%) state that putting money into savings is a habit for them. The great majority of 
people (80%) own life or health insurances, 71% of respondents report to save through retirement 
accounts, while 34% hold financial assets; 20% of respondents currently have education saving 
accounts or loans and 87% have checking accounts. A similar percentage of individuals indicate to 
have money automatically transferred into retirement and non-retirement saving accounts (43% and 
42%, respectively). In our sample, 54% declare to have received teachings about money during 
childhood and 80% show high levels of self-control.6 
In our analysis we also control for standard socio-demographic characteristics. The average 
respondent is male, in the middle age group 35-54, married and without dependent children. About 
42% of the respondents are graduated and only a small percentage of respondents (6.7%) are self-
employed. Around half of the individuals report to be in good health and about 67% own their 
 
4 We recode answers of the first statement such that, in all cases, an increase in the index implies higher self-control. 
5 Regression results reported in Appendix Table B.1 confirm that in our sample financial socialization during young age 
is a significant predictor of current self-control. 
6 Descriptive statistics about the original sample are very similar to those presented in Table 1. In particular, the mean 
levels of financial socialization and self-control in the original sample are equal to 54% and 78%, respectively. 
98 
 
home. Finally, 21% report levels of household income before taxes below 30,000 USD and 30% 
report levels of household income above 100,000 USD. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
     
Outcome variables 
 
    
Saving habits 0.550 0.498 0 1 
Life or health insurance 0.803 0.398 0 1 
Retirement accounts  0.711 0.453 0 1 
Financial assets 0.344 0.475 0 1 
Educational loans 0.203 0.402 0 1 
Checking accounts 0.876 0.329 0 1 
Automated retirement  0.431 0.495 0 1 
Automated non retirement  0.419 0.493 0 1 
     
Main variables  
 
    
Financial socialization 0.545 0.328 0 1 
Self-control 0.802 0.293 0 1 
     
Control variables 
 
    
Age: 18-34 0.204 0.403 0 1 
Age: 55-69 0.274 0.446 0 1 
Age: > 69 0.194 0.396 0 1 
Female 0.460 0.498 0 1 
Married 0.557 0.497 0 1 
No dependent children 0.641 0.480 0 1 
College 0.422 0.494 0 1 
Self-employed 0.067 0.250 0 1 
Good health 0.501 0.500 0 1 
Income <30k 0.212 0.409 0 1 
Income >100k 0.301 0.459 0 1 
Home owner 0.674 0.469 0 1 
Area: Midwest 0.216 0.412 0 1 
Area: South 0.357 0.479 0 1 
Area: West 0.234 0.423 0 1 
     
Notes: The final sample includes 2,854 individuals interviewed in year 2016. All the variables are dummy 
apart from self-control and financial socialization. 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis: saving habits 
We aim to examine the influence of financial socialization and self-control on individuals’ 
saving habits. To this end, we estimate the following full latent linear model, for 1,...,i N= : 
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𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖
∗ = 𝛽0
𝐹 + 𝛽1
𝐹𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2
𝐹𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛾𝐹 + 𝜀𝑖
𝐹 (1) 
where 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠∗ is a latent variable representing saving habits as previously described, 
financial socialization and selfcontrol are our variables of interest and 
1
F , 2
F  are the associated 
parameters to be estimated. The vector X includes standard socio-demographic information such as 
gender, age, education and marital status, plus economic and financial information on occupational 
status, housing property and income. Finally, F  is an idiosyncratic random error term. If we 
assume that F  follows a standard normal distribution, Equation (1) can be estimated using a Probit 
model, where the dependent variable saving habits is a dummy equal to one if the respondent has 
the habit to put money into savings. 
As indicated before, we hypothesize that financial socialization exerts not only a direct 
effect on saving habits but also an indirect one through self-control. Here we are interested in 
disentangling how self-control partially mediates the total effect of financial socialization on saving 
habits.  
In the context of linear regression, the total effect of financial socialization on saving habits 
could be estimated by running a reduced form of Equation (1) in which we leave out self-control as 
follows: 
𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽0
𝑅 + 𝛽1
𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛾𝑅 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑅  (2) 
 
being 
1
R  a measure of the total effect of financial socialization on saving habit. 
The direct effect of financial socialization on saving habits would be captured by the 
regression coefficient 
1
F  in Equation (1). The indirect effect constitutes the part of the relationship 
between financial socialization and saving behavior that is due to self-control and it will be simply 
given by 
1 1
R F −  . Hence, within the framework of linear regression models the decomposition of 
the total effect of a covariate into direct and indirect effects would be straightforward (Kohler et al., 
2011).  
However, in non-linear regression models like Probit, identifying the indirect effect is not so 
easy as it depends on the scale parameters in Equations (1) and (2). More specifically, since 
coefficient estimates in a Probit model are equal to the true parameters divided by the scale of the 
random error term (Karlson et al., 2012), the indirect effect of financial socialization on saving 
habits is given by: 
1 1
1 1
2 2
R F
R F
R F
 
 
 
− = −       (3) 
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where 
2
F  and 2
R  are the scale parameters in Equations (1) and (2) that are a function of the 
standard deviation of the error terms. Since adding variables to the model reduces the residual 
variance of saving habits, it holds that 
2 2
F R  . Thus, the indirect effect of financial socialization 
on saving habit through self-control cannot be simply addressed as 
1 1
R F − . As such, we would be 
conflating mediation with the rescaling of the model, a situation arising whenever the mediator 
variable has an independent effect on the dependent variable (Kohler et al., 2011). 
Therefore, to identify the pathways that explain why financial socialization affects saving 
habits we conduct a mediation analysis using the KHB procedure proposed by Kohler et al., (2011) 
and by Karlson et al. (2012). Its main idea is to enrich the reduced latent linear model in Equation 
(2) with the inclusion in the specification of one further variable: the residuals from an OLS 
regression of selfcontrol on financial socialization. In this new model, the standard deviation of the 
residuals is identical to the one in Equation (1), which allows to have the same rescaling of the 
coefficients in Equation (3). Thus, we explore the relation between financial socialization, self-
control and saving behavior by comparing different reparameterizations of the same model, both of 
which have not only the same scale parameter but also exactly the same error distribution. Based on 
Monte Carlo simulations, this procedure has been shown to be more effective than other alternatives 
such as average partial effects (Wooldridge, 2002) or the decomposition method proposed by 
Erikson et al. (2005) and Buis (2010) to split the total effect of a covariate in direct and indirect 
effects in the context of non-linear regression models. Mediation analysis through the KHB method 
has also been employed in the study about the effect of childhood self-control on adult pension 
participation by Lades et al. (2017). 7 
In our analysis we use the KHB method for decomposing the total effect of financial 
socialization on saving habits into its direct and indirect components through self-control. We report 
the outcomes of the regression analysis on saving habits and of the mediation analysis in Sub-
section 4.1. 
 
4.1. Regression results 
We start our analysis by estimating the reduced form model of Equation (2). This way we 
look at the association between our measure of financial socialization and general saving habits, 
 
7 In our analysis, the KHB method replaces self-control in Equation (1) by the residuals of an auxiliary regression of 
self-control on financial socialization. Since these residuals and self-control only differ in the share of self-control that 
is correlated with financial socialization, the scale of the error term in Equation (1) and the scale of the error term in 
the regression that uses the residuals are about the same, which in turn alleviates the rescaling issue. The difference 
between the 𝛽1
𝑅 in (2) and the total effect obtained using the KHB method is due to a slight change in the scale of the 
coefficients when introducing the residuals. For further details about the method see Kohler et al. (2011).  
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while controlling for a wide set of control variables. The parameter estimates are shown in Column 
(1) of Table 2. Column (2) reports average marginal effects. 
 
Table 2. Saving habits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Saving habits Saving habits 
 Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect 
     
Financial socialization 0.564*** 0.200*** 0.430*** 0.144*** 
 (0.078) (0.027) (0.081) (0.027) 
Self-control   1.254*** 0.419*** 
   (0.095) (0.029) 
Age: 18-34 0.012 0.004 0.011 0.004 
 (0.073) (0.026) (0.075) (0.025) 
Age: 55-69 0.111* 0.039* 0.068 0.023 
 (0.067) (0.024) (0.069) (0.023) 
Age: >69 0.059 0.021 -0.018 -0.006 
 (0.077) (0.027) (0.079) (0.026) 
Female -0.093* -0.033* -0.099* -0.033* 
 (0.051) (0.018) (0.052) (0.018) 
Married 0.014 0.005 -0.016 -0.005 
 (0.055) (0.020) (0.057) (0.019) 
No dependent children 0.159*** 0.056*** 0.178*** 0.060*** 
 (0.057) (0.020) (0.059) (0.020) 
College 0.161*** 0.057*** 0.135** 0.045** 
 (0.056) (0.020) (0.057) (0.019) 
Self-employed -0.294*** -0.104*** -0.317*** -0.106*** 
 (0.101) (0.035) (0.103) (0.034) 
Good health 0.303*** 0.107*** 0.199*** 0.067*** 
 (0.051) (0.018) (0.053) (0.017) 
Income <30k -0.211*** -0.075*** -0.196*** -0.066*** 
 (0.069) (0.024) (0.070) (0.023) 
Income >100k 0.311*** 0.110*** 0.310*** 0.104*** 
 (0.062) (0.022) (0.063) (0.021) 
Home owner 0.315*** 0.112*** 0.248*** 0.083*** 
 (0.060) (0.021) (0.062) (0.021) 
Area: Midwest -0.043 -0.015 -0.078 -0.026 
 (0.077) (0.027) (0.079) (0.026) 
Area: South 0.101 0.036 0.048 0.016 
 (0.069) (0.025) (0.071) (0.024) 
Area: West 0.105 0.037 0.067 0.022 
 (0.076) (0.027) (0.078) (0.026) 
     
Log-Likelihood  -1772.539  -1680.103  
Pseudo R-squared 0.097  0.145  
Avg. dependent variable 0.550  0.550  
Observations 2,854 2,854 2,854 2,854 
     
Notes: Probit analysis, coefficients (Columns 1 and 3) and average marginal effects (Columns 2 and 4) reported. ***, 
**, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively. Reference groups are: age 
between 35 and 54 (age), less than college (education), other employments (occupational status), medium income 
(income), house renter (housing property), Northeast (area of residence). 
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It is clear that financial socialization is highly associated with general saving habits. In our 
sample, those who received teachings about money while growing up at home are 20 percent more 
likely to save on a regular basis, meaning that parental influence is a significant predictor of 
respondents’ saving behavior. We find that early acquisition of financial skills has a significant role 
in stimulating good economic behavior such as better saving habits. Indeed, habits formed during 
youth are highly influential for adult behavior (Whitebread and Bingham, 2013).8 
However, parents’ financial socialization may also indirectly affect the behavior of children 
by influencing their general self-control skills. Indeed, through the process of financial socialization 
children develop self-control, which is another important driver of financial well-being in adulthood 
(Tang, 2017).  
For this reason, we adopt the KHB method to test the mediating effect of self-control in the 
relation between financial socialization and saving habits. Table 3 shows the Probit regression 
coefficients obtained from the KHB method. The standard output of the method presents the direct, 
indirect and total effects. Our results suggest that financial socialization received during childhood 
has significant direct and indirect effects on respondents’ saving habits. Indeed, having been 
provided with teachings about money while growing up at home leads to higher probability of 
developing saving habits, both directly (direct effect coefficient, p<0.01) and indirectly via self-
control (indirect effect coefficient, p<0.01). It turns out that 28 percent (0.167/0.597) of the total 
effect of financial socialization is attributable to self-control.9 This means that much of the pathway 
between financial socialization and saving behavior is via this variable: self-control is a channel 
through which financial socialization leads to better saving habits.  
 
 
 
8 One might argue that the socio-economic background of the family relates with financial socialization in a way that 
affects saving behavior. In other words, children who grow up in richer families might receive higher financial 
education than comparable children who come from disadvantaged families. For this to be true, it must be the case 
that the index of financial socialization exhibits a certain degree of association with some dimension of parental socio-
economic background. The NFWBS contains information on the highest level of education of the person who raised 
the respondent. We consider this variable as an indicator of socio-economic background. However, the correlation 
between financial socialization and parental education is quite low in our sample (0.256), meaning that the 
relationship between financial socialization and saving behavior is not explained by parental characteristics.  
9 The slight discrepancy between the coefficient of financial socialization reported in Table 2 (Column 1) and the one 
reporting the total effect of financial socialization in Table 3 is due to non-linearity. Results do not change 
qualitatively when we perform the mediation analysis by considering a linear model (OLS). The percentage of 
mediation in the linear case is equal to 27%. 
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Table 3. Mediation analysis 
Saving habits Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Err. 
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Financial socialization       
(Total) Reduced 0.597 0.081 7.41 0.000 0.440 0.755 
(Direct) Full 0.430 0.081 5.32 0.000 0.272 0.588 
(Indirect) Diff 0.167 0.024 6.92 0.000 0.120 0.215 
       
Notes: Total, direct and indirect effects of financial socialization on saving habits. The mediator in the indirect effect is 
self-control. 
 
Subsequently, we add our measure of self-control as an independent regressor in our 
specification. We exploit the richness of our data to learn more on the role of self-control in 
determining saving habits. That is, we estimate the model in Equation (1). Columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 2 report the coefficients and the average marginal effects of the model which also includes 
self-control as a regressor, respectively.10 The amount of explained saving habits variance 
substantially increases when we include self-control in the model. The significance patterns that 
emerge from the output provide interesting results. 
We find that financial socialization is still positively and significantly related with the 
likelihood of saving regularly, even if the association between the two variables is quite lower after 
controlling for self-control. Results indicate that self-control is a significant predictor of saving 
habits.11 In particular, one standard deviation increase of self-control raises the probability to save 
money as a habit by 0.293*0.419=12.2 percentage points. The positive effect of self-control on 
saving habits is strongly significant not only from a statistical perspective, but also from an 
economic point of view. Indeed, self-control increases the ability to delay gratification, which is 
critical to set financial goals and to develop household budgets in service of those goals (Drever et 
al., 2015).  
As regards the other control variables, we do not find a significant relationship between age 
and saving habits.12 Conversely, we find a positive association between education and the 
 
10 Table 2 also reports the coefficient estimates to be consistent with the decomposition made by the KHB method in 
Table 3. Note that the direct effect of financial socialization on saving habits obtained in Table 3 equals the parameter 
estimate of financial socialization in Column 2 of Table 2. It is important to highlight that the total effect reported in 
Table 3 is slightly different from the parameter estimate of financial socialization in Column 1 of Table 2 because the 
KHB procedure expresses the total effect in the same scale as the direct effect. This also happens in Lades et al. 
(2017).  
11 We repeat our estimates using a linear probability model with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, obtaining 
similar results both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
12 We refer the reader to Appendix C to shed more light on the socio-demographic determinants of saving habits. In 
Appendix C.1 and C.2 we explore heterogeneity in the main findings across generations and by gender, respectively. 
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propensity to save regularly. People with higher educational levels may also increase their 
confidence in dealing with financial matters, with positive effects on their saving behavior. As 
expected, having no children that need to be financially supported increases the probability to save 
as a habit by 6 percent.  
We also find that saving habits are 10.6 percent less likely for those who are self-employed. 
A possible interpretation is that other categories of workers, notably those who are employees, may 
foster their saving habits by participating in saving plans that have been already established in the 
workplace. Besides that, self-employed could be less stimulated to save regularly as they do not 
earn a constant wage.  
The propensity for better saving habits is positively correlated with good health conditions. 
In addition, we show that an increase in income boosts the probability to save regularly. This result 
is in line with Chakrabarty et al. (2008), who find that households are more likely to follow a 
regular saving plan when they have higher permanent income. Finally, we find that individuals who 
own their house are more likely to save regularly compared to those who rent their house, possibly 
because of the lower financial constraints that they face. However, differences in saving habits may 
partly result from different preferences on consumption choices, including the choice about renting 
or buying a home. According to Henderson and Ioannides (1983), when the individual’s investment 
demand is at least as great as his consumption demand, owning is preferred to renting. Individual 
preferences for investment rather than immediate consumption may also affect economic behavior 
by augmenting saving awareness, with positive impact on saving habits. 
 
4.2. Robustness checks 
In the previous analysis, we have presented regression results by using a summary index for 
self-control, which has been drawn from factor analysis. As a robustness check, we replace it with 
an alternative measure of self-control, which is a binary variable representing the likelihood of 
resisting temptation.13 The main findings of Table 2 are confirmed, with financial socialization and 
self-control still positively and significantly related to the likelihood of saving regularly. Results 
from the mediation analysis are also consistent with those previously reported.  
Another robustness check is related to the definition of financial socialization. As discussed 
in Sub-section 3.1.2, our key variable of interest is constructed as an index summarizing all the 
financial socialization items contained in the NFWBS data set. However, studies concerned about 
parental influence on economic behavior usually consider teachings on saving money only, rather 
 
13 This is one of the three items that we used to build the summary index from factor analysis. We consider it as it 
provides the most relevant contribution in the definition of the summary self-control index. 
105 
 
than several other parental socialization practices (Bernheim et al., 2001). Therefore, one may argue 
that our measure of financial socialization is too broad, as it could reflect a general competence in 
financial matters, rather than the specific effect of financial socialization. For this reason, we 
perform again our estimates in Table 2 by replacing the original financial socialization measure by 
two narrower indices that represent parental teachings about money (NFWBS financial socialization 
items 1-5) and financial hands-on experiences (items 6-7), respectively.14 We refer the reader again 
to Appendix A.3 for further details. In addition, we also define financial socialization in a 
(standardized) 0-7 scale as the sum of the seven binary dummies for each of the above mentioned 
financial socialization items. Our central findings are not affected by these alternative definitions of 
financial socialization. Hence, the effects of financial socialization and self-control are consistent in 
sign and significance with those previously reported.15 
Our findings of Tables 2 and 3 remain robust even when we restrict our sample to 
respondents younger than 50 years. We perform this additional check as someone might argue that 
the time between the respondent received financial socialization and the time she completes the 
survey would otherwise be too large. Even in this case the main coefficients do not change much, 
though precision of the estimates slightly declines.  
Appendix D reports the regression output of the robustness checks mentioned above. We 
refer to Table D.1 for more details. We further test for the validity of our findings by repeating the 
analysis on saving habits using two alternative dependent variables related to saving behavior. We 
consider a variable representing the amount of money currently saved by respondents (in cash, 
checking and saving account balances) and a binary variable measuring respondents’ propensity to 
plan by consulting their financial budgets. Regression output and mediation analysis for these 
alternative saving measures are reported in Appendix Table D.2 and are consistent with the main 
findings. 
 
5. Extensions 
5.1. Financial products and services 
In this Section we further analyze the relationship between self-control, financial 
socialization and the decisions to save using different financial products and services. We estimate 
the following equation, for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 and 𝑗 = 1, … ,5:  
𝑌𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛽0,𝑗
𝐹 + 𝛽1,𝑗
𝐹 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2,𝑗
𝐹 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑗
′ 𝛾𝑗
𝐹 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗
𝐹   (4) 
 
14 We first include them separately and then together in our specification. 
15 The estimation results from the mediation analysis are also qualitatively the same. Results are available upon request. 
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where now the dependent variable 𝑌𝑖,𝑗 is a vector of five binary outcomes for individual i denoting 
the categories of financial instruments (checking accounts, educational loans, life or health 
insurance, retirement accounts, financial assets) described in Sub-section 3.1.1. Exploring all these 
financial instruments is interesting not only because they have various financial purposes, but also 
because they differ in their frequency in the society.  
Our goal here is to explore the relationship between financial socialization, self-control and 
the decisions to save through different financial products and services in a multivariate framework. 
Households frequently hold multiple financial products at the same time. Therefore, it is possible 
that the decisions to save through different financial products are jointly determined, rather than the 
result of independent processes. If there are meaningful correlations between the error processes, 
the simultaneous estimation of several binary outcomes will be more efficient than those derived 
from single-equation Probit regressions. Accordingly, we estimate a seemingly unrelated 
Multivariate Probit model by Maximum Likelihood.16 Estimated average marginal effects are 
reported in Table 4. The correlation coefficients between the residuals from the Multivariate Probit 
equations are also presented in Table 4. 
Most of the correlation coefficients of the residuals are statistically significant. This supports 
our hypothesis that the outcome variables share some common unobserved factors and justifies the 
use of Multivariate Probit instead of independent Probit model; the positive sign of the correlation 
coefficients indicates that the decisions to save through specific financial products or services are 
complimentary to each other. This suggests that respondents spread their investment portfolio 
among different financial instruments, which is a commonly used diversification strategy. For 
example, respondents who hold insurances tend to also have other financial products, notably 
retirement or checking accounts. Those who hold retirement accounts are also more likely to have 
financial assets. Conversely, no significant correlation is found between having financial assets and 
educational loans, meaning that the decisions to own these financial products are independent.  
Our findings from Table 4 shed light on the importance of financial socialization and self-
control and their relationships with many financial decisions. The exceptions are checking accounts, 
that are widespread in the population (87.6 percent of the individuals in the sample hold at least one 
account) and education loans, that instead are more rare (present in 20.3 percent of the sample) and 
related to a specific purpose. In particular, regression results reported in Columns 3-5 show that 
 
16 The estimates have been conducted using the cmp module in Stata 15. The cmp modelling framework proposed by 
Roodman (2011) allows for the simultaneous estimation of several binary outcomes in which the errors share a 
multivariate normal distribution. It fits non-linear seemingly unrelated regression models based on Maximum 
Likelihood simulations. Moreover, it easily enables to retrieve marginal effects after estimation. For this reason, it is 
appropriate for jointly predicting decisions over different financial products on an individual-specific basis. 
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parental teachings have long-term impacts on how individuals behave in the future and confirm the 
role of parents as relevant socialization agents. Those who received financial socialization while 
growing up at home, through teachings about money or primary exposures to financial instruments, 
then later in life are more likely to have safe financial products such as insurances or retirement 
accounts (Columns 3 and 4). Our results on these dependent variables are in line with previous 
evidence by Bucciol and Zarri (2019), who show that socialization by parents enhances individuals’ 
future orientation. Hence, we argue that future orientation is an important driver of financial 
decisions, with positive implications on the propensity to hold precautionary savings.  
Financial socialization also increases the likelihood of having financial products such as 
stocks, bonds or mutual funds (Column 5). Indeed, financial socialization received early in life 
influences individuals’ awareness in the financial domain, fostering their competence in taking 
financial decisions during adulthood. This confirms previous results by Shim et al. (2009), who 
show that individuals who are confident with their financial transactions tend to have sufficient 
guidance from their parents since childhood, in addition to basic financial knowledge acquired from 
different sources.  
Our results indicate that an increase in self-control boosts the propensity to have money in 
retirement accounts by 9 percent, possibly because respondents with good self-control exhibit a 
higher preference for saving rather than spending left-over-money. They may find it less costly to 
reduce their current consumption in order to stick to their long-term financial plans.  
Apart from being positively associated with the willingness to have retirement accounts, 
self-control positively affects the probability of having financial assets. Overall, results reported in 
Table 4 confirm previous research showing that individuals with high levels of self-control have 
better general financial behavior (Strömbäck et al., 2017). Nevertheless, it seems that financial 
socialization is more important than self-control for explaining financial assets ownership. We point 
out that in these specifications the coefficient estimates of financial socialization measure the direct 
effect, whereas the corresponding ones for self-control gather its effect plus the indirect effect of 
financial socialization. Since the marginal effect for the net impact of financial socialization is 
larger than the one for self-control, we have some evidence that financial knowledge matters more 
than self-control problems for holding financial assets. However, in the case of retirement savings, 
the size of both effects is roughly similar. Our findings presented in Table 4 also indicate interesting 
correlations among financial products and services and several socio-demographic factors, which 
we discuss hereafter. 
 
Checking accounts 
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Having a checking account is a first step towards building a financial identity, which leads 
to further access to financial products and services (Hogarth et al., 2004). Checking accounts 
mainly exist to allow consumers instant access to cash and withdraw money, to pay bills, and for 
other everyday basic consumer financial needs. Indeed, holding checking accounts is widespread in 
our sample and it requires no specific financial skill or effort to exercise self-control. Even so, we 
find that some control variables are significantly related with the likelihood of having checking 
accounts. For instance, individuals who have higher education, rich income levels and those who 
own their home are more likely to have checking accounts. Such characteristics may help them to 
feel more comfortable with the banking system. Conversely, we find that the self-employed are less 
likely to hold checking accounts, possibly because of their stronger preferences for the privacy of 
their financial records (Hogarth et al., 2004). 
 
Educational loans 
Educational loans have become an important source of financial support for US households 
after the growing increase in higher education tuition prices (Fan and Chatterjee, 2018). Our results 
indicate that individuals older than 55 have 12 percent lower probability of asking for educational 
loans. Our reference group consists of working-age individuals, who may be more likely to take out 
educational loans in the wake of the last recession, possibly to boost their own employment 
prospects. Individuals may also take out loans to help finance for their children’s college tuition 
rather than to fund their own education. We find that married individuals have a larger probability 
of holding loans compared to non-married individuals. Notice that, among the financial products 
and services considered in Table 4, being married is statistically significant only for this outcome 
variable. Married individuals are usually more constrained by their social networks, so that they 
may be more interested in achieving a wide range of educational opportunities (for themselves or 
for their children) which can ultimately influence their wealth and labor market participation. We 
find that low-income households are less likely to borrow for education. Educational loans must be 
repaid to avoid harsh penalties; for this reason, low-income households may wish to limit debt for 
fear of not succeeding in repaying it (Cowan, 2016). 
 
Life or health insurance 
We find that women are more likely to have insurances, probably because they are more risk 
averse than men and, consequently, make safer choices (Luciano et al., 2016). Interestingly, 
insurances ownership is positively related with college education. More educated individuals may 
have a stronger desire to protect family members, that is, a higher intensity of the bequest motive 
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(Truett and Truett, 1990). Other variables that explain the ownership of insurances are occupational 
status and income, which means that socioeconomic factors are important determinants of policy 
insurance holdings. Furthermore, decisions about insurances are strongly and positively correlated 
with home ownership. Indeed, many home mortgages include or require some life insurance 
(Gandolfi and Miners, 1996), all of which could explain the positive effect of home ownership on 
the dependent variable presented in Column 3. As for geographical differences, our results show 
that people in the South exhibit a lower likelihood of having life or health insurances in comparison 
to those living in the Northeast. 
 
Retirement accounts 
Demographics are also strongly associated with the probability of having retirement 
accounts. Older individuals, with high education and income and homeowners are more likely to 
have retirement accounts. Conversely, females are less likely to have such financial products. 
Household responsibilities among women may negatively affect their labor market participation, 
lowering their possibilities to obtain work-provided benefits such as employer-sponsored retirement 
plans. 
 
Financial assets 
Several variables, including age, gender, education and health status of respondents are 
significant determinants of financial assets ownership. Assets holding increases with age and 
income, while females are 5.9 percent less likely to have stocks, bonds or mutual funds. As 
expected, college educated are more likely to own these financial products. Indeed, holding income 
constant, higher education implies steeper income profiles than would be indicated by the income 
variable alone (Gandolfi and Miners, 1996). The absence of dependent children and the dummy 
variable for good health also show positive relationships with financial assets ownership. 
Interestingly, we find that people living in the Midwest have a higher probability of holding 
financial assets.  
 
Table 4. Financial products and services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Checking  
accounts 
Educational 
loans 
Insurance Retirement 
accounts 
Financial  
assets 
      
Financial socialization 0.015 -0.011 0.055** 0.087*** 0.123*** 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) 
Self-control 0.021 -0.017 0.013 0.090*** 0.076** 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.030) 
Age: 18-34 0.005 0.108*** -0.010 -0.051*** -0.024 
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 (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) 
Age: 55-69 0.019 -0.120*** 0.015 0.090*** 0.079*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) 
Age: >69 0.005 -0.126*** 0.037* 0.088*** 0.157*** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Female -0.001 0.019 0.040*** -0.034** -0.059*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) 
Married 0.019 0.047*** 0.023 0.002 -0.028 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) 
No dependent children 0.018 -0.115*** -0.004 0.043*** 0.066*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
College 0.060*** 0.145*** 0.073*** 0.133*** 0.146*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Self-employed -0.056*** -0.003 -0.091*** -0.182*** 0.003 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) 
Good health 0.010 0.022 0.020 0.025* 0.050*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Income <30k -0.088*** -0.075*** -0.138*** -0.200*** -0.136*** 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.025) 
Income >100k 0.033** 0.037** 0.049*** 0.103*** 0.130*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Home owner 0.055*** -0.064*** 0.092*** 0.147*** 0.170*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) 
Area: Midwest 0.023 0.011 -0.013 0.017 0.064*** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) 
Area: South 0.008 0.001 -0.040** -0.033* 0.034 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) 
Area: West 0.020 -0.034 -0.041* -0.015 0.028 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) 
      
𝜌12 0.221***     
𝜌13 0.400***     
𝜌14 0.218***     
𝜌15 0.210***     
𝜌23 0.276***     
𝜌24 0.118***     
𝜌25 0.036     
𝜌34 0.406***     
𝜌35 0.207***     
𝜌45 0.368***     
      
Log-Likelihood  -5825.552 
Pseudo R-squared 0.155 
Avg. dependent variable 0.876 0.203 0.803 0.711 0.344 
Observations 2,854 2,854 2,854 2,854 2,854 
      
Notes: Multivariate Probit analysis, average marginal effects reported. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels respectively. Reference groups are: age between 35 and 54 (age), less than college 
(education), other employments (occupational status), medium income (income), house renter (housing property), 
Northeast (area of residence). 
 
5.2. Saving strategies 
Finally, we investigate the association between financial socialization, self-control and the 
decision to save through different saving strategies. To this end, we consider the same specification 
described in Equation (1), where now the dependent variable saving habits is replaced by the 
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outcome variables on saving strategies presented in Sub-section 3.1.1 (automated retirement and 
automated non retirement). One could proceed modelling both outcomes separately. However, it is 
possible that decisions to save through different saving strategies may be jointly determined. 
Therefore, we use a seemingly unrelated bivariate Probit model (SUR-Biprobit), which allows for 
the simultaneous estimation of the correlation structure between the dependent variables and the 
regression coefficients. The relatedness between the two outcomes occurs via correlation of the 
errors that appears in the index-function model formulation of the binary outcome model. 
Specifically, the two outcomes are determined by a system of two equations: 
 
{
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
′𝛾 + 𝜔𝑖     
      (5) 
 
where the errors 𝜀𝑖 and 𝜔𝑖 are jointly normally distributed with mean zero, variance one, and 
correlations 𝜌. The model is jointly estimated by Full Information Maximum Likelihood. It 
collapses to two separate Probit models if 𝜌 = 0. 
Table 5 reports the results from the model on the decisions to save through an automated 
retirement account (Column 1) and an automated non-retirement account (Column 2). A problem of 
reverse causality could arise in the model specified in Equation (5), because the decision to save 
automatically may act as a commitment device that lowers perceived self-control problems. This 
notwithstanding, we are not claiming that our results should be given a causal interpretation. Even 
so, the correlation patterns between automated types of savings and the explanatory variables 
remain of great interest.  
Results reported in Table 5 suggest that both financial socialization and self-control are 
positively and significantly associated with the decision to automatically transfer savings to both 
retirement and non-retirement accounts. Interestingly, the magnitude of the two effects is about the 
same. As argued before, we recall that the coefficient for financial socialization just measures the 
direct effect whereas the one for self-control also includes the indirect effect of financial 
socialization. Hence, from the marginal effects we cannot conclude which of the two dimensions 
weighs more.  
Common strategies for self-control management rely on the use of automatic transfers from 
checking accounts to saving accounts (Webley and Nyhus, 2006). This would imply that people 
with high self-control would have a low demand for automated accounts. We find the opposite, 
which suggests that in our sample those who exhibit high self-control are more likely to invest in 
any types of financial instruments, choosing also committed devices. In turn, this may indicate that 
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the role of self-control in predicting financial decisions is mainly via the development of 
conscientiousness and future orientation among individuals. We are cautious when interpreting this 
result since our measure of this dimension is not specifically defined in the finance domain. Even 
though NFWBS measures the financial well-being of the US population, so that our self-control 
measure can be regarded as a valuable proxy for self-control problems, it might be the case that its 
estimated effect is confounded with other factors. Regarding the socio-demographic variables, an 
interesting result is that people in middle and elder age display a lower likelihood of having 
automated savings, either for retirement or for other purposes. Accordingly, automated savings 
appear to be more common among individuals under 55. A possible explanation is the following: if 
we consider automated savings to be a way of commitment for leaving some money aside for the 
future, people over 55 might be more concerned about the present due to having fewer years of life 
ahead. This does not mean they do not save money, but that at least they do not do it automatically.  
Whilst males are more likely to hold automated non-retirement accounts, married people are 
less likely to have automated savings for retirement. Interestingly, self-employed people are less 
likely to hold automated savings, either for retirement or for non-retirement purposes. Conversely, 
both kinds of automated savings are more widespread among highly educated people. People in 
good health conditions display a higher probability of transferring money automatically to 
retirement accounts. As could be expected, the probability of saving automatically is higher among 
high income people and home owners. Everything else being equal, these individuals have higher 
chances for saving and thus a higher likelihood of transferring savings in an automated way.  
Table 5 also presents the estimated tetrachoric correlation (𝜌) between the error terms, 
which is significantly different from zero. This suggests that those who automatically save for 
retirement also transfer some automated savings for other purposes. Thus, the decisions to save 
through different saving products share some common unobservables that, in case of not accounting 
for, would lead to biased parameter estimates.  
 
Table 5. Saving strategies 
 (1) (2) 
 Automated retirement account Automated non retirement account 
   
Financial socialization 0.095*** 0.106*** 
 (0.026) (0.028) 
Self-control 0.139*** 0.140*** 
 (0.030) (0.032) 
Age: 18-34 -0.031 -0.004 
 (0.023) (0.026) 
Age: 55-69 -0.155*** -0.043* 
 (0.021) (0.024) 
Age: >69 -0.335*** -0.078*** 
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 (0.025) (0.028) 
Female -0.015 -0.037** 
 (0.017) (0.018) 
Married -0.036** -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.020) 
No dependent children -0.013 0.016 
 (0.018) (0.020) 
College 0.096*** 0.044** 
 (0.018) (0.020) 
Self-employed -0.220*** -0.065* 
 (0.035) (0.037) 
Good health 0.045*** 0.014 
 (0.017) (0.019) 
Income <30k -0.239*** -0.172*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) 
Income >100k 0.112*** 0.078*** 
 (0.019) (0.022) 
Home owner 0.077*** 0.062*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) 
Area: Midwest 0.024 -0.000 
 (0.025) (0.027) 
Area: South 0.010 0.018 
 (0.022) (0.025) 
Area: West 0.008 0.055** 
 (0.024) (0.027) 
   
Rho (𝜌) 0.455*** 
Log-Likelihood  -3258.776 
Pseudo R-squared 0.119 
Avg. dependent variable 0.431 0.419 
Observations 2,854 2,854 
   
Notes: Bivariate Probit analysis, average marginal effects reported. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels respectively. Reference groups are: age between 35 and 54 (age), less than college 
(education), other employments (occupational status), medium income (income), house renter (housing property), 
Northeast (area of residence). 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the growing empirical literature on the determinants of saving 
behavior by exploring the role of financial socialization and self-control on saving decisions. Using 
novel data from the US, we have firstly assessed the direct and indirect linkages between financial 
socialization and saving habits using the KHB decomposition method. Consistently with our 
expectations, our results show that financial socialization does not only have a direct positive effect 
on the probability of saving money as a regular habit, but also an indirect positive one by means of 
increasing self-control. Hence, there are two different channels by which higher financial 
socialization is linked with a higher likelihood of developing saving as a habit. These findings 
clearly suggest that financial socialization received in young age has significant direct and indirect 
effects on respondents’ saving habits. 
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We have further explored the relationship between financial socialization, self-control and 
different types of financial products using a multivariate framework that controls for the presence of 
shared unobserved heterogeneity among variables. Our results from this analysis suggest that the 
relevance of financial socialization depends on the type of financial product being examined. People 
who received financial education at home, either through teachings about money or by direct 
exposure to financial instruments, are more likely to hold insurances, retirement accounts and 
financial assets. However, the tenure of educational loans of checking accounts is not related to 
teachings received from family. Similarly, people with high self-control scores are more likely to 
hold retirement accounts and financial assets, whereas this variable is not significant for explaining 
the ownership of the other types of assets.  
Finally, we have examined the determinants of automated retirement and non-retirement 
saving accounts. Interestingly, we find that both financial socialization and self-control are 
significantly and positively related with the decision to automatically transfer savings to both types 
of automated saving accounts.  
In our regressions, we have controlled for several demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics. Our findings are robust to different definitions of our variables of interest. We 
highlight the fact that our measure of financial socialization is broader than the ones previously 
used in the literature. Our indicator does not only consider ‘theoretical’ teachings about good 
financial behavior but also ‘practical’ teachings about how to manage a regular allowance. We 
believe that financial socialization is better identified with our measure than it was in earlier 
research.  
Overall, our results support the role of parental socialization and self-control as important 
drivers of saving behavior. As indicated earlier, we are cautious when interpreting the effect of self-
control on saving decisions since our measure of this dimension might not be totally representative 
of self-control in the finance domain.  
Our results have relevant policy implications. Since we provide robust evidence of financial 
socialization and self-control being two important drivers of financial behavior, it seems that 
parents should place greater attention on the economic-related teachings given to their children. 
This is especially important as higher self-control appears also to be an intermediate outcome of 
parental teachings received in young age. Knowing that self-control skills matter not only for 
financial behaviors, but also for consumer choices, interpersonal relationships and emotional 
problems, improving financial socialization practices warrants additional emphasis. Making 
children participate in household discussions about every day financial decisions, stressing them the 
importance of saving and to adjust their expenditures to the budget constraint, or managing a 
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regular allowance early in childhood are some examples of financial socialization practices parents 
should put into action with their children.    
Nevertheless, our study has some limitations that should be pointed out. The main limitation 
is that it our measure of self-control is self-reported, and this is not free of bias. People may 
overestimate their capacity to control themselves. Future research might try to replicate our analysis 
by means of experimental protocols that elicit self-control in a more objective way. Another 
drawback is that we lack information on individual’s risk aversion and non-cognitive abilities other 
than self-control (i.e. patience and temperament), which could also be relevant for characterizing 
the saving pattern behavior. In addition, our study relies on cross-sectional data. A valuable avenue 
for further research could be to examine the role of financial socialization and self-control using 
longitudinal data, which could provide further insights into the dynamics of these variables and 
financial behavior. Further research may also compare how saving habits and experiences vary by 
gender. This would be beneficial to provide a better understanding of the determinants of financial 
decisions. In addition, it might be interesting to explore the relationship between financial 
socialization, self-control and other relevant dimensions such as future orientation.  
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Appendix A. NFWBS: exact wording of the questions 
 
A.1. Financial products and services  
The NFWBS asks respondents to select which financial products and services they currently have 
from an exhaustive list including checking or savings accounts, life or health insurance, retirement 
or pension account, non-retirement investments and education loan. The exact wording of the 
questions and the distribution of responses is reported in Table A.1. We grouped categories 2 and 3 
in a variable representing “Insurance”, categories 4 and 5 in a variable representing “Retirement 
accounts” and categories 7 and 8 in a variable representing “Educational loans”. We model each 
category as a binary variable taking the value one if the respondent currently holds the specific 
financial product or service, and zero otherwise. 
 
Table A.2. Financial products and services 
[NFWBS variable name: PRODHAVE] 
Question: “Which of the following financial products and services do you currently have?” 
Possible answers: “Yes”; “No” 
  Answer: “Yes” 
N (fraction) 
   
1 Checking or Savings Account at a bank or credit union  2,501 (0.87) 
2 Life Insurance  1,555 (0.54) 
3 Health Insurance  2,104 (0.74) 
4 Retirement Account (such as a 401k or IRA)  1,765 (0.61) 
5 Pension  1,043 (0.36) 
6 Non-Retirement Investments (such as stocks, bonds or mutual funds)  983 (0.34) 
7 Education Savings Account (such as 529 or Coverdale)  202 (0.07) 
8 Student/Education Loan (for yourself or someone else) 421 (0.15) 
 Respondent did not select any item in PRODHAVE bank  87 (0.03) 
Notes: The final sample includes 2,854 individuals interviewed in year 2016 
 
Figure A.2: frequency distribution of responses (n=2,854) 
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A.2. Saving strategies 
 
Table A.2. Saving strategies 
[NFWBS variable name: PRODHAVE] 
Question: “Do you currently have money automatically transferred to:” 
Possible answers: “Yes”; “No”; “I do not have this type of account” 
  Answer: “Yes” 
N (fraction) 
   
1 A Retirement Savings Account  1,230 (0.43) 
2 A Non-Retirement Savings Account  1,196 (0.41) 
Notes: The final sample includes 2,854 individuals interviewed in year 2016 
 
 
A.3. Financial socialization  
 
Table A.3. Financial socialization 
[NFWBS variable name: FINSOC2] 
Question: “While growing up at home, did your family do any of the following?”  
Possible answers: “Yes”; “No” 
  Answer: “Yes” 
N (fraction) 
   
1 Discussed family financial matters with me 972 (0.34) 
2 Spoke to me about the importance of saving  1,854 (0.65) 
3 Discussed how to establish a good credit rating 1,013 (0.35) 
4 Taught me how to be a smart shopper 1,724 (0.60) 
5 Taught me that my actions determine my success in life 2,120 (0.74) 
6 Provided me with a regular allowance 1,141 (0.40) 
7 Provided me with a savings account  1,211 (0.42) 
Notes: The final sample includes 2,854 individuals interviewed in year 2016 
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Appendix B. Relationship between self-control and financial socialization 
 
Table B.1. Analysis of self-control 
 
 (1) 
 Self-control 
  
Financial socialization 0.134*** 
 (0.016) 
Age: 18-34 -0.003 
 (0.016) 
Age: 55-69 0.040*** 
 (0.014) 
Age: >69 0.066*** 
 (0.016) 
Female 0.001 
 (0.011) 
Married 0.024** 
 (0.012) 
No dependent children -0.009 
 (0.012) 
College 0.027** 
 (0.012) 
Self-employed 0.018 
 (0.018) 
Good health 0.097*** 
 (0.011) 
Area: Midwest 0.024 
 (0.017) 
Area: South 0.044*** 
 (0.015) 
Area: West 0.035** 
 (0.016) 
Income <30k -0.028* 
 (0.016) 
Income >100k 0.013 
 (0.012) 
Home owner 0.066*** 
 (0.014) 
Constant 0.565*** 
 (0.024) 
  
Avg. dependent variable 0.802 
R-squared 0.121 
Observations 2,854 
  
Notes: This table presents OLS coefficients of a regression model of self-control on financial socialization including all 
the control variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent levels respectively. Reference groups are: age between 35 and 54 (age), less than college (education), 
other employments (occupational status), medium income (income), house renter (housing property), Northeast (area of 
residence). 
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Appendix C. Further extensions 
 
Age has also been frequently examined in previous research on saving behavior. We enrich here our 
benchmark analysis by looking at heterogeneity in saving habits across age groups. Specifically, we 
make a distinction between different generations in the effects of financial socialization and self-
control on saving habits. Our dataset includes information about respondents’ generation at the 
beginning of the survey field period in fall 2016. We focus on individuals aged between 18 and 35, 
who are defined as “Millennials”; among the generations, the Millennials are the largest group in 
the United States (Yao and Cheng, 2017). In Table C.1, the variables on financial socialization and 
self-control are interacted with generation, so that they capture the effects on millennials and other 
generations (“no Millennials” are individuals aged more than 35 at the beginning of the survey). In 
Column 1 the association between financial socialization and saving habits is larger among 
Millenials compared to other generations, possibly because they received financial socialization 
more recently compared to other generations. Thus, the influence of parenting on subsequent saving 
decisions seems to decrease as respondents grow older. When measures of self-control are included 
in models predicting saving habits by generation, financial socialization remains a significant 
variable (Column 2). Moreover, the amount of explained saving habits variance substantially 
increases when we include the interaction between generation and self-control in the model. As 
with financial socialization, we find a larger association between self-control and saving habits 
among Millennials. We interpret this finding as an indication that differences in self-control are 
related to individuals’ cognitive maturation: individuals’ attitudes towards saving may be less 
driven by short-term motives, which require self-control, as they age and become more 
independent. 
 
Table C.1. Saving habits across generations 
 
 (1) (1) 
 Saving habits Saving habits 
   
Financial socialization 0.264*** 0.183*** 
(Millennials) (0.058) (0.059) 
Self-control  0.452*** 
(Millennials)  (0.062) 
Financial socialization 0.182*** 0.133*** 
(no Millennials) (0.031) (0.030) 
Self-control  0.410*** 
(no Millennials)  (0.034) 
Age: 18-34 0.047 0.062 
 (0.081) (0.081) 
Age: 55-69 0.038 0.021 
 (0.024) (0.023) 
Age: >69 0.020 -0.007 
 (0.027) (0.026) 
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Female -0.032* -0.033* 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Married 0.005 -0.005 
 (0.020) (0.019) 
No dependent children 0.054*** 0.058*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
College 0.058*** 0.046** 
 (0.020) (0.019) 
Self-employed -0.101*** -0.104*** 
 (0.036) (0.034) 
Good health 0.106*** 0.066*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Area: Midwest -0.015 -0.026 
 (0.027) (0.026) 
Area: South 0.036 0.016 
 (0.025) (0.024) 
Area: West 0.038 0.023 
 (0.027) (0.026) 
Income <30k -0.074*** -0.065*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) 
Income >100k 0.109*** 0.103*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) 
Home owner 0.112*** 0.083*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
Generation: Millennials -0.092 -0.123 
 (0.090) (0.103) 
   
Log-Likelihood  -1771.600 -1679.348 
Pseudo R-squared 0.098 0.145 
Avg. dependent variable 0.550 0.550 
Observations 2,854 2,854 
   
Notes: Probit analysis by generation, coefficients (Columns 1 and 3) and average marginal effects (Columns 2 and 4) 
reported in panel (a). ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
 
 
Previous research also indicates that the influence of parenting on self-control differs by gender (Li 
et al., 2019). Parents may tolerate certain behaviors from sons that would be quickly curtailed if 
displayed by daughters; in turn, differences in parental practices like monitoring and supervision 
may partially account for gender differences in self-control (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). To 
shed more light on this issue, we repeat here our analysis on saving habits by making a distinction 
between males and females in our data. Results reported in Table C.2 reveal that in our sample the 
effect of financial socialization is larger among females (16 percentage points) as opposed to their 
male counterparts (12.4 percentage points). For both genders, we find a strong role of self-control in 
contributing to saving habits. Most interestingly, results from the mediation analysis by gender 
indicate that the mediating effect of self-control is higher among males: in this subsample we find 
that 31 percent (0.173/0.557) of the effect of financial socialization is attributable to self-control. 
All in all, this suggests that males’ self-control may be largely built and developed through financial 
socialization. Conversely, females may display larger self-control to begin with, as part of their 
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behavioral and attitudinal traits. These findings provide only a first evidence about the factors 
explaining gender differences in saving habits and would benefit from further research. In-depth 
exploration of the associations between financial socialization, self-control and gender would be 
useful to determine what role each of these elements plays in fostering financial decisions.  
 
 
Table C.2. Saving habits by gender 
 
Panel a: regression results by gender 
 
 Females Males 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Saving habits  Saving habits  
 Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect 
     
Financial socialization 0.463 0.160*** 0.384 0.124*** 
 (0.118) (0.040) (0.112) (0.036) 
Self-control 1.035 0.357*** 1.465 0.471*** 
 (0.133) (0.043) (0.137) (0.039) 
Socio-demographic 
controls 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
-794.729 
0.126 
0.498 
1,312 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
-874.244 
0.161 
0.593 
1,542 
Area fixed effects 
 
Log-Likelihood  
Pseudo R-squared 
Avg. dependent variable 
Observations 
 
Panel b: mediation analysis by gender 
 
Financial socialization     
(Total) Reduced 
 
(Direct) Full 
 
(Indirect) Diff 
0.620*** 
(0.118) 
0.463*** 
(0.118) 
0.157*** 
(0.033) 
0.557*** 
0.112 
0.384*** 
0.112 
0.173*** 
0.036 
   
Notes: Probit analysis by gender, coefficients (Columns 1 and 3) and average marginal effects (Columns 2 and 4) 
reported in panel (a). ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively. All 
regressions include the vector of socioeconomic variables listed in the previous tables. Reference groups are: age 
between 35 and 54 (age), less than college (education), other employments (occupational status), medium income 
(income), house renter (housing property), Northeast (area of residence). Panel (b): total, direct and indirect effects of 
financial socialization on saving habits. The mediator in the indirect effect is self-control. 
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Appendix D. Robustness checks on saving habits: estimation results 
 
Table D.1. Robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Saving  
habits 
Saving 
 habits 
Saving  
habits 
Saving  
habits 
Saving  
habits 
      
Financial socialization 0.172***    0.138*** 
 (0.027)    (0.036) 
Financial socialization: std 0-7    0.155***  
    (0.028)  
Financial socialization: items 1-5  0.115***    
  (0.023)    
Financial socialization: items 6-7   0.108***   
   (0.027)   
Self-control  0.419*** 0.440*** 0.421*** 0.390*** 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.038) 
Self-control: resisting temptation 0.217***     
 (0.020)     
Age: 18-34 0.008 0.005 0.009 0.002 -0.003 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) 
Age: 55-69 0.028 0.022 0.023 0.024  
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)  
Age: >69 -0.006 -0.008 -0.001 -0.003  
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)  
Female -0.029* -0.034* -0.032* -0.032* 0.119*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031) 
Married -0.002 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) 
No dependent children 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.058*** -0.058** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) 
College 0.059*** 0.048** 0.046** 0.043** 0.007 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) 
Self-employed -0.101*** -0.107*** -0.103*** -0.105*** 0.059** 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.025) 
Good health 0.084*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.059** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) 
Income <30k -0.080*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.065*** -0.038 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.033) 
Income >100k 0.112*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.103*** 0.099*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) 
Home owner 0.097*** 0.084*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.068** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) 
Area: Midwest -0.022 -0.027 -0.029 -0.027  
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)  
Area: South 0.024 0.015 0.017 0.016  
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  
Area: West 0.025 0.022 0.016 0.022  
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)  
      
Log-Likelihood  -1716.850 -1681.705 -1686.673 -1679.608 -891.742 
Pseudo R-squared 0.126 0.144 0.141 0.145 0.151 
Avg. dependent variable 0.550 0.550 0.550 0.550 0.526 
Observations 2,854 2,854 2,854 2,854 1,518 
Notes: Univariate Probit analysis, average marginal effects reported. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent levels respectively. In Column 1 we replace our self-control index with an alternative binary 
variable representing the likelihood of resisting temptation. In Columns 2-4 we replace the original financial 
socialization index by alternative definitions as described in Sub-section 4.2. Column 5 reports regression results for a 
subsample of respondents younger than 50. 
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Table D.2. Saving habits: alternative definitions 
 
Panel a: regression results 
 (1) (2) 
 Money saved Propensity to plan 
  
 
Coefficient Marginal effect 
     
Financial socialization 0.891*** 
(0.168) 
1.337*** 
(0.191) 
0.279*** 0.099*** 
 (0.079) (0.028) 
Self-control 0.604*** 0.215*** 
 (0.087) (0.030) 
Socio-demographic controls Yes Yes 
Yes Area fixed effects Yes 
     
Log-Likelihood   -1778.829 
0.032 
0.656 
2,854 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.413 
8.137 
2,445 
Avg. dependent variable 
Observations 
     
Panel b: mediation analysis 
 
Financial socialization     
(Total) Reduced 1.081*** 
(0.167) 
0.890*** 
(0.168) 
0.190*** 
(0.036) 
0.359*** 
0.078 
0.279*** 
0.079 
0.081*** 
0.015 
  
 
(Direct) Full 
 
(Indirect) Diff 
Notes: Dependent variable in Column 1 represents the logarithm of the amount of money in savings currently held by 
respondents. The answer to this question is reported on a discrete scale with seven tiers between 0 and more than 75,000 
USD. For each range we create a continuous variable equal to the central value; we set the variable equal to the 
threshold for the extreme values. Coefficients estimates using OLS regression model reported. Dependent variable in 
Column 2 takes the value 1 if the respondent engages in a lot of planning by consulting her budget, and 0 otherwise; 
coefficients and average marginal effects estimated through Probit reported. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively. All regressions include the vector of socioeconomic variables 
listed in the previous tables. Reference groups are: age between 35 and 54 (age), less than college (education), other 
employments (occupational status), medium income (income), house renter (housing property), Northeast (area of 
residence). 
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